Tag: Knowledge Systems

The Artist-Activist as Hero

Mashinka Firunts Hakopian imagines artists and artist-activists as heroic alternatives to mad scientists. The ones who teach best what we know about ourselves as learning machines.

“Artists, and artist-activists, have introduced new ways of knowing — ways of apprehending how learning machines learn, and what they do with what they know,” writes Hakopian. “In the process, they’ve…initiated learning machines into new ways of doing. They’ve explored the interiors of erstwhile black boxes and rendered them transparent. They’ve visualized algorithmic operations as glass boxes, exhibited in white cubes and public squares. They’ve engaged algorithms as co-creators, and carved pathways for collective authorship of unanticipated texts. Most saliently, artists have shown how we might visualize what is not yet here” (The Institute for Other Intelligences, p. 90).

This is what blooms here in my library: “blueprints and schemata of a forward-dawning futurity” (90).

The Inner Voice That Loves Me

Stretches, relaxes, massages neck and shoulders, gurgles “Yes!,” gets loose. Reads Armenian artist Mashinka Hakopian’s “Algorithmic Counter-Divination.” Converses with Turing and the General Intellect about O-Machines.

Appearing in an issue of Limn magazine on “Ghostwriters,” Hakopian’s essay explores another kind of O-machine: “other machines,” ones powered by community datasets. Trained by her aunt in tasseography, a matrilineally transmitted mode of divination taught and practiced by femme elders “across Armenia, Palestine, Lebanon, and beyond,” where “visual patterns are identified in coffee grounds left at the bottom of a cup, and…interpreted to glean information about the past, present, and future,” Hakopian takes this practice of her ancestors as her key example, presenting O-machines as technologies of ancestral intelligence that support “knowledge systems that are irreducible to computation.”

With O-machines of this sort, she suggests, what matters is the encounter, not the outcome.

In tasseography, for instance, the cup reader’s identification of symbols amid coffee grounds leads not to a simple “answer” to the querent’s questions, writes Hakopian; rather, it catalyzes conversation. “In those encounters, predictions weren’t instantaneously conjured or fixed in advance,” she writes. “Rather, they were collectively articulated and unbounded, prying open pluriversal outcomes in a process of reciprocal exchange.”

While defenders of western technoscience denounce cup reading for its superstition and its witchcraft, Hakopian recalls its place as a counter-practice among Armenian diasporic communities in the wake of the 1915 Armenian Genocide. For those separated from loved ones by traumas of that scale, tasseography takes on the character of what hauntologists like Derrida would call a “messianic” redemptive practice. “To divine the future in this context is a refusal to relinquish its writing to agents of colonial violence,” writes Hakopian. “Divination comes to operate as a tactic of collective survival, affirming futurity in the face of a catastrophic present.” Consulting with the oracle is a way of communing with the dead.

Hakopian contrasts this with the predictive capacities imputed to today’s AI. “We reside in an algo-occultist moment,” she writes, “in which divinatory functions have been ceded to predictive models trained to retrieve necropolitical outcomes.” Necropolitical, she adds, in the sense that algorithmic models “now determine outcomes in the realm of warfare, policing, housing, judicial risk assessment, and beyond.”

“The role once ascribed to ritual experts who interpreted the pronouncements of oracles is now performed by technocratic actors,” writes Hakopian. “These are not diviners rooted in a community and summoning communiqués toward collective survival, but charlatans reading aloud the results of a Ouija session — one whose statements they author with a magnetically manipulated planchette.”

Hakopian’s critique is in that sense consistent with the “deceitful media” school of thought that informs earlier works of hers like The Institute for Other Intelligences. Rather than abjure algorithmic methods altogether, however, Hakopian’s latest work seeks to “turn the annihilatory logic of algorithmic divination against itself.” Since summer of 2023, she’s been training a “multimodal model” to perform tasseography and to output bilingual predictions in Armenian and English.

Hakopian incorporated this model into “Բաժակ Նայող (One Who Looks at the Cup),” a collaborative art installation mounted at several locations in Los Angeles in 2024. The installation features “a purpose-built Armenian diasporan kitchen located in an indeterminate time-space — a re-rendering of the domestic spaces where tasseography customarily takes place,” notes Hakopian. Those who visit the installation receive a cup reading from the model in the form of a printout.

Yet, rather than offer outputs generated live by AI, Hakopian et al.’s installation operates very much in the style of a Mechanical Turk, outputting interpretations scripted in advance by humans. “The model’s only function is to identify visual patterns in a querent’s cup in order to retrieve corresponding texts,” she explains. “This arrangement,” she adds, “declines to cede authorship to an algo-occultist circle of ‘stochastic parrots’ and the diviners who summon them.”

The ”stochastic parrots” reference is an unfortunate one, as it assumes a stochastic cosmology.

I’m reminded of the first thesis from Walter Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” the one where Benjamin likens historical materialism to that very same precursor to today’s AI: the famous chess-playing device of the eighteenth century known as the Mechanical Turk.

“The story is told of an automaton constructed in such a way that it could play a winning game of chess, answering each move of an opponent with a countermove,” writes Benjamin. “A puppet in Turkish attire and with a hookah in its mouth sat before a chessboard placed on a large table. A system of mirrors created an illusion that this table was transparent from all sides. Actually, a little hunchback who was an expert chess player sat inside and guided the puppet’s hand by means of strings. One can imagine a philosophical counterpart to this device. The puppet called ‘historical materialism’ is to win all the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which today, as we know, is wizened and has to keep out of sight.” (Illuminations, p. 253).

Hakopian sees no magic in today’s AI. Those who hype it are to her no more than deceptive practitioners of a kind of “stage magic.” But magic is afoot throughout the history of computing for those who look for it.

Take Turing, for instance. As George Dyson reports, Turing “was nicknamed ‘the alchemist’ in boarding school” (Turing’s Cathedral, p. 244). His mother had “set him up with crucibles, retorts, chemicals, etc., purchased from a French chemist” as a Christmas present in 1924. “I don’t care to find him boiling heaven knows what witches’ brew by the aid of two guttering candles on a naked windowsill,” muttered his housemaster at Sherborne.

Turing’s O-machines achieve a synthesis. The “machine” part of the O-machine is not the oracle. Nor does it automate or replace the oracle. It chats with it.

Something similar is possible in our interactions with platforms like ChatGPT.

Saturday June 5, 2021

Yunkaporta describes his book Sand Talk as “an examination of global systems from an Indigenous perspective.” This is what we need, is it not? The Marxist literary theorist Fredric Jameson proposed that we call this thing we need a “cognitive map,” but Yunkaporta calls it “a template for living.” Reading the latter’s book, I’m reminded immediately of “songlines,” or “maps of story carrying knowledge along the lines of energy that manifest as Law in the mind and land as one, webbed throughout the traditional lands of the First Peoples.” Yunkaporta’s is a cosmology that allows for Elders and Ancestors, as well as “sentient totemic entities” and non-human kin. That cosmology clarifies, its form shimmers into being, when he writes, “Beings of higher intelligence are already here, always have been. They just haven’t used their intelligence to destroy anything yet. Maybe they will, if they tire of the incompetence of domesticated humans.” Most of us, he argues, have been displaced. History is a narrative of global diaspora, as most of us are “refugees” severed from the land-based cultures of origin of our Ancestors. Progress or healing occurs by revisiting “the brilliant thought paths of our Paleolithic Ancestors.” The ancients possessed cognitive functions that remain part of our evolutionary inheritance, but most of us remember no more than a fraction of these functions, our capacities stifled by our separation from the knowledge systems of Indigenous, land-based people. Through reading Yunkaporta’s book, one encounters “yarns.” Oral culture provides a lens through which to view the print-based knowledge systems of the Empire. Yunkaporta recognizes the challenges involved in such a project. “English,” he writes, “inevitably places settler worldviews at the centre of every concept, obscuring true understanding” (36). To communicate with the global system, Yunkaporta must write with “the inadequate English terms of his audience” (38) — but he makes the language work through “the meandering paths between the words, not the isolated words themselves” (37). “Dreaming” is an example of such a word: necessary, Yunkaporta notes, “unless you want to say, ‘supra-rational interdimensional ontology endogenous to custodial ritual complexes’ every five minutes” (38). Yunkaporta introduces “the dual first person…a common pronoun in Indigenous languages” (39) — and just like that, the Cave is behind us and we’re beginning to see the light. He translates it as “us-two.” Us-two’s fingers type those letters while with our mouths we say ngal.