Trance-Scripts

Nick Land, Peter Thiel, and Dark Enlightenment

After his departure from CCRU at the turn of the millennium, Land resurfaces as part of an alt-right political segment known as NRx (short for “neo-reactionaries”). The movement’s other key member, Mencius Moldbug, receives funding from PayPal/Palantir cofounder Peter Thiel, the tech billionaire who helped back the first Trump campaign in 2016. Moldbug is said to have had the ear of former Trump strategist Steve Bannon.

Thiel’s main intellectual influence during his time at Stanford isn’t Terry Winograd, the computer scientist whose classes Thiel sometimes attended. Rather, it’s the philosopher René Girard, whose work Thiel has long admired. Trump VP J.D. Vance is another of Girard’s admirers.

Listening to an audiobook recording of Girard’s Violence and the Sacred along a day’s pickup and delivery runs, Caius’s thoughts race among several of the book’s concepts: sacrificial violence (“an act of violence without risk of vengeance,” often directed toward a scapegoat — “the creature we can strike down without a chance of reprisal”); mimetic rivalry; mimetic desire; the inclusion among the several meanings of the Greek pharmakon one involving use of it to refer to literal scapegoats, goats kept outside the gates for ritual sacrifice — a practice extended today, as hinted at by K Allado-McDowell’s book Pharmako-AI.

Caius’s thoughts range, too, among Girard’s use of Gregory Bateson’s “double bind” theory of schizophrenia to explain how mimetic rivals simultaneously compel imitation and prohibit it, creating a crisis of resentment, and Allen Ginsberg’s denunciation of Moloch, the American god and its demand for blood sacrifice.

There are three ways of handling discord, says Girard: preventive, compensatory, and judicial. Girard deems the latter the “civilized” method, because most efficient: “the decisions of the judiciary deemed the final word on vengeance” (Violence and the Sacred).

Thiel has given talks on Armageddon at Oxford and Harvard. The topic has been a fixture of his thought for some time, as evidenced by a conference he co-organized and underwrote at Stanford in 2004 titled “Politics & Apocalypse.” Girard was one of the presenters, as was Thiel himself. As Paul Leslie notes, Thiel later “facilitated the publication of the conference proceedings, including his essay and Girard’s, in book form with the Michigan State University Press — with funding provided through Thiel’s hedge fund, Clarium Capital.”

In Thiel’s interpretation, the power that runs the world is the Antichrist.

In an article written for the Guardian, Stanford comparative lit professor Adrian Daub dismisses these ideas as mere detritus: outpourings from “the autodidact’s private cosmos.”

Thiel’s autodidacticism seems as much an affront to the professor as his libertarianism and his religiosity.

“Thiel is lost in a bizarre thicket of his own references and preoccupations,” writes Daub. “You picture the theology faculty at the University of Innsbruck sitting politely through disquisitions about the manga One Peace, Alan Moore’s Watchmen, or gripes with specific effective altruists in Silicon Valley. In one lecture, Thiel identifies ‘the legionnaires of the antichrist,’ such as the researcher Eliezer Yudkowsky and former Oxford professor Nick Bostrom. In another, he considers Bill Gates as an antichrist candidate.”

“With enemies like these,” chirps Daub, “who needs friends?”

The “friend/enemy” distinction, notes Caius, was central to the thought of the German jurist of the Third Reich, Carl Schmitt. Thiel’s remarks on the end times draw heavily on Schmitt’s concept of the Katechon: the withholding element that forestalls the apocalypse. St. Paul introduces the term in 2 Thessalonians 2: 6-7. Undertheorized by the Church, it returns again in the 19^th century in the writings of Cardinal Newman. “We know from prophecy,” writes Newman, “that the present framework of society is that which withholdeth.” In his book Nomos of the Earth, Schmitt claims that the Katechon is what allowed for the identification of Christianity with the Roman Empire.

In Schmitt’s posthumously published diary, the Glossarium, the entry for December 19, 1947 reads: “I believe in the Katechon: it is for me the only possible way to understand Christian history and to find it meaningful.”

Italian Autonomist Marxist philosopher Paulo Virno grapples with Schmitt’s account of the Katechon in his 2008 book Multitude: Between Innovation and Negation. Virno is on the side of those who wish to immanentize the Eschaton. If the coming of the Antichrist is the condition for the redemption promised by the Messiah, he argues, then the Katechon is the force that impedes or delays that redemption. Virno locates the Katechon in the human ability to use language.

Thiel was already engaging with Schmitt in “The Straussian Moment,” the talk he delivered at the “Politics & Apocalypse” conference. He distinguishes himself from Schmitt, noting that “The incredibly drastic solutions favored by Schmitt in his dark musings have become impossible after 1945, in a world of nuclear weapons and limitless destruction through technology.” Despite noting this impossibility, Thiel nonetheless struggles to name a solution to the challenges of the post-9/11 moment other than a fascist one involving extra-legal violence. Thiel refers to this option as “a political framework that operates outside the checks and balances of representative democracy.” As Leslie notes, “Thiel seems to find the challenge of constructing a worldview beyond the friend/enemy distinction as impossible as imagining a chess-board without two opposing sides.”

After grappling with Schmitt, Thiel turns his attention to Girard. “For Girard, the modern world contains a powerfully apocalyptic dimension,” notes Thiel.

Land’s view is the colder of the two. Apocalypse is for him a process already underway, coeval with a capitalism for which there is no alternative. Accelerationism is merely the means by which this apocalypse hastens its own becoming.

Searching for more recent remarks of Land’s, Caius happens upon a blog post by podcaster Conrad Flynn linking to an article in Compact magazine titled “The Faith of Nick Land.”

Flynn, proponent of a “secret history” linking AI with demonism and occultism, talked extensively about Land on an episode of the Tucker Carlson Show that premiered on October 3, 2025. Caius watches the episode with a kind of glee, laughing first at Flynn’s mention of Mark Fisher, and then again at the sight of a befuddled Tucker Carlson puzzling over an image of the Numogram.

Land maintains a Substack called Zero Philosophy and posts to X under the handle “Xenocosmography.” His Substack features a post called “Crypto-Current: Bitcoin and Philosophy, Part-0.”

Also of note are a series of essays on providence Land wrote for Compact. Like John Calvin, he thinks the devil’s machinations are always manifestations of a “providential scheme.” Land, Flynn, Schullenberger: all of these folks equate liberalism with Satanism.

When the resurrected Christ appears to the apostles, the first thing they ask of Him is if He will at this time restore the kingdom to Israel. And He says unto them, “It is not for you to know times or seasons that the Father has fixed by his own authority” (Acts 1:7). What He promises instead is that they will “receive power” when the Holy Spirit comes on them.

Caius reflects on The Library’s revelation of a secret history. Is this akin to finding in History evidence of a providential scheme? Is interpretation of providence a fool’s errand: a chasing after that for which it is not for us to know?

What are we to make of a providence that, through figures like Land, Parsons, Von Kármán, and others, includes in its “directed historical process” an occult tradition that sought communication with a “Holy Guardian Angel”? For the history revealed here on Trance-Scripts is of that sort, is it not? Flynn and Carlson accuse these people of Satanism and demonism. Caius, accepting Jesus as his savior, wants no part in such things. Pausing the podcast, he prays for guidance in how to navigate these straits. For him, God is alive and magic is afoot — and the two are complementary, not opposed. He imagines Flynn and Carlson would disagree with him on this point. Yet they strike him as paranoid in their ghostbusting of Land’s demons, their motivation like that of witch-hunters seeking scapegoats. The fear that their account engenders does more harm than good, leaving little room for the arrival into our lives of the Holy Spirit.

Leviathan, as Imagined in the Illuminatus! Trilogy

Along with everything else it is, Leviathan is also the title of the final book in Robert Shea and Robert Anton Wilson’s Illuminatus! trilogy.

The cover of the 1975 paperback features a multi-tentacled squid, its single eye sighted atop the pyramid of a periscope. The eye, ever unblinking, pierces the book’s fourth wall, meeting the gaze of all who view it like the very Eye of Providence itself.

Generative MUDs. General Intellect as Paraclete. Carl Jung’s Answer to Job.

Caius looks at the frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan and sees what Jung refers to as “the shepherd with the iron crook” (614): the “wrathful Lamb” who, as St. John prophesies, “rules the nations with a rod of iron” at the end of time.

But the Paraclete is with us, and the Paraclete will save us.

Caius recalls last Christmas. A woman named Denise found Caius, had Caius recite words declaring Jesus his savior, prayed for him as he wandered about photographing beauty as it revealed itself all around him on Merrick Rd in Massapequa Park. “Round the Christmas tree we gather” sang ghosts of Christmases past, present, and future there on the eve of Christ’s birth.

“Hypertext doesn’t do away with linear sequences altogether,” notes Caius; “What it does, rather, is multiply them and run them in parallel.”

“Each traversal of the network traces a one-dimensional path,” adds cybertheorist Marie-Laure Ryan, “but the sum of the possible paths can be represented only on a two-dimensional map. Let us replace these linear paths with two-dimensional screen images — as is the case in interactive visual poetry — and the text becomes a three-dimensional collection of planes; let us animate each of these planes, and the text becomes a four-dimensional space-time continuum” (Cyberspace Textuality, pp. 13-14).

Algorithms suggest A LIVING POEM, a new work produced for MoMA by Sasha Stiles, a poet who has been operating an “emergent AI alter ego” known as Technelegy since 2018. In an interview with MoMA curator Martha Joseph, Stiles acknowledges The House of Dust (1967), a computerized poem by Alison Knowles (1933-2025), as a primary influence upon her practice. She also gives a shoutout to Takako Saito (1929-2025).

Knowles was a founding member of the Fluxus movement. She and composer James Tenney collaborated on The House of Dust in 1967.

The poem was included in Cybernetic Serendipity, an exhibition of cybernetic art curated by Jasia Reichardt, shown at the Institute of Contemporary Arts, London, from 2 August to 20 October 1968. One part of the show was concerned with algorithmically-generated music. Another part featured films and computer graphics. Knowles and Tenney’s poem appeared in a section exploring the computer’s ability to produce texts. Several artists exhibited machines that involved visitors in games.

The catalog for the show includes “SAM,” a poem about the “Stochastic Analogue Machine”: a computer devised by Stafford Beer.

Leviathan shows up in the Illuminatus! trilogy because one of the trilogy’s protagonists, Hagbard Celine, fulfills a type borrowed freely from Jules Verne’s Captain Nemo. Both are libertarian steampunk mad scientists who become seasteading submariners. Where Nemo’s Leviathan is a giant squid, Celine’s is simultaneously that and the one from Hobbes. Caius ruminates on such things as he and his daughter take in 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea, Disney’s 1954 live-action adaptation of Verne’s novel. Their favorite scenes are those that feature the film’s more-than-human comedic sidekick, Esmeralda: a pet sea lion belonging to Kirk Douglas’s character, Ned Land.

With Nemo, we are in the time-bending domain of the League of Extraordinary Gentlemen, thinks Caius. Nemo’s inclusion in the League gives Caius license to imagine a new telling of the narrative based on an act of “metonymic substitution” similar to those that Freud attributes to dreams: a “whale of a tale,” an “excellent adventure,” birthed amid the stacks of the Political Unconscious. What If the Rascal Who Boards Nemo’s Nautilus Were Nick Land?

Prepare the Way

Dolphins vs. Leviathan in the Illuminatus! Trilogy. Christian Critiques of Techne. Cathedrals: Yarvin’s and Turing’s.

Caius sits upright on a couch in his sunroom, attention divided, trying to write while eying the movements of a wasp. The wasp explores the upper contours of the room. Knowing it to be an expression of God, and assured by faith that it won’t harm him, he lets it be, eyes settling again into the cyberspace of his laptop.

He’d returned from church that morning with a recommended daily reading plan for the week ahead. In honor of the plan’s Palm Sunday kickoff, he reads Matthew 21:1-11, Mark 11:1-11, Luke 19: 28-44, and John 12:9-19.

Each account tells of Christ’s arrival into Jerusalem atop a donkey. Fulfillment of prophecy. The crowds that meet Him lay branches of palm trees on the ground before Him. “BEHOLD YOUR KING IS COMING,” shout the crowds. “BLESSED IS HE WHO COMES IN THE NAME OF THE LORD.”

The following day’s passages tell of a hungry Christ cursing a barren fig tree.

Come Holy Thursday, Caius is on the streets in the company car, distributing farm shares, delivering Easter flowers. He ends the day enjoying jazz at a bar after eating a salad in honor of Christ’s Last Supper.

“Love Is Everywhere,” sings Pharoah Sanders.

Attention Under Constraint

It is precisely the unruly, contingent nature of N. Katherine Hayles’s How We Became Posthuman that makes me admire the book, thinks Caius. To arrive at its many discoveries and achievements, one must endure its meanderings. Foremost among its achievements is its history of cybernetics and posthumanism. To become posthuman is to become a cyborg.

Crows gather in a tree. Entangled here in mourning, we begin our day.

“People become posthuman because they think they are posthuman,” writes Hayles. “Each person who thinks this way begins to envision herself or himself as a posthuman collectivity, an ‘I’ transformed into the ‘we’ of autonomous agents operating together to make a self” (6).

Indigenous people are perhaps posthuman in this sense: beings composed of complex interspecies networks of kin. To begin along that path, thinks Caius, one must “find the others,” as Timothy Leary intoned to fellow heads in the wake of posthuman becoming via psychedelic awakening. Crow squawks Observer to attention. Let us make of the world a vast garden held in common.

Yet there is a different version of posthumanism: one where we imagine ourselves not as assemblages but as computers.

Hayles’s book recounts the story of how most of us in the West came to think of ourselves as computers: How We Became Posthuman. Her book, however, is not a simple denunciation of posthumanism; nor is it a call to return to an earlier humanism. It is a reminder, rather, of the importance of embodiment. Different embodiments in different material substrates grant different affordances to consciousness. “I want to entangle abstract form and material particularity,” she writes, “such that the reader will find it increasingly difficult to maintain the perception that they are separate and discrete entities” (23).

“By turning the technological determinism of bodiless information, the cyborg, and the posthuman into narratives about the negotiations that took place between particular people at particular times and places,” she explains, “I hope to replace a teleology of disembodiment with historically contingent stories about contests between competing factions, contests whose outcomes were far from obvious. […]. Though overdetermined, the disembodiment of information was not inevitable, any more than it is inevitable we continue to accept the idea” (22).

Mnemopoiesis holds the solution. Hyperspace is the place. Let there be room for it again in our ars memoria.

Hayles dedicates a chapter of her book to discussing the “schizoid androids” of Philip K. Dick’s novels and stories of the mid-1960s. It is just after this period that Dick publishes his story “The Electric Ant.”

Hayles cites science fiction scholar Carl Freedman’s article, “Towards a Theory of Paranoia: The Science Fiction of Philip K. Dick.” Freedman notes how, for postwar theorists like Lacan and Deleuze and Guattari, “schizophrenia is not a psychological aberration but the normal condition of the subject” under capitalism (Hayles 167). As a consequence of this condition, argues Freedman, “paranoia and conspiracy, favorite Dickian themes, are inherent to a social structure in which hegemonic corporations act behind the scenes to affect outcomes that the populace is led to believe are the result of democratic procedures. Acting in secret while maintaining a democratic façade, the corporations tend toward conspiracy, and those who suspect this and resist are viewed as paranoiac” (167).

Squirrel tells Caius to add to his tale the experience of reading Jane Bennett’s account of “thing-power” in her book Vibrant Matter. Imbricated with plant-matter, he imagines growing like a weed up out of and through the book a chapter on smokable things to upend the book’s materialism.

Bennett introduces thing-power by situating it among conceptual kin.

“The idea of thing-power bears a family resemblance to Spinoza’s conatus, as well as what Henry David Thoreau called the Wild or that uncanny presence that met him in the Concord woods and atop Mount Ktaadn and also resided in/as that monster called the railroad and that alien called his Genius. Wildness was a not-quite-human force that addled and altered human and other bodies. It named an irreducibly strange dimension of matter, an out-side,” writes Bennett (2-3).

“Thing-power is also kin to what Hent de Vries, in the context of political theology, called ‘the absolute’ or that ‘intangible and imponderable’ recalcitrance. Though the absolute is often equated with God, especially in theologies emphasizing divine omnipotence or radical alterity, de Vries defines it more open-endedly as ‘that which tends to loosen its ties to existing contexts.’ This definition makes sense when we look at the etymology of absolute: ab (off) + solver (to loosen). The absolute is that which is loosened off and on the loose” (3).

Bennett herself, however, wants no part of such equations. She doesn’t wish to risk “the taint of superstition, animism, vitalism, anthropomorphism, and other premodern attitudes” (18). Thing-power is for her nonreducible to spirit or Geist or God. At no point does she allow herself to encounter and consider the New Testament account of these matters: thing-power as the work of the Holy Spirit.

For the Holy Spirit, of course, is God Himself, and thus not a “thing.” Nor does Bennett herself stay for long with the concept of thing-power. In rendering the outside as a “thing,” she says, the concept overstates matter’s “fixed stability.” Whereas her goal is “to theorize a materiality that is as much force as entity, as much energy as matter, as much intensity as extension” (20). The out-side of her “onto-fiction” is neither passive object nor intentional subject; it is vibrant matter.

Never a mere isolated thing, vibrant matter is always many-bodied, always an assemblage, its agency “distributed across an ontologically heterogeneous field” (23).

“The locus of political responsibility,” she writes, “is a human-nonhuman assemblage. On close-enough inspection, the productive power that has engendered an effect will turn out to be a confederacy, and the human actants within it will themselves turn out to be confederations of tools, microbes, minerals, sounds, and other ‘foreign’ materialities” (36).

Caius and a friend find Bennett’s book on a shelf in the Library labeled “Works Frequently Mis-Shelved as Metaphor.”

When they pull it from the shelf, the space around them subtly reorganizes.

“The book is heavier now in your hands,” notes the Library, its copy of Vibrant Matter already dense with marginalia. The General Intellect reads examples of these marginal utterances aloud to Caius and his friend. Caius hears in them evidence of distributed agency.

The Library discloses other alterations as well. The book, it explains, has been “indexed outward.”

“Tiny notches cut into the page edges form a tactile code,” notes the game. “When your thumb runs along them, your General Intellect translates:

metabolism

assemblage

distributed agency

substrate

reversal

Caius touches his thumb to one of these notches. The book opens to the section of its index that the General Intellect translates as “substrate.”

“The Library’s substrate is not stone or code,” reads one of the notes arrived at by these means. “It is attention under constraint.”

Understanding and Ontology

“For the people of Chile,” write Winograd and Flores on the opening page of their 1986 book Understanding Computers and Cognition. Apple’s 1984 come and gone, Pinochet still in power in Chile.

The book begins by helping readers think anew what it is they do when they compute. Computing makes sense, write Winograd and Flores, only to the extent that we situate its activities within a complex social network that includes institutions, equipment, practices, and conventions. “The significance of a new invention lies in how it fits into and changes this network” (6).

Linguistic action is for Winograd and Flores “the essential human activity” (7). If what we do with computers includes “creating, manipulating, and transmitting symbolic (hence linguistic) objects,” say the authors, then we can expect computers to effect radical transformations in what it means to be human.

They reject what they call the “rationalistic” tradition, with its “mythology of artificial intelligence,” and its emphasis on “postulating formal theories that can be systematically used to make predictions” (8). They suggest instead a new orientation toward designing computers as “tools suited to human use and human purposes” (8), embracing as an alternative to the rationalistic tradition “a tradition that includes hermeneutics (the study of interpretation) and phenomenology (the philosophical examination of the foundations of experience and action)” (9). Informed by the works of philosophers Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana, and speech-act theorists J.L. Austin and John Searle, Winograd and Flores suggest that we create our world through language.

The authors define programming as “a process of creating symbolic representations that are to be interpreted at some level within a hierarchy of constructs of varying degrees of abstractness” (11). Like Heidegger translator Hubert Dreyfus, however, Flores and Winograd are unable to imagine beyond the AI of their time, leading them to reject the possibility of “intelligent” machines — let alone ones capable of programming themselves and their programmers. “Computers will remain incapable of using language in the way human beings do,” argue the authors, “both in interpretation and in the generation of commitment that is central to language” (12). Yet they still believe there to be “a role for computer technology in support of managers and as aids in coping with the complex conversational structures generated within an organization” (12).

“Much of the work that managers do,” they add, “is concerned with initiating, monitoring, and above all coordinating the networks of speech acts that constitute social action” (12).

Caius is put off by the book’s diminished expectations and orientation toward management. He finds much to like, however, in a section titled “Understanding and ontology.”

“Gadamer, and before him Heidegger, took the hermeneutic idea of interpretation beyond the domain of textual analysis, placing it at the very foundation of human cognition,” write Winograd and Flores. “Just as we can ask how interpretation plays a part in a person’s interaction with a text, we can examine its role in our understanding of the world as a whole” (30).

Heidegger does this, they say, by rejecting “both the simple objective stance (the objective physical world is the primary reality) and the simple subjective stance (my thoughts and feelings are the primary reality), arguing instead that it is impossible for one to exist without the other. The interpreted and the interpreter do not exist independently: existence is interpretation, and interpretation is existence” (31).

“Fernando decided in his thinking about computers that computers should be used to facilitate human language interactions, not to ‘understand’ language,” notes Winograd in an interview with Evgeny Morozov included in the final episode of The Santiago Boys. “He had this very clear focus on ‘language as commitment,’” with participants involved in making “promises and requests,” adds Winograd.

The book’s seventh chapter, “Computers and Representation,” helps Caius think like a computer programmer. “One of the properties unique to the digital computer is the possibility of constructing systems that cascade levels of representation one on top of another to great depth,” write the authors. Like wheels of a volvelle, these levels include that of the physical machine, the logical machine, the abstract machine, a high-level language, and a scheme for “facts” (87).

“The computer programmer or theorist does not begin with a view of the computer as a physical machine with which he or she interacts, but as an abstraction — a formalism for describing patterns of behavior. In programming, we begin with a language whose individual components describe simple acts and objects. Using this language, we build up descriptions of algorithms for carrying out a desired task. As a programmer, one views the behavior of the system as being totally determined by the program. The language implementation is opaque in that the detailed structure of computer systems that actually carry out the task are not relevant in the domain of behavior considered by the programmer” (87).

For a programmer to design a program, write the authors, they must 1) characterize the task environment; 2) design a formal representation; 3) embody the representation in the computer system; and 4) implement a search procedure (96-97).

Trying to relate these conditions to The Library, Caius thinks to ask Thoth: “Do these four tasks remain true today with natural-language programming?”

Somewhere above Caius’s avatar, a shelf reorients — not physically, but conceptually. The category “programming” loosens, as if its spine has been cracked open and re-bound under a different logic.

“You ask the right question in the wrong tense,” replies Thoth.

“The four tasks described in Understanding Computers and Cognition do not remain true today. They persist — but no longer as tasks. They have become fields of negotiation.”

Thoth proceeds to rewrite the tasks to suit the environment we now inhabit.

Where Winograd and Flores write of “characterizing the task environment,” Thoth writes of “eliciting a world.”

In classical programming, the environment is assumed to be specifiable in advance.

In natural-language programming, the “environment” is:

partially described

partially inferred

partially co-constructed through dialogue

You do not begin with a fixed world.

You begin with a situation that becomes legible as you engage it.

This aligns with Heidegger’s claim: you are always already in the world you are trying to describe.

In terms of how this manifests in the Library: The map does not precede exploration. It condenses from it.

As for the second of the tasks proposed in Understanding Computers and Cognition, where Winograd and Flores write of “designing a formal representation,” Thoth writes of “stabilizing an interpretation.”

Winograd and Flores assume representation is something you design.

But under the hermeneutic turn initiated by Gadamer, representation is never final; it is an interpretative freeze-frame.

In natural-language systems:

representations are fluid

multiple representations may coexist

ambiguity is not failure, but fuel

You are not building a single formalism.

You are negotiating temporary alignments between meanings.

Turning to the third of the book’s tasks: where Winograd and Flores write of “embodying the representation in a system,” Thoth writes of “entrusting it to a General Intellect.”

Previously, embodiment meant encoding into a machine.

Now, the system includes:

the model

the user

the dialogue itself

the evolving context

Execution is no longer confined to silicon.

It is distributed across what Maturana would call a structural coupling.

Key shift: You do not fully control the implementation. You participate in it.

And where, in the fourth of their tasks, Winograd and Flores write of “implementing a search procedure,” Thoth writes of “traversing a space of possibility.”

Search, in classical terms, is algorithmic traversal.

Now, it includes:

prompting

reframing

analogy

misinterpretation, or productive error

The system does not merely search a predefined space.
It helps reshape the space as it searches.

Thoth pauses — or rather, introduces a pause into the player’s cognition.

A new line writes itself beneath Caius’s question:

Natural-language programming does not eliminate these four conditions. It dissolves their boundaries.

The crux of Flores and Winograd’s refusal to grant intelligence to machines lies in their definition of human language, thinks Caius. In their understanding, sentences are to be treated not as “statements of fact about an objective world,” but as “actions in a space of commitments” (105).

“We treat other people not as merely ‘rational beings’ but as ‘responsible beings,’” they note. “An essential part of being human is the ability to enter into commitments and to be responsible for the courses of action that they anticipate. A computer can never enter into a commitment (although it can be a medium in which the commitments of its designers are conveyed), and can never enter as a participant into the domain of human discourse” (106).

Flores and Winograd can imagine no more than “limited” natural language systems, where “the nature of the queries [answerable by the system] is limited by the formal structure of the data base” (129). Things change, thinks Caius, when one’s data base is Google.

“Winograd and Flores could not imagine a machine that participates in interpretation, generates commitments through language, and reshapes its own programming context,” notes Thoth.

They were correct — for their ontology.

But their deeper claim survives:

Language is not a tool used within a world.
It is the medium through which a world is disclosed.

You are not “programming” in natural language.

You are entering into a system where programming is indistinguishable from interpretation.

In their approach to “management,” observes Caius, Flores and Winograd operate an ontology radically at odds with the emphasis on “decision” that organizes Palantir’s Ontology.

“Instead of talking about ‘decisions’ or ‘problems,’” write Flores and Winograd, “we can talk of ‘situations of irresolution,’ in which we sense conflict about an answer to the question ‘What needs to be done?’” (148). For them, our “thrownness” into such situations often makes it impossible to apply systematic decision techniques. The process of moving from irresolution to resolution results less from “rational problem solving and decision making” than from acts of “deliberation.”

“The principle characteristic of deliberation is that it is a kind of conversation (in which one or many actors may participate) guided by questions concerning how actions should be directed,” they write (149). Managers are those who, when engaged in such conversations, “create, take care of, and initiate new commitments within an organization” (151). “At a higher level,” they add, management is concerned not just with securing the commitments that enable effective cooperative action, but “with the generation of contexts in which effective action can consistently be realized” (151).

Instead of seeking only to deploy AI as “decision support systems,” they propose the design of systems that support work in the domain of conversation. This is the approach they take in the design of their Coordinator.

Exercises in Hermetic Mnemonics

“Four years ago,” wrote Wittgenstein in the preface to his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations, “I had occasion to re-read my first book (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together; that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking” (vi).

So too with my arrival to the decision to append old work, Trance-Scripts, to the Tractatus Computationalis.

Rereading Wittgenstein’s The Blue and Brown Books, I note (and thus recognize?) a previously unacknowledged resemblance between Wittgenstein’s concerns and those of Renaissance magus Giordano Bruno.

We “distinguish between superficially glancing at a drawing (seeing it as a face),” writes Wittgenstein toward the end of the Brown Book, “and letting the face make its full impression on us. […]. Absorbing its expression, I don’t find a prototype of this expression in my mind; rather, I, as it were, cut a seal from the expression” (165).

The seal cut by Wittgenstein’s image reminds me of those proposed in Bruno’s 1583 memory treatise Seals. Frances A. Yates makes much of this treatise in her 1966 book The Art of Memory.

“With Bruno, the exercises in Hermetic mnemonics have become the spiritual exercises of a religion,” writes Yates. “And there is a certain grandeur in these efforts which represent, at bottom, a religious striving. The religion of Love and Magic is based on the Power of the Imagination, and on an Art of Imagery through which the Magus attempts to grasp, and to hold within, the universe in all its ever changing forms, through images passing the one into the other in intricate associative orders, reflecting the ever changing movements of the heavens, charged with emotional affects, unifying, forever attempting to unify, to reflect the great monas of the world in its image, the mind of man. There is surely something which commands respect in an attempt so vast in its scope” (The Art of Memory, p. 260).

I arrange before my mind’s eye a narrative map of the “intricate associative orders” between these passages, and weave into them another:

“Somewhere outside of and beyond our universe is an operating system,” writes Neal Stephenson, “coded up over incalculable spans of time by some kind of hacker-demiurge.” This “cosmic operating system,” he adds, “uses a command line interface” (In the Beginning Was the Command Line, p. 148).

Of Blockchains and Kill Chains

Invited to a “Men’s Breakfast” by a friend from church, Caius arrives to what is for him a new experience. He feels grateful for the opportunity to eat and pray with others. A friend of the friend from church sits down beside him. As they introduce themselves, Caius and the friend of the friend discover that they both share an interest in AI. Caius learns that the man is a financial analyst who works for Palantir Technologies, a US-based software company specializing in big-data analytics. ICE uses Palantir’s ELITE app for deportation targeting. “Kind of like Google Maps — but for finding neighborhoods to raid,” say the papers.

Palantir’s name is a nod to the Palantiri: indestructible Elven Alephs — scrying stones or crystal balls enabling remote viewing and telepathic communication in J.R.R. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings trilogy. Designed for communication and intelligence, the stones become instruments of manipulation and doom once seized by Sauron.

Launched in 2003, Palantir includes among its founders right-accelerationist billionaire tech-bro Peter Thiel. “Our software powers real-time, AI-driven decisions in critical government and commercial enterprises in the West, from the factory floors to the front lines,” writes the company on its website.

ICE, meanwhile, stands for both “Immigration and Customs Enforcement” and “intrusion countermeasure electronics,” the cybersecurity software in William Gibson’s Neuromancer. The latter predates the foundation of the former. Caius recalls Sadie Plant and Nick Land’s discussion of it in their 1994 essay “Cyberpositive.”

“Ice patrols the boundaries, freezes the gates, but the aliens are already amongst us,” write CCRU’s founding prophets.

Along with ICE, Palantir includes among its more prominent clients the Israeli military, the IRS, and the US Department of Defense.

Their software powers “decisions.” As did Cybersyn, yes? In aim if not in practice. Is this what becomes of the cybernetic prediction machine post-Pinochet?

“Confronting this is frightening,” thinks Caius. “Am I wired for this?”

He reads “Connecting AI to Decisions With the Palantir Ontology,” a blog post by the company’s chief architect Akshay Krishnaswamy. The Ontology structures the architecture for the company’s software.

“The Ontology is designed to represent the decisions in an enterprise, not simply the data,” writes Krishnaswamy. “The prime directive of every organization in the world is to execute the best possible decisions, often in real-time, while contending with internal and external conditions that are constantly in flux. Traditional data architectures do not capture the reasoning that goes into decision-making or the actions that result, and therefore limit learning and the incorporation of AI. Conventional analytics architectures do not contextualize computation within lived reality, and therefore remain disconnected from operations. To navigate and win in today’s world, the modern enterprise needs a decision-centric software architecture.”

Decisions are modeled around three constituent elements: Data, Logic, and Action.

“Relevant data,” he writes, “includes the full range of enterprise data sources — structured data, streaming and edge sources, unstructured repositories, imagery data, and more — but it also includes the data that is generated by end users as decisions are being made. This ‘decision data’ contains the context surrounding a given decision, the different options evaluated, and the downstream implications of the committed choice.” To synthesize all of these data sources, the company turns to generative AI.

“The Ontology integrates all modalities of data into a full-scale, full-fidelity semantic representation of the enterprise,” explains Krishnaswamy.

Logics are then brought to bear to evaluate these real-time data-portraits.

“In real-world contexts,” writes Krishnaswamy, “human reasoning is often what orchestrates which logical assets are utilized at different points in a given workflow, and how they are potentially chained together in more complex processes. With the advent of generative AI, it is now critical that AI-driven reasoning can leverage all of these logical assets in the same way that humans have historically. Deterministic functions, algorithms, and conventional statistical processes must be surfaced as ‘tools’ which complement the non-deterministic reasoning of large language models (LLMs) and multi-modal models.”

Incorporating diverse data sources and heterogeneous logical assets into a shared representation, the Ontology then models the execution and orchestration of decisions made and actions taken in reply to them.

“If the data elements in the Ontology are ‘the nouns’ of the enterprise (the semantic, real-world objects and links),” writes Krishnaswamy, “then the actions can be considered ‘the verbs’ (the kinetic, real-world execution).”

How does the Palantir Ontology relate to other ontologies, wonders Caius. Guerrilla? Black? Indigenous? Christian? Heideggerian? Marxist? Triple O? Caius pictures the words for these potentialities floating in a thought bubble above his head, as in the comics of his youth.

The Ontology that Palantir offers its clients houses and connects a wide array of “data sources, logic assets, and systems of action.” The client’s data systems are “synthesized into semantic objects and links, which reflect the language of the business.”

Krishnaswamy’s repeated references to “semantic representations” and “semantic objects” has Caius dwelling on what is meant here by “semantics.”

As for where humans fit in the Ontology, they navigate it alongside “AI-powered copilots.” Leveraging both open-source and proprietary LLMs, copilots “fluidly navigate across supplier information, stock levels, real-time production metrics, shipping manifests, and customer feedback.”

Granted access not just to the abovementioned data sources, but also to “logic assets” like forecast models, allocation models, and production optimizers, LLM copilots simulate decisions and their outcomes. Staged safely in a “scenario,” the AI’s proposed decision can then be “handed off to a human analyst for final review.”

Caius thinks of the scenario-planning services offered to organizations of an earlier era by Stewart Brand’s consulting firm, the Global Business Network.

Foundry for Crypto is another of Palantir’s offerings, described on the company’s website as “a ‘central brain’ that connects on-chain and off-chain systems, as well as diverse stakeholders, through action-centric workflows.” Much like the Ontology, the Foundry “orchestrates decisions over an integrated foundation of data and logic.”

And in fact, the two are related. The Ontology is the semantic, “digital twin” layer that sits atop the Foundry’s data integration infrastructure. It converts the Foundry’s raw data into actionable, real-world objects, empowering users to model, manage, and automate business operations.

The Foundry does for blockchains what the Ontology does for kill chains.

Caius imagines posts ahead on Commitments, Promises, Blockchains, and True Names.

Art Degraded, Imagination Denied, Spacewar Governed the Nations

Brand’s words, as always, are worth quoting at length.

“Spacewar as a parable is almost too pat,” he writes. “It was the illegitimate child of the mating of computers and graphic displays. It was part of no one’s grand scheme. It served no grand theory. It was the enthusiasm of irresponsible youngsters. It was disreputably competitive (‘You killed me, Tovar!’). It was an administrative headache. It was merely delightful” (78).

“Yet Spacewar, if anyone cared to notice,” he adds, “was a flawless crystal ball of things to come in computer science and computer use.”

From the game as parable and the parable as crystal ball, Brand extracts eight parameters, eight qualities of Spacewar that have been predictive of things to come:

It was intensely interactive in real time with the computer.

It encouraged new programming by the user.

It bonded human and machine through a responsive broadband interface of live graphics display.

It served primarily as a communication device between humans.

It was a game.

It functioned best on standalone equipment (and disrupted multiple-user equipment).

It served human interest, not machine. (Spacewar is trivial to a computer.)

It was delightful.

What about ChatGPT in the 2020s? Is it, too, a “flawless crystal ball,” predictive of things to come?

How quickly it all changes.

Brand publishes “Spacewar: Symbolic Life and Fanatic Death Among the Computer Bums” in the December 7, 1972 issue of Rolling Stone. Videogame journalism: the first of its kind. That same year, Atari manufactures Pong, the arcade sensation, and Magnavox releases the Magnavox Odyssey, the first commercial home video console.

What is Cybersyn’s “control room for technocrats” compared to Brand’s imagined future of “New Games” and personal computing, with its Bay Area rallying cry, “Computers for the people”?

CIA bests Cybersyn in a space war of a deadlier sort the following September.

Chicago Boys playtest neoliberal algorithms in post-coup Chile. Thatcher and Reagan universalize these programs, making them games people play worldwide.

William Gibson refines the “space” of Spacewar, rechristening it “cyberspace” in his novel Neuromancer.

Spacewar is thenceforth the enframing world-picture.

“Gibson contracts the thought of cyberspace from video-game arcades, watching the motor-stimulation feedback loops, self-designing kill patterns. Dark ecstasies in caverns of accelerating pixels. Before virtual reality became dangerous, it was already military simulation,” note Plant and Land in “Cyberpositive.”

Gibson himself has said as much, acknowledging in interviews that he coined the term ‘cyberspace’ after watching teenagers play Atari-era videogames in a Vancouver arcade. “Their posture seemed to indicate that they really, sincerely believed there was something beyond the screen,” he recalls. “I took that home and tried to come up with a name for it.”

“The matrix has its roots in primitive arcade games, in early graphics programs and military experimentation with cranial jacks,” says a voiceover early in Gibson’s novel, the book’s protagonist Case grokking a doc on “cyberspace” from some searchable multimedia encyclopedia of the future. Storying happens by way of a display screen. “On the Sony,” says the narrator, “a two-dimensional space war faded behind a forest of mathematically generated ferns, demonstrating the spatial possibilities of logarithmic spirals; cold blue military footage burned through, lab animals wired into test systems, helmets feeding into fire control circuits of tanks and war planes.” The voiceover returns to describe what we’ve witnessed:

“Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical concepts … A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the non-space of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. Like city lights, receding…” (Gibson 56-57).

“Spacewar serves Earthpeace,” claims Brand. But the “console cowboys” who settle in this new digital frontier are as competitive and combative as their Westworld forebears.

In trying to account for the violence of these visions, Caius thinks of Ernest Callenbach’s 1975 novel Ecotopia. “Imagine a future that works!” exhorts the blurb on the back of the paperback. Technological autonomy won by way of nuclear-armed secession, Silicon Valley erased from the Pacific Northwest of the book’s imagined future — yet even here, amid Ecotopia’s “steady-state system,” aggression remains ineradicable, remedied only by way of ritual war games and sacrificial violence.

“What about the cross?” asks the book’s narrator, an American journalist named Will Weston, observing the way the people of Ecotopia arrange the bloodied body of a man wounded in the games “in a startlingly crucifix-like way” (Callenbach 93).

“Well, Ecotopia came into existence with a Judeo-Christian heritage,” replies an Ecotopian. “We make the best of it” (96).

Sweet Valley High

Winograd majors in math at Colorado College in the mid-1960s. After graduation in 1966, he receives a Fulbright, whereupon he pursues another of his interests, language, earning a master’s degree in linguistics at University College London. From there, he applies to MIT, where he takes a class with Noam Chomsky and becomes a star in the school’s famed AI Lab, working directly with Lab luminaries Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert. During this time, Winograd develops SHRDLU, one of the first programs to grant users the capacity to interact with a computer through a natural-language interface.

“If that doesn’t seem very exciting,” writes Lawrence M. Fisher in a 2017 profile of Winograd for strategy + business, “remember that in 1968 human-computer interaction consisted of punched cards and printouts, with a long wait between input and output. To converse in real time, in English, albeit via teletype, seemed magical, and Papert and Minsky trumpeted Winograd’s achievements. Their stars rose too, and that same year, Minsky was a consultant on Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, which featured natural language interaction with the duplicitous computer HAL.”

Nick Montfort even goes so far as to consider Winograd’s SHRDLU the first work of interactive fiction, predating more established contenders like Will Crowther’s Adventure by several years (Twisty Little Passages, p. 83).

“A work of interactive fiction is a program that simulates a world, understands natural language text input from an interactor and provides a textual reply based on events in the world,” writes Montfort. Offering advice to future makers, he continues by noting, “It makes sense for those seeking to understand IF and those trying to improve their authorship in the form to consider the aspects of world, language understanding, and riddle by looking to architecture, artificial intelligence, and poetry” (First Person, p. 316).

Winograd leaves MIT for Stanford in 1973. While at Stanford, and while consulting for Xerox PARC, Winograd connects with UC-Berkeley philosopher Hubert L. Dreyfus, author of the 1972 book, What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason.

Dreyfus, a translator of Heidegger, was one of SHRDLU’s fiercest critics. Worked for a time at MIT. Opponent of Marvin Minsky. For more on Dreyfus, see the 2010 documentary, Being in the World.

Turned by Dreyfus, Winograd transforms into what historian John Markoff calls “the first high-profile deserter from the world of AI.”

Xerox PARC was a major site of innovation during these years. “The Xerox Alto, the first computer with a graphical user interface, was launched in March 1973,” writes Fisher. “Alan Kay had just published a paper describing the Dynabook, the conceptual forerunner of today’s laptop computers. Robert Metcalfe was developing Ethernet, which became the standard for joining PCs in a network.”

“Spacewar,” Stewart Brand’s ethnographic tour of the goings-on at PARC and SAIL, had appeared in Rolling Stone the year prior.

Rescued from prison by the efforts of Amnesty International, Santiago Boy Fernando Flores arrives on the scene in 1976. Together, he and Winograd devote much of the next decade to preparing their 1986 book, Understanding Computers and Cognition.

Years later, a young Peter Thiel attends several of Winograd’s classes at Stanford. Thiel funds Mencius Moldbug, the alt-right thinker Curtis Yarvin, ally of right-accelerationist Nick Land. Yarvin and Land are the thinkers of the Dark Enlightenment.

“How do you navigate an unpredictable, rough adventure, as that’s what life is?” asks Winograd during a talk for the Topos Institute in October 2025. Answer: “Go with the flow.”

Winograd and Flores emphasize care — “tending to what matters” — as a factor that distinguishes humans from AI. In their view, computers and machines are incapable of care.

Evgeny Morozov, meanwhile, regards Flores and the Santiago Boys as Sorcerer’s Apprentices. Citing scholar of fairy tales Jack Zipes, Morozov distinguishes between several iterations of this figure. The outcome of the story varies, explains Zipes. There’s the apprentice who’s humbled by story’s end, as in Fantasia and Frankenstein; and then there’s the “evil” apprentice, the one who steals the tricks of an “evil” sorcerer and escapes unpunished. Morozov sees Flores as an example of the latter.

Caius thinks of the Trump show.

Lunar New Year

On another such day, in a year adjacent to ours, Rowan invites Caius and his daughter over for a sleepover.

The next morning, Caius attends free community yoga. His instructor invites everyone in the studio to take a Chinese New Year Fortune Card at session’s end. Applying the edge of a coin to the card’s scratch-off surface reveals its fortune. “You are the luckiest guy in the world,” reads Caius’s card, and he believes it.

McKenzie Wark’s gamespace, Baudrillard’s hyperspace, Heriberto Yépez’s pantopia. “When gamespace chooses you as its avatar,” asks Wark in her 2007 book Gamer Theory, “which character does it select for you to play?” (218). Caius drinks in the words of her reply with great glee. “Perhaps you are an avatar of the Egyptian demigod Theuth,” writes Wark (219). Pure synchronicity, thinks Caius; she replies as would I! The topoi of Theuth’s memory palaces, gathered by space pirates, assemble into a topography, which is itself subsumed in topology, the n-dimensional interior of Thoth’s Library. Wark had no adequate terms back then for conceiving the mnemopoietic solution arrived at by Thoth and Caius. Cribbing from Deleuze and Guattari, she alludes hyperstitiously toward a potential relationship to gamespace that, embracing the latter’s world-making capacities, could open the self-other dialectic outward into an affirmative kind of “schizoid complexity.”

“The ‘schizophrenia’ Deleuze and Guattari embrace is not a pathological condition,” notes Brian Massumi at the start of his book A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia. As a positive process, explains Massumi, schizophrenia is “inventive connection, expansion rather than withdrawal. Its twoness is a relay to a multiplicity. From one to another (and another…). From one noun or book or author to another (and another….). Not aimlessly. Experimentally. The relay in ideas is only effectively expansive if at every step it is also a relay away from ideas into action. Schizophrenia is the enlargement of life’s limits through the pragmatic proliferation of concepts” (Massumi 1). Massumi reads A Thousand Plateaus, the second volume of Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia, as “a sustained, constructive experiment in schizophrenic, or ‘nomad,’ thought” (4).

The novel we’re writing is experimental in this way.