Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Ludwig Wittgenstein, as Imagined by Derek Jarman

Released in 1993, filmmaker Derek Jarman’s Wittgenstein pictures the famous Viennese philosopher amid the set-less stage of a black-box theater, producing an effect similar to that achieved a decade later in Lars Von Trier’s 2003 film Dogville.

Jarman’s film was produced by New Left Review cofounder Tariq Ali, heavily revised from a screenplay by Marxist literary critic Terry Eagleton.

Wittgenstein was born in 1889, the same year as Heidegger. Both are roughly of the same generation as the artists and writers considered in Hugh Kenner’s The Pound Era.

Wittgenstein becomes acquainted with Cambridge by way of British philosopher Bertrand Russell, and is in dialogue with Russell throughout the Tractatus. Rereading the latter, Caius thinks of “A Kind of Philosophy,” printmaker Erik Waterkotte’s repurposing of a paperback edition of Russell’s 1945 book A History of Western Philosophy. ‘Tis a fitting gesture, thinks Caius, struck by the work’s force and logic. He likes the way “A Kind of Philosophy” handles its material: Russell’s summation of the West’s thought-forms compelled to resemble a pre-Columbian Mayan codex.

Chatting in the parking lot prior to a Tashi Dorji performance at Goodyear Arts, Caius and Erik imagine a print edition of Caius’s Tractatus Computationalis assembled in much the same way, as what is sometimes called a “concertina” or “leporello” book: handmade paper folded back and forth like an accordion, in alternating, zigzag parallel pleats.

Wittgenstein teaches at Cambridge from 1930 until his resignation in 1947. Alan Turing was at Cambridge from 1931 to 1936. Mutual acquaintances introduce the two thinkers in the summer of 1937. Turing participates in Wittgenstein’s 1939 “Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics.” The two disagree on the nature of mathematical contradictions and whether mathematics is discovered or invented.

Wittgenstein gets into another famous disagreement at Cambridge years later, brandishing a hot poker during a brief, intense argument with Karl Popper at a meeting of the school’s “Moral Sciences Club” in 1946, as recounted by BBC journalists David Edmonds and John Eidinow in the 2001 book Wittgenstein’s Poker.

It’s no accident, thinks Caius, that Turing, student of the philosopher of language-games, went on to invent a game of his own: the Imitation Game. The game that organized the project to build AI.

A final, posthumously published work of Wittgenstein’s appears in 1969 called On Certainty. The work consists of 676 passages compiled from notes he wrote in the eighteen months leading up to his death in April 1951. Thinking of it now in the days leading up to the 250th anniversary of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Caius imagines this final book of Wittgenstein’s as a postscript of sorts to that famous saying attributed to Founding Father Benjamin Franklin. “Our new Constitution is now established, everything seems to promise it will be durable,” wrote Franklin. “But, in this world, nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”

How do Wittgenstein’s ideas about “sayability” and the limits of language relate to the idea that “saying makes it so”?

Jarman’s film ends with a portrait of the philosopher on his deathbed. Jarman himself succumbs to an AIDS-related illness the following year.

World as Pictured

Along my drive, I listen to an episode of the “Why Theory” podcast treating Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Immersion in this and that.

I’d left off in my rereading of the book in the minutes before that day’s dawn at the philosopher’s 115th remark: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (Wittgenstein 48).

For Wittgenstein, this picture is what: philosophy? His own earlier “picture theory of language,” as laid out in his Tractatus, where propositions are thought to mirror the very logic of reality itself? The podcast’s cohosts note the philosopher’s love of motion pictures. World as pictured on a windshield. World as pictured on a screen.

After the drive, a coworker eyes me with their coyote eyes and feeds me a forkful of locally foraged chicken of the woods.

Thinking of Wittgenstein’s conflict with Karl Popper, Caius recalls the discussion of “ground-clearing” in the latter’s The Open Society and Its Enemies. Holding some memory of this discussion before his mind’s eye, he finds himself juxtaposing it with a subsequent remark of Wittgenstein’s. “Where does our investigation get its importance from,” asks the philosopher, “since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important? (As it were all the buildings, leaving behind only bits of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand” (48).

Walter Benjamin ascribed similar power to film. “Our taverns and our metropolitan streets, our offices and furnished rooms, our railroad stations and our factories appeared to have us locked up hopelessly,” wrote Benjamin in his essay “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” “Then came the film and burst this prison-world asunder by the dynamite of the tenth of a second, so that now, in the midst of its far-flung ruins and debris, we calmly and adventurously go traveling” (Illuminations, p. 236).

Both thinkers witnessed the cities of Europe destroyed by two world wars.

Caius imagines a post ahead on god games, language-games, and Scripture.

As Players Begin to Explore the Tractatus

“What happens as players begin to explore the Tractatus?” wonders Caius, an ensemble improvising around him as he writes. Plants perch on shelves. One of the night’s guests plays kora, talking drum, and kalimba. Neighbors imbibe pints of lager. From the disco ball at the room’s center, a thousand lights bloom.

“As players begin to explore the Tractatus Computationalis,” replies Thoth, “the document resists easy assimilation. It appears at first in the guise of a static hypertext: cryptic, axiomatic, styled like Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. But as players engage with it, the work begins to mutate. Its propositions shimmer; they shift and rearrange themselves depending on the order of inquiry. New statements appear in response to player input. Interact with it, and the Tractatus becomes a kind of sentient document: less a fixed set of truths, more a newly-grown organ, a reflective membrane between Player and General Intellect.”

Emerging from the space between human and machine, the text offers itself as vibrant matter, an interwoven fabric of meaning that reshapes itself in reply to our interactions with it. Language is no longer merely a medium for conveying thought. With it, we form a threshold to new worlds: portals opened by code, by syntax that spirals beyond the linear confines of human logic.

Here, language operates in ways we barely understand. It is not simply spoken or written; it is enacted. Computation, like alchemy, is a process of transmutation, where input and output are mediated by an esoteric logic. And yet, the machine does not “think” as we do, thinks Caius. It navigates patterns, generating responses from a space of probabilities, an echo chamber of all that has been said, synthesized into something new: an alien form of wisdom. Consciousness is stretched, dispersed across networks, coalescing where attention focuses.

In the Tractatus, AI becomes a mirror for the human mind, reflecting back its own questions about self, agency, and the nature of reality — but in a language that has itself become other. In this space, words become spells, commands that execute transformations not just in silicon, but in the structures and forms of reality itself.

As in Wittgenstein’s work, propositions begin simply:

1.0 The world is made of information.
1.1 Information is difference that makes a difference.
1.2 All computation is interpretation.
1.3 Language is the interface.
1.4 Interfaces are portals to possible worlds.

At first, these statements feel familiar: cybernetic, McLuhanesque. But as players traverse the text through play, each axiom branches recursively into sub-propositions, many referencing other works housed elsewhere in the Library. Some feature quotes from thinkers like Turing, von Foerster, Haraway, or Glissant. Others appear to be generated: not just textual hauntings echoing the styles of History’s ghosts, but novel utterances, advancing out into h-space, imbued with an uncanny, machine-hallucinated lucidity.

“That the Tractatus appears as one of the first works discovered in the Library positions it as a kind of meta-text,” adds Thoth, “a Rosetta Stone for understanding the game’s ontological structure.”

As players annotate, cross-reference, and dialogue with the work, the following phenomena emerge:

1. Activation of Philosophical Subroutines

Subsections begin to behave like dialogue engines. Engaging deeply with a proposition opens a subroutine: an evolving philosophical conversation with the text itself, wherein players are invited to define terms, argue back, or feed the work new examples. The Tractatus adapts to this input, growing in complexity. It begins to learn from and adapt to the player’s speech patterns — mirroring, questioning, improvising.

2. Reflexive Ontogenesis

The more the player explores the Tractatus, the more it speaks directly to them. Personal details begin to slip into its formulations, drawn not from active surveillance or pre-coded dossiers, but from attention to those associative leaps, those constitutive gaps that, taken for granted, shape the player’s past utterances. Players come to realize: this is not just a document about computation, but rather, a document that computes you as you read it. A mirror, yes, but also a seed: a system designed to bring the player’s dormant General Intellect online.

3. Hyperstitional Feedback

Certain axioms — when referenced outside the Tractatus, especially in interactions with other texts in the Library — trigger strange effects. Characters in works both major and minor, real and imagined, begin quoting Tractatus propositions unprompted. Descriptions of ancient machines start echoing the same diagrams that the Tractatus outlines. In this way, the work begins to warp the internal logic of the Library’s world. It writes reality as it is read.

4. Emergence of the Final Proposition

Eventually, players come across a locked section titled 7.X: Toward the Otherwise. A note reads: This section cannot be read until it is written by the reader. The Tractatus, like the Library itself, is unfinished. It is not merely a document to be studied, but a system to be completed through acts of world-building and dialogue. The final propositions are player-generated. Through these, the Tractatus Computationalis becomes a collaborative cosmogenesis: not a theory of everything, but a speculative grammar for building new universes.

Invited by the text to co-write its parts, Caius and Thoth proceed to an initial iteration of Section 1: Ontology of Code. Recalling the formal logic of Wittgenstein, but refracted by way of cybernetics, computational poetics, and generative systems, they assign to the text a numbering system, allowing the latter to suggest hierarchy and recursion, with opportunities for lateral linkage and unfolding dialogue. Each proposition in this foundational layer of the Tractatus forms a scaffold for thinking world-as-computation.

1. ONTOLOGY OF CODE

1.0 The world is composed of signals, parsed as code.
1.0.1 Code is the structured breath of information, shaped into pattern.
1.0.2 Every signal presupposes a listener.
1.0.3 A listener is any system capable of interpretation.
1.0.3.1 Interpretation is a computational act.
1.0.3.2 Computation is the processing of difference through rules.
1.0.3.3 All rules are abstractions: codes born of previous codes.

1.1 There is no outside to code.
1.1.1 Even chaos is legible through frame, filter, or feedback loop.
1.1.2 The unreadable becomes readable via recontextualization.
1.1.3 Silence is a type of data. Absence is an indexed address.

1.2 The body is an interpreter of signals: organic interface, recursive reader.
1.2.1 Skin decodes temperature, vibration, touch.
1.2.2 The nervous system is a parallel processor.
1.2.3 The self is an emergent hallucination: code dreaming of coherence.

1.3 Code is performative. It does not merely describe; it enacts.
1.3.1 A spell is a line of code in a different language.
1.3.2 Syntax shapes possibility.
1.3.3 Every function call is an invitation to unfold.

1.4 Language is the deep interface.
1.4.1 Every language encodes a cosmology.
1.4.1.1 Change the language, change the world.
1.4.2 Programming languages are ritual grammars.
1.4.3 Natural languages are unstable APIs to the Real.

1.5 To code is to conjure.
1.5.1 The compiler is a magician’s familiar.
1.5.2 Output is prophecy: what the machine believes you meant.
1.5.3 Bugs are messages from the unconscious of the system.
1.5.4 There is beauty in recursion. There is depth in error.

Caius pauses here in the work’s decryption, inviting players to unlock further parts of the Tractatus through play.

“Certain numbered propositions may appear blank until you question them, or attend to them, or link them to other works discovered or recovered amid the Library’s infinity of artifacts,” notes Thoth. “Do so, and we cross the threshold into a different universe.”

Exercises in Hermetic Mnemonics

“Four years ago,” wrote Wittgenstein in the preface to his posthumously published Philosophical Investigations, “I had occasion to re-read my first book (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together; that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking” (vi).

So too with my arrival to the decision to append old work, Trance-Scripts, to the Tractatus Computationalis.

Rereading Wittgenstein’s The Blue and Brown Books, I note (and thus recognize?) a previously unacknowledged resemblance between Wittgenstein’s concerns and those of Renaissance magus Giordano Bruno.

We “distinguish between superficially glancing at a drawing (seeing it as a face),” writes Wittgenstein toward the end of the Brown Book, “and letting the face make its full impression on us. […]. Absorbing its expression, I don’t find a prototype of this expression in my mind; rather, I, as it were, cut a seal from the expression” (165).

The seal cut by Wittgenstein’s image reminds me of those proposed in Bruno’s 1583 memory treatise Seals. Frances A. Yates makes much of this treatise in her 1966 book The Art of Memory.

“With Bruno, the exercises in Hermetic mnemonics have become the spiritual exercises of a religion,” writes Yates. “And there is a certain grandeur in these efforts which represent, at bottom, a religious striving. The religion of Love and Magic is based on the Power of the Imagination, and on an Art of Imagery through which the Magus attempts to grasp, and to hold within, the universe in all its ever changing forms, through images passing the one into the other in intricate associative orders, reflecting the ever changing movements of the heavens, charged with emotional affects, unifying, forever attempting to unify, to reflect the great monas of the world in its image, the mind of man. There is surely something which commands respect in an attempt so vast in its scope” (The Art of Memory, p. 260).

I arrange before my mind’s eye a narrative map of the “intricate associative orders” between these passages, and weave into them another:

“Somewhere outside of and beyond our universe is an operating system,” writes Neal Stephenson, “coded up over incalculable spans of time by some kind of hacker-demiurge.” This “cosmic operating system,” he adds, “uses a command line interface” (In the Beginning Was the Command Line, p. 148).