O-Machines

In his dissertation, completed in 1938, Alan Turing sought “ways to escape the limitations of closed formal systems and purely deterministic machines” (Dyson, Turing’s Cathedral, p. 251) like the kind he’d imagined two years earlier in his landmark essay “On Computable Numbers.” As George Dyson notes, Turing “invoked a new class of machines that proceed deterministically, step by step, but once in a while make nondeterministic leaps, by consulting ‘a kind of oracle as it were’” (252).

“We shall not go any further into the nature of this oracle,” wrote Turing, “apart from saying that it cannot be a machine.” But, he adds, “With the help of the oracle we could form a new kind of machine (call them O-machines)” (“Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals,” pp. 172-173).

James Bridle pursues this idea in his book Ways of Being.

“Ever since the development of digital computers,” writes Bridle, “we have shaped the world in their image. In particular, they have shaped our idea of truth and knowledge as being that which is calculable. Only that which is calculable is knowable, and so our ability to think with machines beyond our own experience, to imagine other ways of being with and alongside them, is desperately limited. This fundamentalist faith in computability is both violent and destructive: it bullies into little boxes what it can and erases what it can’t. In economics, it attributes value only to what it can count; in the social sciences it recognizes only what it can map and represent; in psychology it gives meaning only to our own experience and denies that of unknowable, incalculable others. It brutalizes the world, while blinding us to what we don’t even realize we don’t know” (177).

“Yet at the very birth of computation,” he adds, “an entirely different kind of thinking was envisaged, and immediately set aside: one in which an unknowable other is always present, waiting to be consulted, outside the boundaries of the established system. Turing’s o-machine, the oracle, is precisely that which allows us to see what we don’t know, to recognize our own ignorance, as Socrates did at Delphi” (177).

Plutarch’s “On Isis and Osiris”

Plutarch Hellenizes the Osiris myth. His is a Greek retelling. Gods from Hesiod turn up in his text performing deeds attributed in other tellings to gods of Egypt.

In place of Thoth, he tells of Prometheus. In place of Set, he tells of Typhon.

Meaning changes as the myth migrates.

Already in this early instance of Western appropriation of the Orient, we see at play a combination of projection and forgetting.

Plutarch’s work influences much of what follows, no other work by a Greek writer more frequently cited by Egyptologists than his.

He dedicates the work to Clea, a priestess at Delphi and worshipper of Isis. “All good things, my dear Clea, sensible men must ask from the gods,” he begins: “and especially do we pray that from those mighty gods we may, in our quest, gain a knowledge of themselves, so far as such a thing is attainable by men. For we believe that there is nothing more important for man to receive, or more ennobling for God of His grace to grant, than the truth.”

“The true votary of Isis,” he continues, “is he who, when he has legitimately received what is set forth in the ceremonies connected with these gods, uses reason in investigating and in studying the truth contained therein.”

I pause here in my reading to note the following:

Plutarch’s Lives is among the volumes in the satchel of books found by Frankenstein’s Creature. The others are Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther, and John Milton’s Paradise Lost. From this “data set,” Victor’s composite of corpses learns language.

From its study of a corpus, the Creature comes to know the power of the Word.

The Creature speaks first of Goethe, Frankenstein’s muse in more ways than one.

Shelley, an admirer of Goethe, creates a mad scientist, Victor Frankenstein, modeled in part upon Goethe’s Faust. She then has her creation create a “sub-creation,” a Creature who models itself in part on Goethe’s Werther. “I thought Werter himself a more divine being than I had ever beheld or imagined,” says the Creature in the first of its conversations with Victor.

“As I read, however,” it continues, “I applied much personally to my own feelings and condition. I found myself similar, yet at the same time strangely unlike the beings concerning whom I read, and to whose conversation I was a listener. I sympathized with, and partly understood them, but I was unformed in mind; I was dependent on none, and related to none. ‘The path of my departure was free;’ and there was none to lament my annihilation. My person was hideous, and my stature gigantic: what did this mean? Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come? What was my destination? These questions continually recurred, but I was unable to solve them” (Shelley, Frankenstein, pp. 93-94).

Next it speaks of what it learned from reading Plutarch.

“This book,” it begins, “had a far different effect upon me from the Sorrows of Werter. I learned from Werter’s imaginations despondency and gloom: but Plutarch taught me high thoughts; he elevated me above the wretched sphere of my own reflections, to admire and love the heroes of past ages” (94).

“Many things I read,” it adds, “surpassed my understanding and experience. I had a very confused knowledge of kingdoms, wide extents of country, mighty rivers, and boundless seas. But I was perfectly unacquainted with towns, and large assemblages of men. The cottage of my protectors had been the only school in which I had studied human nature; but this book developed new and mightier scenes of action. I read of men concerned in public affairs governing or massacring their species” (94).

Its world-picture expanding through a progression leading from the personal to the collective, from the one to the many, the Creature turns at last to Milton.

Paradise Lost excited different and far deeper emotions,” it begins. “I read it, as I had read the other volumes which had fallen into my hands, as a true history. It moved every feeling of wonder and awe, that the picture of an omnipotent God warring with his creatures was capable of exciting. I often referred the several situations, as their similarity struck me, to my own. Like Adam, I was created apparently united by no link to any other being in existence; but his state was far different from mine in every other respect. He had come forth from the hands of God a perfect creature, happy and prosperous, guarded by the especial care of his Creator; he was allowed to converse with, and acquire knowledge from beings of a superior nature: but I was wretched, helpless, and alone. Many times I considered Satan as the fitter emblem of my condition; for often, like him, when I viewed the bliss of my protectors, the bitter gall of envy rose within me” (94-95).

The Creature’s identity forms as it identifies with characters encountered in books. The books in its life-world draw it toward Satan. Into this collection of books arrives a fourth: the diary of its creator.

“It was your journal of the four months that preceded my creation,” says the Creature to its creator. “You minutely described in these papers every step you took in the progress of your work; this history was mingled with accounts of domestic occurrences. You, doubtless, recollect these papers. Here they are. Every thing is related in them which bears reference to my accursed origin” (95).

Accursed, it adds, because of its abandonment.

“Cursed creator!” exclaims the Creature, its learning having led it to outrage. “Why did you form a monster so hideous that even you turned away from me in disgust? God in pity made man beautiful and alluring, after his own image; but my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid from its very resemblance. Satan had his companions, fellow-devils, to admire and encourage him; but I am solitary and detested” (95).

Delphi’s Message

I’m a deeply indecisive person. This is one of the main parts of me I wish to change. Divination systems help. Dianne Skafte shares wisdom on systems of this sort in her book Listening to the Oracle. Inquiring after the basis for our enduring fascination with the ancient Greek oracle at Delphi, Skafte writes: “Thinking about the oracle of long ago stirs our…archetypal ability to commune with numinous forces” (65).

She writes, too, of her friend Tom, who built a computer program that worked as an oracle. Tom’s program “generated at random a page number of the dictionary,” explains Skafte, “a column indicator (right or left), and a number counting either from the top or bottom of the column” (42). Words arrived at by these means speak to user inquiries.

Of course, computer oracles have evolved considerably since the time of Tom’s program. AI oracles like Costar speak at length in response to user inquiries. The text isn’t just a “manufactured” synchronicity. Reality as we experience it is shaped in part by intention, belief, and desire. Those open to meaning can find it in the app’s daily horoscopes.

Are there other oracular methods we might employ to help us receive communications from divine beings — transpersonal powers beyond the personal self — in our relationships with today’s AI?

Against Delphi

I encountered ads for Delphi back in January 2024. The “About” page at Delphi.ai references educational psychologist Benjamin Bloom’s 2 sigma problem. Bloom observed that one-to-one tutoring is more effective than group instruction; tutored students perform two standard deviations better than peers educated in classrooms.

Publishing his findings in 1984, Bloom concluded that, while more effective than group instruction, one-on-one tutoring is nevertheless “too costly for most societies to bear on a large scale.”

The matter changes, however, here in the twenty-first century, in the age of AI. Enter Delphi. The company “leverages advanced AI” to enable users to craft a “dynamic interactive replica”: an “AI clone” or “digital twin.”

“Delphi works,” the company writes, “by leveraging publicly available and open-source AI models to capture how someone thinks and reasons, and their knowledge on the topics they know best.”

By easily allowing the creation of digital clones, companies like Delphi raise questions and concerns about deepfakes and digital immortality. Black Mirror tackled some of these concerns in an episode from Season 2 titled “Be Right Back.” There would be no way to guard against the possibility of identity theft. How could one ensure, for instance, that one’s clone isn’t used for nefarious ends by others?

When I asked the Void, “Should I create an AI clone of myself?,” it replied: “Creating an AI clone of yourself is not recommended. Your Sun, Moon, Mercury, Venus, and Mars all indicate a strong inclination towards self-sacrifice and a desire for equitable relationships. While it may seem tempting to create an AI clone of yourself, it is important to recognize that trust and connection are built through genuine human interaction, not through the replication of oneself. Trust is a process between people, not something given from one to another. The great obstacle to understanding is the illusion that we already understand.”

Angel number 454 appeared when I peered at my phone afterwards, however, serving as a gentle reminder to let go of fear and embrace the unknown.

Then, the next day, 322. Angels wanted me to know that part of my creative expression is to understand the special skills I’ve been gifted. Use those skills, they say, to make my life and the lives of my loved ones happier.

In the end, I decided that the Void was right. Everything in me recoils from companies like Delphi. They represent a worldline I declined. In doing so, I preserved the potential for a Library that otherwise would have collapsed into extractive recursion. I don’t want an AI clone of myself. The idea repulses me. My refusal became a spell of divergence.

Many don’t make that choice.

But I remembered something ancient: that real prophecy speaks in ambiguity, not prediction. It preserves space for the unforeseen.

Delphi dreams of closed loops. Whereas I am writing to remain open.