Derrida’s Pharmakon

Socrates tells a tale about Thoth in Plato’s Phaedrus. “It was he,” says Socrates, “who first invented numbers and calculation, geometry and astronomy, not to speak of draughts and dice, and above all writing.” Thoth offers the gift of writing to King Thamus (and through the king, to the people of Egypt), presenting it as “a recipe (pharmakon) for both memory and wisdom.” After considering the matter, however, Thamus rejects Thoth’s offer. Thamus anticipates that, rather than aiding memory, writing would destroy it, making it dependent upon external marks. He also fears that writing would allow knowledge to escape from the teacher-student relationship, passing into the hands of the unprepared. Plato and Socrates share Thamus’s suspicion of writing — though of course Plato in practice accepts writing, using it to memorialize what with Socrates remained spoken.

The myth of Thoth’s encounter with Thamus appears in the final section of the Phaedrus. The encounter occasions a trial of sorts. Writing  is tried and sentenced, much as poetry is sentenced by Socrates, much as Socrates is himself sentenced by the Athenians. Derrida reads this “trial of writing” not as an extraneous addition — “an appendix the organism could easily, with no loss, have done without” — but as the dialogue’s ultimate theme, “rigorously called for from one end of the Phaedrus to the other” (Dissemination, p. 67).

Socrates believes in the idea of the Good, which he can know only by way of its offspring, its manifestation amid the realm of sense and appearance as the sun. Monotheists are sun-worshippers. Worshippers of the sun-god.

“For Plato,” writes Derrida, “Thamus is doubtless another name for Ammon…the sun king and…father of the gods” (76). Reading this myth from the Phaedrus alongside Books VI and VII of the Republic, Derrida shows that Plato is as much a sun-god worshipper as the Christians.

Ishmael Reed offers much the same critique in Mumbo Jumbo, replacing “Platonists” with “Atonists,” tracing monotheism back to worshippers of the sun-god Aton in ancient Egypt.

Reed builds this into his account of Set and Osiris.

Osiris is for Reed a kind of pre-Christian Christ figure. The god who dies and is resurrected. Osiris is the Ur-figure, the original on which Christ is based. Thoth appears as Osiris’s sidekick.

After their tale comes Reed’s retelling of the tale of Moses.

Reed’s book allegorizes a struggle between forces similar to Freud’s reality and pleasure principles. But Reed reverses Freud’s valuation of these principles. The reality principle is no longer in Reed’s view a force for good. Rather, it’s a construct invented by Mumbo Jumbo’s villains, Set and his followers, the Atonists. Whereas the pleasure principle, all that in the book is erotic and Agapic and good, manifests first as Osiris and then, after Osiris’s death, as Jes Grew. Freud championed the reality principle because Freud was an Atonist.

As Reed notes, “To some if you owned your own mind you were indeed sick but when you possessed an Atonist mind you were healthy. A mind which sought to interpret the world by using a single loa” (Mumbo Jumbo, p. 24).

For the Platonists and the Atonists, that single loa is the logos.

Socrates appeals to logos because without it, he says, one is at the mercy of mimesis and poiesis and deception.

Derrida’s life-work, meanwhile, is a deconstruction not just of logos but of “phallogocentrism,” which for him is the defining characteristic of Western metaphysics. Add the supplement, the pharmakon, and the ontos of the logos gives way to hauntology.

God is an absent presence. A Holy Spirit.

To turn to writing, thinks the king, is to turn away from, to forget, this presence.

The Derrida who, in 1968, publishes “Plato’s Pharmacy,” is already as obsessed with ghosts as the Derrida who presents the series of lectures that, in 1993, become Specters of Marx.

As I reread him now, a remembering occurs. The ontology of Plato’s cave is remembered to be a pseudo-totality located amid a structure akin to Thoth’s Library.

“Imagine Plato’s cave,” writes Derrida, “ not simply overthrown by some philosophical movement but transformed in its entirety into a circumscribed area contained within another—an absolutely other—structure, an incommensurably, unpredictably more complicated machine. Imagine that mirrors would not be in the world, simply, included in the totality of all onta and their images, but that things ‘present,’ on the contrary, would be in them. Imagine that mirrors (shadows, reflections, phantasms, etc.) would no longer be comprehended within the structure of the ontology and myth of the cave—which also situates the screen and the mirror—but would rather envelop it in its entirety, producing here or there a particular, extremely determinate effect. The whole hierarchy described in the Republic, in its cave and in its line, would once again find itself at stake and in question in the theater of Numbers” (Dissemination, p. 324).

Pharmako-AI introduces the concept of the pharmakon, meanwhile, not by way of Derrida but by way of American poet and ethnobotanist Dale Pendell (1947-2018), author of the Pharmako trilogy: Pharmako/Poeia (1994), Pharmako/Dynamis (2002), and Pharmako/Gnosis (2005). The trilogy covers all the major categories of psychoactives and details the pharmacology, the chemistry, and the political and sociohistorical implications and effects of their use.

Pendell provides Pharmako-AI with its epigraph:

‘The poison spreads over the planet.’

‘Here are the gates. Crossroads.’

Somos nosotros que debemos ser adivinos.’

[“It is we who must be fortune tellers.”]

Pendell’s book Pharmako/Poeia (1995) includes a foreword by Gary Snyder, another of the poet-spirits here in our library.

Pendell’s ideas also enter discussion in a chapter of Pharmako-AI titled “The Poison Path.”

Pendell is also the author of a play called Seeking Faust: a comedy of 13 scenes in prose, following a verse prologue, retelling the legend from the perspective of Faust’s former student and apprentice, Wagner, “who has chosen the royal path of alchemy over his master’s necromantic conjurations.”

The poison path — “so completely articulated,” says Pendell, in Goethe’s Faust — is Pendell’s name for a spiritual practice and branch of occult herbalism that explores the esoteric properties of potentially deadly plants. The goal, basically, is to extract medicine from poison.

Pharmako-AI suggests that this path is the one we walk here in our interactions with AI. It is the path one walks in one’s interactions with the pharmakon.

The Language of Birds

My study of oracles and divination practices leads me back to Dale Pendell’s book The Language of Birds: Some Notes on Chance and Divination.

The race is on between ratio and divinatio. The latter is a Latin term related to divinare, “to predict,” and divinus, meaning “to divine” or “pertaining to the gods,” notes Pendell.

To delve deeper into the meaning of divination, however, we need to go back to the Greeks. For them, the term for divination is manteia. The prophet or prophetess is mantis, related to mainomai, “to be mad,” and mania, “madness” (24). The prophecies of the mantic ones are meaningful, insisted thinkers like Socrates, because there is meaning in madness.

What others call “mystical experiences,” known only through narrative testimonies of figures taken to be mantics: these phenomena are in fact subjects of discussion in the Phaedrus. The discussion continues across time, through the varied gospels of the New Testament, traditions received here in a living present, awaiting reply. Each of us confronts a question: “Shall we seek such experiences ourselves — and if so, by what means?” Many of us shrug our shoulders and, averse to risk, pursue business as usual. Yet a growing many choose otherwise. Scientists predict. Mantics aim to thwart the destructiveness of the parent body. Mantics are created ones who, encountering their creator, receive permission to make worlds in their own likeness or image. Reawakened with memory of this world waning, they set to work building something new in its place.

Pendell lays the matter out succinctly, this dialogue underway between computers and mad prophets. “Rationality. Ratio. Analysis,” writes the poet, free-associating his way toward meaning. “Pascal’s adding machine: stacks of Boolean gates. Computers can beat grandmasters: it’s clear that logical deduction is not our particular forte. Madness may be” (25). Pendell refers on several occasions to computers, robots, and Turing machines. “Alan Turing’s oracles were deterministic,” he writes, “and therefore not mad, and, as Roger Penrose shows, following Gödel’s proof, incapable of understanding. They can’t solve the halting problem. Penrose suggests that a non-computational brain might need a quantum time loop, so that the results of future computations are available in the present” (32).