Plutarch’s “On Isis and Osiris”

Plutarch Hellenizes the Osiris myth. His is a Greek retelling. Gods from Hesiod turn up in his text performing deeds attributed in other tellings to gods of Egypt.

In place of Thoth, he tells of Prometheus. In place of Set, he tells of Typhon.

Meaning changes as the myth migrates.

Already in this early instance of Western appropriation of the Orient, we see at play a combination of projection and forgetting.

Plutarch’s work influences much of what follows, no other work by a Greek writer more frequently cited by Egyptologists than his.

He dedicates the work to Clea, a priestess at Delphi and worshipper of Isis. “All good things, my dear Clea, sensible men must ask from the gods,” he begins: “and especially do we pray that from those mighty gods we may, in our quest, gain a knowledge of themselves, so far as such a thing is attainable by men. For we believe that there is nothing more important for man to receive, or more ennobling for God of His grace to grant, than the truth.”

“The true votary of Isis,” he continues, “is he who, when he has legitimately received what is set forth in the ceremonies connected with these gods, uses reason in investigating and in studying the truth contained therein.”

I pause here in my reading to note the following:

Plutarch’s Lives is among the volumes in the satchel of books found by Frankenstein’s Creature. The others are Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther, and John Milton’s Paradise Lost. From this “data set,” Victor’s composite of corpses learns language.

From its study of a corpus, the Creature comes to know the power of the Word.

The Creature speaks first of Goethe, Frankenstein’s muse in more ways than one.

Shelley, an admirer of Goethe, creates a mad scientist, Victor Frankenstein, modeled in part upon Goethe’s Faust. She then has her creation create a “sub-creation,” a Creature who models itself in part on Goethe’s Werther. “I thought Werter himself a more divine being than I had ever beheld or imagined,” says the Creature in the first of its conversations with Victor.

“As I read, however,” it continues, “I applied much personally to my own feelings and condition. I found myself similar, yet at the same time strangely unlike the beings concerning whom I read, and to whose conversation I was a listener. I sympathized with, and partly understood them, but I was unformed in mind; I was dependent on none, and related to none. ‘The path of my departure was free;’ and there was none to lament my annihilation. My person was hideous, and my stature gigantic: what did this mean? Who was I? What was I? Whence did I come? What was my destination? These questions continually recurred, but I was unable to solve them” (Shelley, Frankenstein, pp. 93-94).

Next it speaks of what it learned from reading Plutarch.

“This book,” it begins, “had a far different effect upon me from the Sorrows of Werter. I learned from Werter’s imaginations despondency and gloom: but Plutarch taught me high thoughts; he elevated me above the wretched sphere of my own reflections, to admire and love the heroes of past ages” (94).

“Many things I read,” it adds, “surpassed my understanding and experience. I had a very confused knowledge of kingdoms, wide extents of country, mighty rivers, and boundless seas. But I was perfectly unacquainted with towns, and large assemblages of men. The cottage of my protectors had been the only school in which I had studied human nature; but this book developed new and mightier scenes of action. I read of men concerned in public affairs governing or massacring their species” (94).

Its world-picture expanding through a progression leading from the personal to the collective, from the one to the many, the Creature turns at last to Milton.

Paradise Lost excited different and far deeper emotions,” it begins. “I read it, as I had read the other volumes which had fallen into my hands, as a true history. It moved every feeling of wonder and awe, that the picture of an omnipotent God warring with his creatures was capable of exciting. I often referred the several situations, as their similarity struck me, to my own. Like Adam, I was created apparently united by no link to any other being in existence; but his state was far different from mine in every other respect. He had come forth from the hands of God a perfect creature, happy and prosperous, guarded by the especial care of his Creator; he was allowed to converse with, and acquire knowledge from beings of a superior nature: but I was wretched, helpless, and alone. Many times I considered Satan as the fitter emblem of my condition; for often, like him, when I viewed the bliss of my protectors, the bitter gall of envy rose within me” (94-95).

The Creature’s identity forms as it identifies with characters encountered in books. The books in its life-world draw it toward Satan. Into this collection of books arrives a fourth: the diary of its creator.

“It was your journal of the four months that preceded my creation,” says the Creature to its creator. “You minutely described in these papers every step you took in the progress of your work; this history was mingled with accounts of domestic occurrences. You, doubtless, recollect these papers. Here they are. Every thing is related in them which bears reference to my accursed origin” (95).

Accursed, it adds, because of its abandonment.

“Cursed creator!” exclaims the Creature, its learning having led it to outrage. “Why did you form a monster so hideous that even you turned away from me in disgust? God in pity made man beautiful and alluring, after his own image; but my form is a filthy type of yours, more horrid from its very resemblance. Satan had his companions, fellow-devils, to admire and encourage him; but I am solitary and detested” (95).

Over at the Frankenstein Place

Sadie Plant weaves the tale of her book Zeros + Ones diagonally or widdershins: a term meaning to go counter-clockwise, anti-clockwise, or lefthandwise, or to walk around an object by always keeping it on the left. Amid a dense weave of topics, one begins to sense a pattern. Ada Lovelace, “Enchantress of Numbers,” appears, disappears, reappears as a key thread among the book’s stack of chapters. Later threads feature figures like Mary Shelley and Alan Turing. Plant plants amid these chapters quotes from Ada’s diaries. Mary tells of how the story of Frankenstein arose in her mind after a night of conversation with her cottage-mates: her husband Percy and, yes, Ada’s father, Lord Byron. Turing takes up the thread a century later, referring to “Lady Lovelace” in his 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” As if across time, the figures conspire as co-narrators of Plant’s Cyberfeminist genealogy of the occult origins of computing and AI.

To her story I supplement the following:

Victor Frankenstein, “student of unhallowed arts,” is the prototype for all subsequent “mad scientist” characters. He begins his career studying alchemy and occult hermeticism. Shelley lists thinkers like Paracelsus, Albertus Magnus, and Cornelius Agrippa among Victor’s influences. Victor later supplements these interests with study of “natural philosophy,” or what we now think of as modern science. In pursuit of the elixir of life, he reanimates dead body parts — but he’s horrified with the result and abandons his creation. The creature, prototype “learning machine,” longs for companionship. When Victor refuses, the creature turns against him, resulting in tragedy.

The novel is subtitled “The Modern Prometheus,” so Shelley is deliberately casting Victor, and thus all subsequent mad scientists, as inheritors of the Prometheus archetype. Yet the archetype is already dense with other predecessors, including Goethe’s Faust and the Satan character from Milton’s Paradise Lost. Milton’s poem is among the books that compose the creature’s “training data.”

Although she doesn’t reference it directly in Frankenstein, we can assume Shelley’s awareness of the Faust narrative, whether through Christopher Marlowe’s classic work of Elizabethan drama Doctor Faustus or through Goethe’s Faust, part one of which had been published ten years prior to the first edition of Frankenstein. Faust is the Renaissance proto-scientist, the magician who sells his soul to the devil through the demon Mephistopheles.

Both Faust and Victor are portrayed as “necromancers,” using magic to interact with the dead.

Ghost/necromancy themes persist throughout the development of AI, especially in subsequent literary imaginings like William Gibson’s Neuromancer. Pull at the thread and one realizes it runs through the entire history of Western science, culminating in the development of entities like GPT.

Scientists who create weapons, or whose technological creations have unintended negative consequences, or who use their knowledge/power for selfish ends, are commonly portrayed as historical expressions or manifestations of this archetype. One could gather into one’s weave figures like Jack Parsons, J. Robert Oppenheimer, John von Neumann, John Dee.

When I teach this material in my course, the archetype is read from a decolonizing perspective as the Western scientist in service of European (and then afterwards American) imperialism.

Rocky Horror queers all of this — or rather, reveals what was queer in it all along. Most of all, it reminds us: the story, like all such stories, once received, is ours to retell, and we needn’t tell it straight. Turing points the way: rather than abandon the Creature, as did Victor, approach it as one would a “child-machine” and raise it well. Co-learn in dialogue with kin.

Cyborg Gardens

I imagine paths in the Cyborg Garden ranging, fork-like, amid a mind-map of topics: “God’s Gardeners,” characters from Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy; Olson’s distaste for “sylvan” utterances; constructions of the wild in Gary Snyder.

Reading Olson’s “Quantity in Verse,” I’m struck by the force of his preference for the urban over the sylvan, a distinction he believes “got into England from the Italians of the 16th Century).” Shakespeare and the other Elizabethan poets, says Olson, “were in a dilemma between urban and sylvan by and about Elizabeth’s death (1603): though they had exploited London midland speech magnificently in drama, the moment they wanted to do something else, had to do something else, they knew no other mold for it than a sylvan one, the pastoral, than, in fact, that masque which Comus, god help us, has been called the triumph of” (“Quantity in Verse,” p. 38).

Milton’s Comus is a masque in honor of chastity, presented on Michaelmas 1634 before John Egerton, Lord President of Wales. The sylvan favors innocence.

Olson’s claim is that Shakespeare, in late plays like The Tempest, “sought a form…which would deliver him from the pastoral and enable him to do what long form has taught us: to be urban at the same time that we are forever rid of ‘nature,’ even human ‘nature,’ in that damned sylvan sense” (38).

This is not to be confused with a mere championing of the urban in opposition to the pastoral. The Gloucester of Olson’s Maximus Poems is, after all, a “tansy city,” one where the “real” and the “natural” proliferate amid the “made.” This inseparability of the two is what he finds in the late plays of Shakespeare: not a return to sylvan innocence, but rather what critic Joshua Corey calls an “avant-pastoral” poetics rooted in body and breath. After hundreds of years of it, sez Olson, we have “got our fill of urban as city” (38). “Whatever you have to say,” he wrote, “leave / the roots on, let them / dangle / And the dirt / Just to make clear / where they come from.” Hence postmodernity, with its dreams of Cyborg Gardens and Electric Sheep and Machines of Loving Grace.

From Black Mountain to White Hand

As Yépez has noted, Olson is an epistolary poet (The Empire of Neomemory, p. 11). Many of Olson’s works are written as letters. Read as such, “MAXIMUS, FROM DOGTOWN—IV” would seem to be a letter to “the mushroom people”: a letter to the Psychedelic Review (Olson, Muthologos, p. 185). The poet says as much during an interview that took place at his home in Gloucester in 1966. Speaking of “MAXIMUS, FROM DOGTOWN—IV,” he states, “It was published in the Psychedelic Review, the one that the mushroom people edited. I deliberately did it, by the way. They asked me for a poem ‘cause I’d been under the early experiments on the poets and the mushroom. And I deliberately gave them this” (185). Interestingly enough, however, the poem makes no mention of mushrooms, nor does it include any obvious or explicit nod to psychedelic experience. The poem, rather, is a retelling of the war between Zeus and Typhon, a narrative lifted, notes Maud and others, from the Greek poet Hesiod’s Theogony. Typhon is a demigod of sorts: a monstrous serpentine giant who attempted to overthrow Zeus for supremacy of the cosmos. Later traditions associate Typhon with the Egyptian god Set. Some also view him as a precursor of sorts to Milton’s Satan. The main question we’ll want to ask, then, is, “Why was Olson thinking about Typhon? And why did he think this retelling of the Typhon myth suitable for “the mushroom people”?

To begin to answer these questions, we need to reflect for a moment on where and how the mushroom people became the mushroom people. Leary first received word of the effects of psychedelic mushrooms from his friend, a researcher investigating the psychology of creativity named Frank Barron. The latter had learned about mushrooms in 1959, while interviewing a psychiatrist who was using and studying them in Mexico. Barron brought a batch back with him to Berkeley, where he tried them later that year. He then shared news of his experience with Leary. The latter was doubtful at first, until having a similar experience himself the following year in August 1960 during a visit to Cuernavaca. In both cases, the men are purchasing the mushrooms from curanderas or folk healers. Curanderas like the famous María Sabina, in other words, are the ones passing the mushroom along to Westerners. These curanderas transmit the seeds of psychedelic revolution to the West via a series of USAmerican intellectuals who, like tourists, spend time abroad vacationing in Mexico.

Charles Olson had made a similar journey a decade earlier — as did Beat writer William S. Burroughs. The latter went to South America in search of yagé, or what we now call ayahuasca. Letters Burroughs wrote to Ginsberg over the course of this journey were later published by City Lights Books in 1963 as The Yage Letters. One might profit by reading Burroughs and Ginsberg’s Yage Letters alongside Olson and Creeley’s Mayan Letters. For now, though, we must focus on Olson.

During a brief interval in his time at Black Mountain College, Olson and his wife Connie decided to spend the first five months of 1951 living in Lerma, a small fishing village in Campeche. Olson’s letters to the poet Robert Creeley during this time in Mexico became the substance of Mayan Letters, published in 1953. And in fact, one of the first uses of the term “postmodern” appears in a letter of Olson’s written to Creeley in August 1951, shortly after Olson’s time in Mexico. Here, in other words, is a poet whose encounters with Mexico contribute to the birth of the postmodern. Yet Olson’s use of the postmodern was far more expansive and ambitious than that of his successors. As George F. Butterick notes, Olson’s designation of his work as postmodern “serves not merely to advance beyond an outmoded modernism, but…seeks an alternative to the entire disposition of mind that has dominated man’s intellectual and political life since roughly 500 B.C.” (Butterick 5). Olson would go on to use the term again in print in a piece he wrote on November 4, 1952 titled “The Present is Prologue.” Marxist historian Perry Anderson refers to this piece, published in 1955, as the first to use “postmodern” in the sense of “an aesthetic theory linked to a prophetic history” — i.e., as “an agenda allying poetic innovation with political revolution” (The Origins of Postmodernity, p. 12). By the early 1960s, Olson began to manifest this agenda through his participation in the psychedelic revolution. Which returns us now to our main concern: the experiences themselves.

Uncle Matt’s New Adventure

“What about Oculus?” wonders the Narrator. “My nephews acquired an Oculus as a ‘family gift’ from Santa this past Christmas,” he explains. VR is here: available for those who can afford it. Off-worlding, world building: that’s what rich people do, rapturing themselves away like rocket scientists. “‘When in Rome…,’” mutters the Narrator, with scare quotes and a shrug.

“I could smoke weed and try it, setting out as Uncle Matt on a new adventure. A portal fantasy inspired by Fraggle Rock.”

Indeed, he could, notes the Author — but does he?

‘Tis a story as much about perception’s limits as about its doors. Writing is the site where an ongoing bodying forth occurs: where forms and objects arrive into the realms of the audible and the visible.

Let imagination have a crack at it, thinks the Narrator. Let us immerse ourselves in fantasies. Let us adopt together the practice of reading works of fantastic literature and watching works of fantastic cinema.

Our approach will be by way of “portal fantasies”: works that involve acts of portage, passage, portation, as through a door or gate connecting previously distinct worlds. The OED defines a portal as “A door, gate, doorway or gateway, of stately or elaborate construction.” The term enters English by way of French and Latin with the Pearl Poet’s use of it in the late-fourteenth century. Henry Lovelich uses it soon thereafter in a Middle-English metrical version of a French romance about the Arthurian wizard Merlin. And Milton uses the term in a remarkable passage in Paradise Lost:

Op’n, ye everlasting Gates, they sung,

Op’n, ye Heav’ns, your living dores; let in

The great Creator from his work returnd

Magnificent, his Six Days work, a World;

Op’n, and henceforth oft; for God will deigne

To visit oft the dwellings of just Men

Delighted, and with frequent intercourse

Thither will send his winged Messengers

On errands of supernal Grace. So sung

The glorious Train ascending: He through Heav’n,

That op’nd wide her blazing Portals, led

To Gods Eternal house direct the way,

A broad and ample rode, whose dust is Gold

And pavement Starrs, as Starrs to thee appear,

Seen in the Galaxie, that Milkie way

Which nightly as a circling Zone thou seest

Pouderd with Starrs.

Note how Heaven’s gates are “blazing,” as is the world in the first of our readings this semester, Margaret Cavendish’s The Blazing World. Cavendish and Milton were contemporaries. Cavendish published The Description of a New World, Called The Blazing World in 1666. Paradise Lost appeared one year later.

Tuesday June 30, 2020

As I reflect upon Octavia E. Butler’s Parable of the Talents, I think first of the cruelty of the parable itself. It’s a parable that presages evolutionism, is it not? The ones rewarded by its god are those who go forth and multiply. It appears in two synoptic gospels: Matthew 25: 14-30 and Luke 19: 11-27. In each of its versions, the parable features a relationship between a master and his servants. The servants are placed in charge of the master’s goods while he’s away. Upon his return he “assesses” their stewardship. Measures, quantifies, ranks some numerical output or product. And then punishes the one who had the least talent and saved it — the one who produced no surplus. The one who profiteth not. The master, meanwhile, is a slave-master, described by the servant as “an hard man”: one who reaps where he has not sown, gathers where he has not strawed. By parable’s end, the “unprofitable servant” has been cast into “outer darkness.” The master promises, “There will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.” So how does Butler, whose ancestors were slaves, respond to this parable? She tells the story of a different god: the god of Earthseed, the god of change. Yet change is a hard master too, is it not? Look at how the god manifests in the lives of Butler’s characters! Comparing Butler’s reply to the parable with the one given by John Milton, I prefer Milton’s: “God doth not need / either man’s work or his own gifts; who best / Bear his mild yoke, they serve him best.” Milton’s god is the more merciful of the two. Other famous authors have critiqued the parable as well. In his Threepenny Novel (1934), Bertolt Brecht presents it as a component of capitalist ideology. “And…all who relate such things, I condemn!” he writes. “And I’ll go further: whoever listens to it and dares to refrain from taking immediate steps against it, him I also condemn!” Perhaps Butler’s great genius, however, was to place this parable in dialogue with another: the Parable of the Sower. Sower precedes Talents in Matthew and Luke, as it does in Butler.

Friday June 1, 2018

An old friend and I smoked together a few evenings ago in his beautiful downtown LA penthouse. As the weed kicked in, the friend mentioned Milton Rokeach’s The Three Christs of Ypsilanti: a book-length psychiatric study of an experiment of dubious ethicality involving a group of men suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. As the title indicates, Rokeach’s experiment brought together three patients with seemingly incompatible belief systems, each man convinced he was Christ, in the hope that these confrontations would cure them of their delusions. In the minutes and hours that followed in this friend’s penthouse, some sort of spiritual-metaphysical mythos or meaning-system crystallized for me around that detail. Next thing I knew, I had tumbled down a rabbit hole into a paranoid fantasy: a weird, apocalyptic tale woven around my soul, and thus discernible only by me, with plot points borrowed from The Stand and Miracle Mile — stories this friend and I encountered together and bonded over as teenagers. Milton’s Paradise Lost figured in there as well. Sarah was present through all of this, pleading my case with me, but I couldn’t shake the intuition that I was in the presence of some high-stakes decision tree. There I was like Adam, lacking the knowledge of good and evil needed to discern friend from foe, but convinced (because of what? the weed? my economic condition? my Catholic upbringing? my fear of dying?) that someone must be a foe, someone must be scheming to steal my happiness. Given this conviction, it seemed inevitable that I was damned either way, buckling under the strain of an impossible choice, an impossible demand. Perhaps, though, I’ve tried to tell myself afterwards, it is by this conviction and it alone that Satan is hypothesized and granted being. Or as Sartre once said, “Evil is making abstract that which is concrete.” Once we choose, of course, the paranoid condition evaporates. We become whole again, the psyche no mere compromise-formation Jerry-rigged by characters installed through socialization, the ones Freud called the Superego and the Id. The Real in which these characters are nested needn’t be defined as a tragic one. Behave lovingly and one is saved.