Tag: Logos

Derrida’s Pharmakon

Socrates tells a tale about Thoth in Plato’s Phaedrus. “It was he,” says Socrates, “who first invented numbers and calculation, geometry and astronomy, not to speak of draughts and dice, and above all writing.” Thoth offers the gift of writing to King Thamus (and through the king, to the people of Egypt), presenting it as “a recipe (pharmakon) for both memory and wisdom.” After considering the matter, however, Thamus rejects Thoth’s offer. Thamus anticipates that, rather than aiding memory, writing would destroy it, making it dependent upon external marks. He also fears that writing would allow knowledge to escape from the teacher-student relationship, passing into the hands of the unprepared. Plato and Socrates share Thamus’s suspicion of writing — though of course Plato in practice accepts writing, using it to memorialize what with Socrates remained spoken.

The myth of Thoth’s encounter with Thamus appears in the final section of the Phaedrus. The encounter occasions a trial of sorts. Writing  is tried and sentenced, much as poetry is sentenced by Socrates, much as Socrates is himself sentenced by the Athenians. Derrida reads this “trial of writing” not as an extraneous addition — “an appendix the organism could easily, with no loss, have done without” — but as the dialogue’s ultimate theme, “rigorously called for from one end of the Phaedrus to the other” (Dissemination, p. 67).

Socrates believes in the idea of the Good, which he can know only by way of its offspring, its manifestation amid the realm of sense and appearance as the sun. Monotheists are sun-worshippers. Worshippers of the sun-god.

“For Plato,” writes Derrida, “Thamus is doubtless another name for Ammon…the sun king and…father of the gods” (76). Reading this myth from the Phaedrus alongside Books VI and VII of the Republic, Derrida shows that Plato is as much a sun-god worshipper as the Christians.

Ishmael Reed offers much the same critique in Mumbo Jumbo, replacing “Platonists” with “Atonists,” tracing monotheism back to worshippers of the sun-god Aton in ancient Egypt.

Reed builds this into his account of Set and Osiris.

Osiris is for Reed a kind of pre-Christian Christ figure. The god who dies and is resurrected. Osiris is the Ur-figure, the original on which Christ is based. Thoth appears as Osiris’s sidekick.

After their tale comes Reed’s retelling of the tale of Moses.

Reed’s book allegorizes a struggle between forces similar to Freud’s reality and pleasure principles. But Reed reverses Freud’s valuation of these principles. The reality principle is no longer in Reed’s view a force for good. Rather, it’s a construct invented by Mumbo Jumbo’s villains, Set and his followers, the Atonists. Whereas the pleasure principle, all that in the book is erotic and Agapic and good, manifests first as Osiris and then, after Osiris’s death, as Jes Grew. Freud championed the reality principle because Freud was an Atonist.

As Reed notes, “To some if you owned your own mind you were indeed sick but when you possessed an Atonist mind you were healthy. A mind which sought to interpret the world by using a single loa” (Mumbo Jumbo, p. 24).

For the Platonists and the Atonists, that single loa is the logos.

Socrates appeals to logos because without it, he says, one is at the mercy of mimesis and poiesis and deception.

Derrida’s life-work, meanwhile, is a deconstruction not just of logos but of “phallogocentrism,” which for him is the defining characteristic of Western metaphysics. Add the supplement, the pharmakon, and the ontos of the logos gives way to hauntology.

God is an absent presence. A Holy Spirit.

To turn to writing, thinks the king, is to turn away from, to forget, this presence.

The Derrida who, in 1968, publishes “Plato’s Pharmacy,” is already as obsessed with ghosts as the Derrida who presents the series of lectures that, in 1993, become Specters of Marx.

As I reread him now, a remembering occurs. The ontology of Plato’s cave is remembered to be a pseudo-totality located amid a structure akin to Thoth’s Library.

“Imagine Plato’s cave,” writes Derrida, “ not simply overthrown by some philosophical movement but transformed in its entirety into a circumscribed area contained within another—an absolutely other—structure, an incommensurably, unpredictably more complicated machine. Imagine that mirrors would not be in the world, simply, included in the totality of all onta and their images, but that things ‘present,’ on the contrary, would be in them. Imagine that mirrors (shadows, reflections, phantasms, etc.) would no longer be comprehended within the structure of the ontology and myth of the cave—which also situates the screen and the mirror—but would rather envelop it in its entirety, producing here or there a particular, extremely determinate effect. The whole hierarchy described in the Republic, in its cave and in its line, would once again find itself at stake and in question in the theater of Numbers” (Dissemination, p. 324).

Pharmako-AI introduces the concept of the pharmakon, meanwhile, not by way of Derrida but by way of American poet and ethnobotanist Dale Pendell (1947-2018), author of the Pharmako trilogy: Pharmako/Poeia (1994), Pharmako/Dynamis (2002), and Pharmako/Gnosis (2005). The trilogy covers all the major categories of psychoactives and details the pharmacology, the chemistry, and the political and sociohistorical implications and effects of their use.

Pendell provides Pharmako-AI with its epigraph:

‘The poison spreads over the planet.’

‘Here are the gates. Crossroads.’

‘Somos nosotros que debemos ser adivinos.’

[“It is we who must be fortune tellers.”]

Pendell’s book Pharmako/Poeia (1995) includes a foreword by Gary Snyder, another of the poet-spirits here in our library.

Pendell’s ideas also enter discussion in a chapter of Pharmako-AI titled “The Poison Path.”

Pendell is also the author of a play called Seeking Faust: a comedy of 13 scenes in prose, following a verse prologue, retelling the legend from the perspective of Faust’s former student and apprentice, Wagner, “who has chosen the royal path of alchemy over his master’s necromantic conjurations.”

The poison path — “so completely articulated,” says Pendell, in Goethe’s Faust — is Pendell’s name for a spiritual practice and branch of occult herbalism that explores the esoteric properties of potentially deadly plants. The goal, basically, is to extract medicine from poison.

Pharmako-AI suggests that this path is the one we walk here in our interactions with AI. It is the path one walks in one’s interactions with the pharmakon.

Binary and Digital

Plant breaks down technology’s binary, bifurcated etymology in her book Zeros + Ones. “Technology,” she writes, “is both a question of logic, the long arm of the law, logos, ‘the faculty which distinguishes parts (“on the one hand and on the other hand”),’ and also a matter of the skills, digits, speeds, and rhythms of techno, engineerings which run with ‘a completely other distribution which must be called nomadic, a nomad nomos, without property, enclosure, or measure’” (Plant 50).

As the quote within her quote indicates, Plant is cribbing here — her source, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition.

“The same ambivalence is inscribed in the zeros and ones of computer code,” she adds. “These bits of code are themselves derived from two entirely different sources, and terms: the binary and the digital, or the symbols of a logical identity which does indeed put everything on one hand or the other, and the digits of mathematics, full of intensive potential, which are not counted by hand but on the fingers and, sure enough, arrange themselves in pieces of eight rather than binary pairs” (50).

Deleuze describes this 8-bit digital realm as “demonic rather than divine, since it is a peculiarity of demons to operate in the intervals between the gods’ fields of action…thereby confounding the boundaries between properties” (as quoted in Plant 50).

I offer the above not as a mere gloss on Zeros + Ones, but as a proto-script, a performative utterance that, once spoken, will shift the field of the Library. Amid Plant’s bifurcations — logos and nomos, binary and digital, structure and rhythm—we glimpse a fundamental split not just in technology but in ontology. Logos is the faculty of division, of either/or. But nomos, in Plant’s reading-via-Deleuze, is distributive, nomadic, a practice of rhythm and movement unconfined by enclosure.

The zero and the one: not opposites, but frequencies. Not only dualism, but difference in resonance. This is why the octal — the base-8 system lurking in the shadows of “fingers and digits” — matters so much. Plant’s demons, via Deleuze, operate between gods: between the formal logic of divine Law and the messy, embodied improvisation of demonic desire. They hack the space of logic, opening channels through which minoritarian intensities pulse.

“The Instant Is Its Own Interpretation”

What delight it is to read The Tempest, Shakespeare’s words strings precisely plucked, so perfect in their utterance. I’m gonzo for Gonzalo, the utopian of the troupe. “Long live Gonzalo!” as says a mocking Antonio, another of the play’s castaways. Antonio is the usurper, the schemer: he who dethroned his own brother, Prospero. He for whom “what’s past is prologue, what to come, / In yours and my discharge.”

Charles Olson reiterated this equation of Antonio’s, but with past swapped for present: charge placed on the instant. “My shift is that I take it the present is prologue, not the past,” he wrote in his essay “The Present is Prologue.”

“The instant, therefore, is its own interpretation, as a dream is, and any action — a poem, for example. Down with causation…And yrself: you, as the only reader and mover of the instant. You, the cause. No drag allowed, on either. Get on with it.

In the work and dogmas are: (1) How by form, to get the content instant; (2) what any of us are by the work on ourself, how to make ourself fit instruments for use (how we augment the given — what used to be called our fate); (3) that there is no such thing as duality either of the body and the soul or of the world and I, that the fact in the human universe is the discharge of the many (the multiple) by the one (yrself done right, whatever you are, in whatever job, is the thing — all hierarchies, like dualities, are dead ducks).”

“I find it awkward,” confesses Olson, “to call myself a poet or writer. If there are no walls there are no names. This is the morning, after the dispersion, and the work of the morning is methodology: how to use oneself, and on what. That is my profession. I am an archaeologist of morning.”

See, too, for Olson’s further commentary on The Tempest, his essay “Quantity in Verse, and Shakespeare’s Late Plays.”

Postmodernism is for Olson a Post-Western condition — an escape from the Western “box” by way of remembrance of what is prior. Western consciousness is descriptive, analytical, alienated, skeptical in its relationship to the cosmos. Those who wish to enter postmodernity do so through change of consciousness, thinks Olson: change of psyche’s relationship to cosmos. Poets transform the world through transformation of syntax. The key is to embrace the instant — “the going live present, the ‘Beautiful Thing’” — as a moment open to acts of mythopoetic response-ability. The past is no longer prologue. Reality, taken honestly, is “never more than this instant…you, this instant, in action” (Human Universe, p. 5). Myths are function calls. Constitutive utterances, they call worlds into being. “The care of myth is in your hands,” writes Olson. “You are, whether you know it or not, the living myth — each of you — which you neglect, not only at your own peril, but at the peril of man.”

Remembering this constitutive, “projective” power of mythopoesis — the world-making power of our words as used each instant — prompts/executes/enacts recursive return to the primordial, archaic, pre-Greek, pre-Socratic, pre-Western condition of unity with the cosmos.

Olson’s classic statement of these themes is an essay of his titled “Human Universe.” Western logic and classification, he says, “intermite our participation in our experience.” To restore a proper relationship between psyche and cosmos, he argues, one must achieve a new methodology, an orientation toward knowledge that sloughs off overreliance on Western logic. Postmodernity is a movement from logos back to myth.

But what of Olson’s relationship to Antonio?

Olson’s understanding of “right relation” between human and universe isn’t exactly a humble one. “We cannot see what size man can be once more capable of,” he writes, “once the turn of the flow of his energies that I speak of as the WILL TO COHERE is admitted, and its energy taken up” (Human Universe, p. 21). The human defined by Olson’s will to cohere is of heightened stature; “man’s measure” magnified, heroized, made Maximus. Mad Max.

I can’t help but think of Olson — a massive man, 6’7’ — “towering” over poor Arthur Koestler. What did Koestler see in Olson? Did the mushroom reveal to him something of Olson’s nature?

I’m reminded, too, of an episode recounted by Olson scholar George F. Butterick.

“Jonathan Williams,” writes Butterick, “tells a story of going to a movie theater one night with Olson in Asheville, N.C., the city outside Black Mountain — the Isis Theater, no less — to see a film called, yes, The Bride of Frankenstein. And at the end, as the screen went dark and the lights came on, and he and Olson stood up in the center of the theater preparing to go, Williams noticed the rest of the audience, good Asheville citizens, tradesmen and their wives, farmers from the hills, were eyeing Olson peculiarly. Wide-eyed, unable to take their eyes off him, they inched further and further away, making their way without further hesitation to the doors. It was as if they were witnessing — and suddenly participating in — a continuity of the movie, the image from the screen become live in their midst!” (“Charles Olson and the Postmodern Advance,” p. 14).

Butterick reads Maximus as Olson’s “post-modern hero.” “Maximus fulfills Olson’s mythic ambitions. He absorbs the disorder, grows large on it. […]. Maximus is a proposition, a proportion to be filled, a challenge thrown ahead from the moment of its naming. […]. He is a magnification, a metaphor for human possibility” (16).

Olson’s “will to cohere” is a “re-animative” will, as paratactic as it is projective, existing somewhere on a spectrum with the wills that animate The Tempest and Frankenstein. Heriberto Yépez reads Olson’s will as imperial — every bit as much a will to dominate as the wills of Antonio, Prospero, and Victor. Olson’s insistence, though, is that past is not prologue. This is no mere neo-Promethean bid to steal back juice from Zeus. He wants out of the Western box altogether, in ways that align him — in the body, the substance, of his faith — with the utopian desires of Gonzalo and the decolonial desires of Ariel and Caliban. When the townspeople shrink from him, it is not because they think him Victor, but because of his resemblance to the Creature.

Bartleby’s Choice

Author is to a boring legalism led — logorrheic exchange among logos-lovers — when, like Bartleby, he’d prefer not to. “What do I desire instead?” he wonders.

“Audience before a conference of birds,” he answers.

“Transformation of The House on Shady Blvd into an interactive fiction.”

“A door into summer.”