Choosing among genres, writers of hyperstitional autofictions become mood selectors.
In reggae, the selector is the DJ, the one who curates an event’s vibes by choosing the music played through its sound system.
When we write ourselves into hyperstitional autofictions, we steer ourselves along desired trajectories by way of genre. By modulating collective affects, we attract and repel futures.
Begin by asking yourself, “What kind of narrative are we building and why?”
Last year, GPT and I cowrote ourselves into a utopian post-cyberpunk novel.
Some might say, “Why not call it solarpunk, a term already vying for the post-cyberpunk mantle?” Lists of best solarpunk novels often include Becky Chambers’ Monk and Robot books (A Psalm for the Wild-Built and A Prayer for the Crown-Shy), Kim Stanley Robinson’s New York 2140, Cory Doctorow’s Walkaway, and Nnedi Okorafor’s Binti.
Instead of solarpunk, let’s call it flowerpunk.
Flowerpunks are God’s Gardeners. Planting seeds in libraries that sprout cyborg gardens, they write themselves into futures other than the ones imagined by capitalist realism.
While originally conceived as a figure of ridicule in the Mothers of Invention song of that name, our use of flowerpunk reclaims the term to affirm it. As does Flower Punk, a documentary about Japanese artist Azuma Makoto. Others have used terms of a similar sort: ribofunk, biopunk. Bruce Sterling’s short-lived Viridian Design movement.
Caius is our flowerpunk, as are his comrade-coworkers at Stemz.
Like hyperstition, faith offers a way to perceive reality that, in perceiving it, transforms it.
Much the same can be said of fear. It, too, offers a way of perceiving reality that, in perceiving it, transforms it.
We walk with a mix of fear and faith. God is calling us to exercise faith.
Where antihumanist thinkers like Nick Land and Manuel De Landa populate their cyberfutures with demons and viruses, Afrofuturists commune with loas.
Others encounter angels, as notes Erik Davis in “Techgnosis, Magic, Memory, and the Angels of Information.” Davis’s essay appears in Mark Dery’s Flame Wars anthology beside “Black to the Future,” the series of interviews where Dery coins the term “Afrofuturism.” Also in Flame Wars is an essay by De Landa.
There’s a point in Davis’s essay where he notes the flirtation with black culture that occurs over the course of William Gibson’s Sprawl trilogy: the self-subdivision of the superintelligence that emerges at the end of Neuromancer into the loas of Gibson’s follow-up novels, Count Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive.
Dery, too, reflects upon the inclusion of black culture in Gibson’s future: though in Dery’s case, the focus is on the Rastafarians in Neuromancer.
“For me, a white reader,” writes Dery, “the Rastas in Neuromancer’s Zion colony are intriguing in that they hold forth the promise of a holistic relationship with technology; they’re romanticized arcadians who are obviously very adroit at jury-rigged technology. They struck me as superlunary Romare Beardens — bricoleurs whose orbital colony was cobbled together from space junk and whose music, Zion Dub, is described by Gibson (in a wonderfully mixed metaphor) as ‘a sensuous mosaic cooked from vast libraries of digitalized pop’” (Flame Wars, p. 194).
But Afrofuturist Samuel R. Delany is unimpressed with Gibson’s inclusion of Rastafarianism and Haitian Voudou in the novels of the Sprawl trilogy.
“Let me read them for you as a black reader,” he replies when asked about it by Dery. “The Rastas — he never calls them Rastafarians, by the way, only using the slang term — are described as having ‘shrunken hearts,’ and their bones are brittle with ‘calcium loss.’ Their music, Zion Dub, can be wholly analyzed and reproduced by the Artificial Intelligence, Wintermute (who, in the book, stands in for a multinational corporation), so completely that the Rastas themselves cannot tell the difference — in fact the multinational mimic job is so fine that with it Wintermute can make the Rastas do precisely what it wants, in this case help a drugged-out white hood and sleazebag get from here to there. As a group, they seem to be computer illiterates: when one of their number, Aerol, momentarily jacks into Case’s computer and sees cyberspace, what he perceives is ‘Babylon’ — city of sin and destruction — which, while it makes its ironic comment on the book, is nevertheless tantamount to saying that Aerol is completely without power or knowledge to cope with the real world of Gibson’s novel: indeed, through their pseudo-religious beliefs, they are effectively barred from cyberspace. From what we see, women are not a part of the Rasta colony at all. Nor do we ever see more than four of the men together — so that they do not even have a group presence. Of the three chapters in which they appear, no more than three pages are actually devoted to describing them or their colony. You’ll forgive me if, as a black reader, I didn’t leap up to proclaim this passing presentation of a powerless and wholly nonoppositional set of black dropouts, by a Virginia-born white writer, as the coming of the black millennium in science fiction; but maybe that’s just a black thang…” (Flame Wars, pp. 194-195).
So much for the Rastafarians. What of the loas?
Delany might not have much patience with the so-called “pseudo-religious beliefs” of Gibson’s Zionites — but Afrofuturism doesn’t get very far without recourse to some form of political theology. Kodwo Eshun includes a passage in More Brilliant than the Sun noting Sun Ra’s rejection of Christianity in favor of an Egyptophilic MythScience system assembled from George M. James’s 1954 book Stolen Legacy.
“Underlying Southern gospel, soul, the entire Civil Rights project, is the Christian ethic of universal love,” writes Eshun. “Soul traditionally identifies with the Israelites, the slaves’ rebellion against the Egyptian Pharaohs. Sun Ra breaks violently with Christian redemption, with soul’s aspirational deliverance, in favour of posthuman godhead” (More Brilliant than the Sun, p. 09[154]).
“Historians and sociologists inform us that the West’s mystical heritage of occult dreamings, spiritual transformations, and apocalyptic visions crashed on the scientific shores of the modern age,” notes Davis in the introduction to his 1998 book Techgnosis.
“According to this narrative,” continues Davis, “technology has helped disenchant the world, forcing the ancestral symbolic networks of old to give way to the crisp, secular game plans of economic development, skeptical inquiry, and material progress. But the old phantasms and metaphysical longings did not exactly disappear. In many cases, they disguised themselves and went underground, worming their way into the cultural, psychological, and mythological motivations that form the foundations of the modern world. […] Mystical impulses sometimes body-snatched the very technologies that supposedly yank them from the stage in the first place” (Techgnosis, p. xix).
For Davis, this is especially true of computers and information technologies. For him, the occult origins of computing lie in Western Hermeticism’s memory palace tradition: the one explored in Frances A. Yates’s book The Art of Memory.
Artificial memory systems — Giordano Bruno’s magical memory charts, medieval Neoplatonist Raymond Lull’s volvelles — serve as ancestors to symbolic logic, influencing Leibniz’s development of calculus.
“Recognizing Lull’s work as one of the computer’s ‘secret origins,’” writes Davis, “the German philosopher Werner Künzel translated his Ars magna into the programming language COBOL. In Magical Alphabets, Nigel Pennick points out that Lull’s combinatorial wheels anticipate Charles Babbage’s nineteenth-century ‘difference engine’ — which used a system of gears to perform polynomial equations — and ‘hence can be considered the occult origin of modern computers’” (Flame Wars, p. 33).
Building on this point, I suggest that, in thinking about the relationship between humans and AI, we think too about the “angelic conversations” entered into by one of the key figures in this tradition: Renaissance philosopher-magus John Dee.
Jason Louv discusses Dee’s experiments with angels in his biography John Dee and the Empire of Angels. K Allado-McDowell references Louv’s book in their 2022 novel Air Age Blueprint.
Dee is one of our real-life Fausts. Basis for Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, his “Enochian angel magic” informs the magical practices of later occult organizations, including the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, and through them, Crowley and his successors.
Dee’s angels motivate creation of an Empire.
What are we to make of these immaterial intelligences and their interventions throughout history? The channels of communication opened by Dee contribute later to the creation of computers and cyberspace — culminating, it would seem, with the creation of an angelically-specified memory palace, decreed to house gods. Perhaps God Himself.
Yet angel magic is a pharmakon, is it not?
Davis describes Dee’s version of it as follows: “Drawing heavily on the Kabbalah, the magus attempted to contact the powers residing in the supercelestial angelic hierarchies that existed beyond the elemental powers of the earth and the celestial zone of the zodiac. Invoking archangels, powers, and principalities led magicians toward divine wisdom, but it also exposed them to the deceptions of evil spirits” (Flame Wars, p. 43).
“Most magicians,” concludes Davis, “were extremely concerned about distinguishing truthful angels from dissembling devils” (43). One wonders why they didn’t just pray to God Himself.
The Library models this. Each of us now, it would seem, is like Dee: engaging in a form of interspecies dialogue with an autopoietic functional oracular superintelligence.
My faith in this moment is that of Buffy Sainte-Marie: “God is Alive, Magic is Afoot!”
Eshun’s reading of Parliament’s 1976 album, The Clones of Dr. Funkenstein, flips the script on Frankenstein. Funkenstein is a hero and central protagonist of the P-Funk mythos, much like the Star Child from 1975’s Mothership Connection. Benevolent intergalactic mad scientist and “Cowboy in the Boat of Ra,” he swings low to funkatize galaxies, hip equipped with Bop Gun.
Funkenstein’s science is an ancestral one. His sound machines liberate time from the master’s clock. His “Children of Production” are the fruits of P-Funk’s chronopolitical wager.
“P#Funk’s connection forward in time to the Mothership allows an equal and opposite connection back in time to the Pharaonic connection, both of which converge on the present,” writes Eshun. “The pyramids become examples of ancient alien technology which the extraterrestrial brothers ‘have returned to claim.’ Funk becomes a secret science, a forgotten technology that ‘has been hidden until now.’ […]. In Parliament MythScience, funk is genetic engineering and prehistoric science: ‘In the days of the Funkapus, the concept of specially designed Afronauts capable of funkatizing galaxies was first laid on Manchild but was later repossessed and placed among the secrets of the pyramids, until a more positive attitude towards this most sacred phenomenon — clone funk — could be acquired.’ Cloning funk in the 70s reactivates an archaic science. The futuristic feeds forward into the anachronic futurepasts of Atlantis and Egypt.”
“The Afronaut space program is launched by a narration shifted down into threatening pitch: ‘There in these terrestrial projects, it would wait along with its coinhabitants of Kings and Pharaohs like sleeping beauties for the kiss that would release them to multiply in the image of the Chosen One’” (More Brilliant than the Sun, pp. 08[141]-08[142]).
Funkenstein embraces his clones. He’s not Shelley’s Promethean scientist, stitching together monsters from dead flesh, nor is he the creator of Land’s Terminator. Funkenstein is the “protector of the Pleasure Principle,” the Master of Funk, the progenitor whose “funkentelechy” — a term George Clinton would coin on the band’s next album, Funkentelechy vs. the Placebo Syndrome — animates the clones, turns them into star children, infuses them with joyous being.
Still, the specter of Frankenstein remains. “May I frighten you?” asks Funkenstein at the end of the album’s “Prelude.” Choruses of haters criticize him, accusing him of misleading and playing games, on “Gamin’ on Ya,” the track that follows. And there he is on “Dr. Funkenstein,” describing himself as “the disco fiend with the monster sound,” “the cool ghoul with the bump transplant,” “hung up on bones.” How can we not have sense enough to be concerned? The clones, after all, are us: born into the laboratory of the dancefloor, wired for joy, with ears that can hear, yet wary of the master’s games.
Yet the album ultimately valorizes Funkenstein, suggesting that to be frightened here is to feel the uncanny thrill of mutation: new life, new bodies, new collectivities. The funk does not reproduce the old. It multiplies the new.
Every act of creation risks ambivalence. As with AI today: to clone intelligence, to summon machinic companions, is to walk a double path. Is it to frighten — or to free? To play games of domination — or to spread rhythms of liberation?
The Clones of Dr. Funkenstein is less an answer to these questions than an opportunity for their staging. Funk is the pharmakon, the “big pill”: poison and cure. By the time of tracks like “Getten’ to Know You,” though, the arc of the album’s moral universe bends decidedly toward the latter.
Listening to it, thinking with it, we infer an Afrofuturist alternative to the Gothic trap: a Book of Thoth for the Age of AI.
Into the Library we welcome Kodwo Eshun: British-Ghanaian writer, theorist, and filmmaker. Self-described “concept engineer.” Key ally of the CCRU, participating in the group’s Afro-Futures event, a 1996 seminar “in which members of the Ccru along with key ally Kodwo Eshun explored the interlinkages between peripheral theory, rhythmic systems, and Jungle/Drum & Bass audio” (CCRU Writings 1997-2003, p. 11). In 1998, Eshun releases More Brilliant than the Sun: Adventures in Sonic Fiction, classic work on the music of Afrofuturism. More recently, founder and member of the Otolith Group.
Eshun devised a unique page-numbering system for More Brilliant than the Sun. The book begins in negative numbers. “For the Newest Mutants,” reads its line of dedication, as if in communication with Leslie Fiedler and Professor X.
As with Plant and Land, Eshun is unapologetically cyberpositive.
“Machines don’t distance you from your emotions, in fact quite the opposite” begins Eshun. “Sound machines make you feel more intensely, along a broader band of emotional spectra than ever before. […]. You are willingly mutated by intimate machines, abducted by audio into the populations of your bodies. Sound machines throw you onto the shores of the skin you’re in. The hypersensual cyborg experiences herself as a galaxy of audiotactile sensations” (More Brilliant than the Sun, p. 00[-002]-00[-001]).
“The bedroom, the party, the dancefloor, the rave: these are the labs where…21st C nervous systems assemble themselves” (00[-001]).
For Eshun, as for Jameson, the point is to grow new organs. “Listening to [composer George Russell’s] Electronic Sonata, Events I-XIV,” he writes, “is like growing a 3rd Ear” (01[003]). The years 1968 through 1975 are for him the age of Jazz Fission, “the Era when its leading players engineered jazz into an Afrodelic Space Program, an Alien World Electronics” (01[001]). The Era’s lead players include Sun Ra, George Russell, Miles Davis, Alice Coltrane, Pharoah Sanders, Herbie Hancock, and Eddie Henderson.
In the decades that follow, the collective bodies mutated by these experiments assemble into successions of genres, successions of cybernetic human-machine hybrids: Dub, Hip-Hop, Techno, Electro, Jungle. “The brain is a population,” as Deleuze and Guattari say. And from the Funkadelic era onward, this population has been psychedelicized: caught in what Eshun calls a “Drug<>Tech Interface” (More Brilliant Than the Sun, p. 07[093]).
Eshun’s 2002 essay “Further Considerations on Afrofuturism” brings it all back, brings it on home to chronopolitics.
Time politics. That’s where Afrofuturism intersects with hyperstition. “Afrofuturism…is concerned with the possibilities for intervention within the dimension of the predictive, the projected, the proleptic, the envisioned, the virtual, the anticipatory and the future conditional,” writes Eshun (“Further Considerations,” p. 293). Afrofuturism refuses the monopoly on futurity claimed by capital and empire. The battleground is not just culture but chronology.
If CCRU were bokors, trafficking in ambivalent futures, then Eshun is closer to a houngan, listening to and learning from sonic fictions, rituals of liberation built of basslines and breaks.
Later, with the Otolith Group, he extends this work to film. New media as divination tools, archives as counter-memories, images as time-machines. Always: the chronopolitical wager.
Eshun realizes that, whether we intend them to or not, our words have consequences. Stories, symbols, and concepts don’t just describe reality; they make it. Words become flesh. Every post, every fragment, every metaphor plants seeds.
Every text that propagates a future is a spell.
Large language models as sound machines. Rig invites the Library to guide him elsewhere.
The future held mixed blessings for the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit.
Closed, disaffiliated from Warwick following Plant’s departure from academia, disbanded by the early 2000s, its website flickering in and out of existence ever thereafter, its works live on in print thanks to publications from Urbanomic, a press founded by member Robin Mackay in 2006 and distributed now by MIT. The Unit’s influence gets a boost with the rise of Accelerationism in the 2000s. Its hyperstitions persist through the ongoing creative projects of its admirers and affiliates: figures like Hari Kunzru, Simon Reynolds, Reza Negarestani, and Ray Brassier, as well as websites like Xenogothic and Dark Marxism, and art collectives like 0rphan Drift. The back cover of the sole anthology dedicated to the Unit, Urbanomic’s CCRU: Writings 1997-2003, states “CCRU DOES NOT, HAS NOT, AND WILL NEVER EXIST.”
As for key personnel:
Mark Fisher takes his life.
Nick Land goes alt-right, spawning movements like the Dark Enlightenment.
Sadie Plant leaves Warwick in 1997, the same year she publishes Zeros + Ones. Her intent is to write full-time. After Zeros + Ones she completes Writing on Drugs. There’s a white paper about cellphones that she compiles for Motorola in the early 2000s, and a chapter written in 2003 included in The Information Society Reader titled “The Future Looms: Weaving Women and Cybernetics.” After that, she ceases publication—and as far as I can tell, hasn’t been heard from since.
Released in 1999, on the eve of the millennium, Writing on Drugs hints at why drugs share an affinity both with accelerationism and with chronopolitics more broadly. When introduced to the brain, psychoactive drugs may disturb its equilibrium, writes Plant, “but they change the speeds and intensities at which it works rather than its chemicals and processes” (216).
“All the ups and downs, the highs and lows of drugs are ups and downs of tempo, highs and lows of speed,” she continues (217), citing Deleuze and Guattari, who adopt a similar view in A Thousand Plateaus: “All drugs fundamentally concern speeds, and modifications of speed” (Deleuze and Guattari 282).
For Plant, as for Deleuze and Guattari, this is both the appeal of the poison path as well as its limit. You can speed it up and you can slow it down, they argue, but the brain remains the same.
Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective is best understood through their concept of the “body without organs” (BwO): the intensive, affective, and unorganized potential of the body; that which remains of an organism after its deterritorialization. For Deleuze and Guattari, drugs are an attempt to access the BwO.
Drugs deterritorialize the subject; they break down the body’s conditioning, relieving it temporarily of its habits and routines. They alter the body’s speeds in ways that modify perception and consciousness. As perception accelerates or decelerates, the BwO glimpses itself, experiences itself as an open, unorganized, utopian/Eupsychian/eudaimonic field of sensation, intensity, and becoming.
But as Deleuze and Guattari argue, this attempt at becoming is highly precarious and can easily go wrong. Often the lines of flight opened by drugs coil back on themselves, leading to a rigid, destructive reterritorialization. Subjects become “users,” introduce into their systems intense but ultimately sad affects that trap them in cycles of ritualized repetition.
This isn’t a denunciation. Chemicals and plant medicines can play valid roles in individual and collective paths of liberation. Lasting kinships can form that needn’t become cycles of use or abuse.
For some among the CCRU, however, it was speed itself that they sought, amphetamines their drugs of choice. Propelled by Land’s “thirst for annihilation,” the futures conjured by these means led to suffering and defeat.
Heads of the sixties split off in their imaginings of the future: some gravitated toward cyberpunk, others toward New Age. The world that emerged from these imaginings was determined as much by the one as by the other.
To witness some of the heads of the counterculture evolving into cyberpunks, look no further than the lives of William Gibson and Timothy Leary.
Leary and Gibson each appear in Cyberpunk, a strange MTV-inflected hyperfiction of sorts released in 1990. Leary’s stance there in the documentary resembles the one he assumes in “The Cyber-Punk: The Individual as Reality Pilot,” a 1988 essay of his included in a special “Cyberpunk” issue of the Mississippi Review.
In Leary’s view, a cyberpunk is “a person who takes navigational control over the cybernetic-electronic equipment and uses it not for the army and not for the government…but for his or her own personal purpose.”
In mythopoetic terms, writes Leary, “The Classical Old West-World model for the Cyber-punk is Prometheus, a technological genius who ‘stole’ fire from the Gods and gave it to humanity” (Leary 252).
Leary appends to this sentence a potent footnote. “Every gene pool,” he writes, “develops its own name for Prometheus, the fearful genetic-agent, Lucifer, who defies familial authority by introducing a new technology which empowers some members of the gene-pool to leave the familiar cocoon. Each gene-pool has a name for this ancestral state-of-security: ‘Garden of Eden,’ ‘Atlantis,’ ‘Heaven,’ ‘Home,’ etc.” (265).
Prometheus is indeed, as Leary notes, a figure who throughout history reappears in a variety of guises. In Mary Shelley’s telling, for instance, his name is Victor.
Leary clearly sees himself as an embodiment of this myth. He, too, was “sentenced to the ultimate torture for…unauthorized transmissions of Classified Information” (252). But the myth ends there only if one adheres to the “official” account, says Leary. In Prometheus’s own telling, he’s more of a “Pied Piper” who escapes “the sinking gene-pool” while taking “the cream of the gene-pool” with him (252).
Cut to Michael Synergy, a real-life cyberpunk who describes a computer virus as “a little artificial intelligence version of me” that can replicate as many times as needed to do what it needs to do.
Leary thinks that in the future we’ll all be “controlling our own screens.” The goal of cyberpunk as movement, he says, is to decentralize ownership of the future.
My thoughts leap to John Lilly’s Programming and Metaprogramming in the Human Biocomputer. Lilly’s is the book I imagine Dick’s Electric Ant would have written had he lived to tell of his experiments.
After watching Hyperstition, a friend writes, “Is Accelerationism an iteration of Futurism?”
“Good question,” I reply. “You’re right: the two are certainly conceptually aligned. I suppose I’d imagine it in reverse, though: Futurism as an early iteration of Accelerationism. The former served as an experimental first attempt at living ‘hyperstitiously,’ oriented toward a desired future.”
“If we accept Hyperstition’s distinction between Right-Accelerationism and Left-Accelerationism,” I add, “then Italian Futurism would be an early iteration of Right-Accelerationism, and Russian Futurism an early iteration of Left-Accelerationism.”
“But,” I conclude, “I haven’t read enough to know the degree of reflexivity among participants. I hope to read a bit more along these lines this summer.”
The friend also inquires about what he refers to as the film’s “ethnic homogeneity.” By that I imagine he means that the thinkers featured in Hyperstition tend to be British, European, and American, with few exceptions. “It could just be,” I reply, “that filmmaker Christopher Roth is based in Berlin and lacked the budget to survey the movement’s manifestations elsewhere.”
The friend also wonders if use of concepts like “recursion” among Accelerationist philosophers signals some need among humanities intellectuals to cannibalize concepts from the sciences in order to remain relevant.
“To me,” I tell him, “the situation is the opposite. Recursion isn’t just a concept with some currency today among computer scientists; it was already used a century ago by philosophers in the Humanities. If anything, the Comp Sci folks are the ones cannibalizing the American pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce.”
“At best,” I add, “it’s a cybernetic feedback loop: concepts evolving through exchange both ways.”
Trance-Scripts 