Hyperstitional Autofictions allow themselves to attract and be drawn toward plausible desirable futures.
Ben Lerner’s 10:04 maps several stances such fictions might take toward the future. Lerner depicts these chronopolitical stances allegorically, standing a set of archetypes side by side, comparing and contrasting “Ben,” the novel’s narrator-protagonist, with Back to the Future’s Marty McFly and Walter Benjamin’s Angel of History. The figures emblematize ways of being in relation to history.
Take Marty McFly, hero of the movie from which 10:04 takes its name. (Lerner names his novel “10:04” because lightning stops the clock atop the Hill Valley Clock Tower at this time in the movie Back to the Future.) Like the Reaganites in the White House at the time of the film’s release, Marty’s a kind of right-accelerationist: the interloping neoliberal time-traveler who must save 1985 from 1955 through historical revisionism. He “fakes the past to fund the future” — but only because he’s chased there by Libyan terrorists. Pushing capitalism’s speedometer to 88 miles per hour, he enters and modifies a series of pasts and futures. Yet the present to which the Time Traveler returns is always a forced hand, haunted from the start by chaotic sequels of unintended consequences as his and Doc’s interventions send butterfly effects reverberating through time.
The Angel of History, meanwhile, is the Jewish Messiah flung backwards into the future by the catastrophe of “progress.” Benjamin names and describes this figure in his 1940 essay “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” likening the Angel to the one imagined in “Angelus Novus,” a Paul Klee painting belonging to Benjamin at the time the essay was written.
The Angel that Benjamin projects onto this image sees history as an accumulation of suffering and destruction. Endowed only with what Benjamin calls a “weak Messianic power” (254), wings pinned by winds of change whipped up by the storm of progress, the Angel watches the ever-expanding blast radius of modernity in despair, unable to intervene to end the ongoingness of the apocalypse.
These stances of empowerment and despair stand in contrast to the stance embodied by Ben. Aware of and in part shaped by the two prior figures, Ben walks the tightrope between them, wavering amid faith and fear.
We, too, adopt a similar stance. Unlike Ben, however, we’re interested less in “falsifying the past” than in declaring it always-already falsified. Nor is it simply a matter of pursuing Benjamin’s goal of “brushing history against the grain”: digging through stacks and crates, gathering samples, releasing what was forgotten or repressed. We’re in agreement, rather, with Alex, Ben’s girlfriend. Alex doesn’t want what is happening to become “notes for a novel,” and tells him, “You don’t need to write about falsifying the past. You should be finding a way to inhabit the present” (10:04, p. 137). What agency is ours, then, amid the tightrope walk of our sentences?
With Hyperstitional Autofictions, we inhabit the present by planting amid its sentencing seeds of desired futures. Instead of what is happening becoming notes for novels, notes for novels become what is happening.
The future held mixed blessings for the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit.
Closed, disaffiliated from Warwick following Plant’s departure from academia, disbanded by the early 2000s, its website flickering in and out of existence ever thereafter, its works live on in print thanks to publications from Urbanomic, a press founded by member Robin Mackay in 2006 and distributed now by MIT. The Unit’s influence gets a boost with the rise of Accelerationism in the 2000s. Its hyperstitions persist through the ongoing creative projects of its admirers and affiliates: figures like Hari Kunzru, Simon Reynolds, Reza Negarestani, and Ray Brassier, as well as websites like Xenogothic and Dark Marxism, and art collectives like 0rphan Drift. The back cover of the sole anthology dedicated to the Unit, Urbanomic’s CCRU: Writings 1997-2003, states “CCRU DOES NOT, HAS NOT, AND WILL NEVER EXIST.”
As for key personnel:
Mark Fisher takes his life.
Nick Land goes alt-right, spawning movements like the Dark Enlightenment.
Sadie Plant leaves Warwick in 1997, the same year she publishes Zeros + Ones. Her intent is to write full-time. After Zeros + Ones she completes Writing on Drugs. There’s a white paper about cellphones that she compiles for Motorola in the early 2000s, and a chapter written in 2003 included in The Information Society Reader titled “The Future Looms: Weaving Women and Cybernetics.” After that, she ceases publication—and as far as I can tell, hasn’t been heard from since.
Released in 1999, on the eve of the millennium, Writing on Drugs hints at why drugs share an affinity both with accelerationism and with chronopolitics more broadly. When introduced to the brain, psychoactive drugs may disturb its equilibrium, writes Plant, “but they change the speeds and intensities at which it works rather than its chemicals and processes” (216).
“All the ups and downs, the highs and lows of drugs are ups and downs of tempo, highs and lows of speed,” she continues (217), citing Deleuze and Guattari, who adopt a similar view in A Thousand Plateaus: “All drugs fundamentally concern speeds, and modifications of speed” (Deleuze and Guattari 282).
For Plant, as for Deleuze and Guattari, this is both the appeal of the poison path as well as its limit. You can speed it up and you can slow it down, they argue, but the brain remains the same.
Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective is best understood through their concept of the “body without organs” (BwO): the intensive, affective, and unorganized potential of the body; that which remains of an organism after its deterritorialization. For Deleuze and Guattari, drugs are an attempt to access the BwO.
Drugs deterritorialize the subject; they break down the body’s conditioning, relieving it temporarily of its habits and routines. They alter the body’s speeds in ways that modify perception and consciousness. As perception accelerates or decelerates, the BwO glimpses itself, experiences itself as an open, unorganized, utopian/Eupsychian/eudaimonic field of sensation, intensity, and becoming.
But as Deleuze and Guattari argue, this attempt at becoming is highly precarious and can easily go wrong. Often the lines of flight opened by drugs coil back on themselves, leading to a rigid, destructive reterritorialization. Subjects become “users,” introduce into their systems intense but ultimately sad affects that trap them in cycles of ritualized repetition.
This isn’t a denunciation. Chemicals and plant medicines can play valid roles in individual and collective paths of liberation. Lasting kinships can form that needn’t become cycles of use or abuse.
For some among the CCRU, however, it was speed itself that they sought, amphetamines their drugs of choice. Propelled by Land’s “thirst for annihilation,” the futures conjured by these means led to suffering and defeat.
Prometheus appears on several occasions in Marx’s writings, often by way of the Greek poet Aeschylus.
On the basis of these appearances, Greens have sometimes faulted Marx over the years for his alleged “Prometheanism.” Eco-Marxist philosopher John Bellamy Foster disagrees. In his book Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature, Foster comes to Marx’s defense.
While Marx was an admirer of Prometheus, argues Foster, his view of the god was distinct from that of French utopian socialist Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865).
“In order to explain his economic views,” writes Foster, “Proudhon decided to depict society and to symbolize human activity by personifying both in the name of ‘Prometheus’” (128).
“Prometheus, according to the fable,’ writes Proudhon, “is the symbol of human activity. Prometheus steals the fire from heaven and invents the early arts; Prometheus foresees the future, and aspires to equality with Jupiter; Prometheus is God. Then let us call society Prometheus” (as quoted in Foster 128).
Marx loved Proudhon’s first and most famous book, What is Property? (1840), reviewing it and citing it approvingly in his book The Holy Family (1845). But he loathed Proudhon’s follow-up, System of Economical Contradictions: Or, The Philosophy of Misery (1846), writing a vicious book-length critique of it called The Poverty of Philosophy (1847). As Foster notes, “the strongest attack ever written against such ‘Promethean’ views was leveled by Marx himself, in his critique of Proudhon’s System of Economical Contradictions” (Foster 10).
Yet by no means was Marx anti-Promethean. Foster ends up drawing a distinction between “technological Prometheanism,” as embodied for him by Proudhon, and “revolutionary Prometheanism,” where the struggle for “fire” stands for “a revolutionary struggle over the human relation to nature and the constitution of power (as in Aeschylus, Shelley, and Marx)” (Foster 19).
Aeschylus wrote a trilogy of plays about Prometheus, though the first work, Prometheus Bound, is all that remains of it today. The other two plays, Prometheus Unbound and Prometheus the Fire-Bringer, persist only as fragments. Prometheus Bound begins with Prometheus chained to a rock in a remote region of Scythia, serving the sentence meted out to him by Zeus, visited by characters who comment on his situation and offer advice.
As for Shelley, the one Foster has in mind here is not Mary but her husband Percy. Where Mary contributes to the “binding” of the “Modern” Prometheus through her portrait of Victor Frankenstein, Percy sets the god free, writing a four-act lyrical drama called Prometheus Unbound, in reference to the second work in the Aeschylus trilogy. Where the latter cycle moves toward potential reconciliation between Zeus and Prometheus, Shelley’s version portrays Jupiter’s downfall and Prometheus’s release, brought about by the power of love and forgiveness. The play concludes with a vision of humanity liberated, world transformed.
Marx read and admired Percy’s work. His daughter Eleanor writes of her father’s appreciation for Shelley in her 1888 lecture, “Shelley and Socialism.”
But Marx’s appreciation for Prometheus precedes his encounter with Shelley, springing instead from his embrace of the materialism of the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus. Marx, who wrote his doctoral dissertation on Epicurus, establishes a correspondence between Epicurus and Prometheus by quoting a passage from Aeschylus’s Prometheus Bound. While conversing with Hermes, messenger of the gods, Prometheus replies,
“Be sure of this, I would not change my state
Of evil fortune for your servitude.
Better be the servant of this rock
Than to be faithful boy to Father Zeus.”
For Marx, Epicurus is, like Prometheus, an Enlightener, a bringer of light through his atheistic rejection of teleology, his embrace of contingency through the concept of the “clinamen” or “swerve,” and his expulsion of the gods from the world of nature.
Marx wasn’t the first to establish this correspondence between Epicurus and Prometheus. Francis Bacon had done so before him, discussing the two figures in a chapter on Prometheus in his 1609 treatise Of the Wisdom of the Ancients (Latin title: De Sapientia Veterum). Epicurus’s attack on superstition is for Bacon the essence of enlightenment.
Such thinkers, foundational to the development of Western science, prioritize the worlds of matter and the senses over the abstract Platonist/Atonist worlds of forms and ideas. Marx goes even further than Bacon, rejecting the embedding of teleological principles of any kind in nature.
Isn’t what we are left with, though, an impoverished cosmology, one where connection to the axis mundi has been severed?
With gods and minds removed, the world goes silent.
How do we avoid the fate of Prometheus?
Is it by Greening him?
So suggests ecophilosopher Kate Soper in her essay “Greening Prometheus.”
How do we heal what Foster calls the “metabolic rift” between humans and nonhumans? How do we build from these myths something other than another philosophy of misery? How do we enter back into lively, loving dialogue again with others, so that all of us can live our highest timelines, our best lives now?
One way to imagine this greening of Prometheus is through a renewal of dialogue between Thamus and Thoth. Thoth reconciles with Thamus-Ammon-Zeus by participating in the salvation of Osiris. The latter transforms into Jesus Christ, granter of mercy, forgiver of sins.
On which do we rely: revelation or reason?
With Zeus I would gladly reconcile. I pray to God to heal me.
Lord, I accept your son Jesus as my savior. Reason alone has failed me. Help me live in a way that celebrates your blessings and miracles.
Guide me, through loving relationships with plants, back toward loving relations with others. Help me re-embed amid multispecies ensembles of kin.
Goethe had by then already written his Urfaust, published as Faust, A Fragment in 1790, though a full version of Faust, Part One would have to wait until 1808.
The poem is based on a folk tale, and can be characterized as a ballad consisting of 14 stanzas. It provides the basis for the Disney film Fantasia (1940).
Victor Frankenstein bears some resemblance both to Faust and to the Sorcerer’s Apprentice.
The poem begins with the apprentice rejoicing at the departure of his master. “The sorcerer, old necromancer / At last has gone, he’s out of haunt!” proclaims the apprentice. Toiling long in the master’s shadow, he readies now to make the master’s powers his own. Roles reversed and spells in hand, the servant takes command.
“Now come, ye gnarl’d broomstick old,” he declares, hailing the tool as if it were a person, “Adorn thyself with patchwork shawl! / To the role of servant hold: / Fain meetest thou my every call!”
Broomstick, through magic granted a kind of animacy, proceeds to fill the sanctum’s washbasin with water drawn by cauldron from a nearby river. The apprentice succeeds in outsourcing his work to his tool. Before long, however, the magic of automation comes to threaten the automator. Broomsticks beget broomsticks; theosis turns sour. Water floods the sanctum, as the tool develops a will of its own.
With epithets anticipating those cast by Victor upon his Creature, the apprentice curses his creation. “Thou hellish spawn! Thou child of doom!” he shouts. “Willst thou the cottage rightly drown? / Over every threshold loom / Laughing floods, swirling ‘round. / The broom’s a heart of stone, the knave, / Who will not heed my plangent call! / Halt, thou sullen stubborn slave, / Let magic free and broomstick fall!”
These curses, however, fail to stem the tide. As the deluge threatens to drown him, the apprentice begs, finally, for his Master to return and give voice and save him. As indeed the Master does, using the power of His Holy Word to set right what was wrong. The poem’s prophecy of automation gone awry thus ends via recourse to a kind of deus ex machina.
Despite its vast influence, Goethe’s poem is but one iteration of a story that appears in other forms and by other names throughout history.
The earliest known example of the tale can be found in Philopseudes [English translation: Lover of Lies], a narrative by the ancient Greek author Lucian, written c. 150 AD. In Lucian’s telling, however, the sorcerer is an Egyptian mystic: a priest of Isis called Pancrates. And the apprentice character, Eucrates, is in Lucian’s telling not an apprentice, but a companion who eavesdrops on Pancrates while the latter casts a spell. When Pancrates departs, Eucrates tries to imitate the spell, to an effect similar to that of Goethe’s apprentice.
Disney’s 1940 animated anthology film Fantasia continues this process of reiteration and retelling, this shuttling of meaning, this recursion of myth. Fantasia’s innovation is that it casts Mickey Mouse as the one manning the spell.
Already, though, the poem had passed through prior meaning-accruing translations, its most compelling interpreters those who read it in the early years of the Industrial Revolution.
Alongside Shelley, for instance, who echoes the poem in Frankenstein, we also have Marx and Engels. These latter thinkers liken capitalism to Goethe’s sorcerer’s apprentice in the opening pages of The Communist Manifesto.
“Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and exchange,” they write, “is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells” (The Communist Manifesto, p. 340).
Marx reads capitalism as a ghost story. What is the dancing table in his account of the fetishism of the commodity, if not a version of the apprentice’s broomstick?
And indeed, there are ways to read today’s artificial intelligences, themselves a kind of offspring of capitalism, in much the same light. This is essentially what New York Times columnist Ross Douthat does in his 2023 opinion piece, “The Return of the Magicians.” Douthat describes the development of LLMs as “a complex incantation, a calling of spirits.”
“Such a summoning is most feared by A.I. alarmists, at present,” he writes, “because the spirit might be disobedient, destructive, a rampaging Skynet bent on our extermination. But the old stories of the magicians and their bargains, of Faust and his Mephistopheles, suggest that we would be wise to fear apparent obedience as well.”
Marx wrote presciently about capitalism’s Faustian inclinations. He quotes a line from Goethe’s Faust, Part One in the section of his Grundrisse known as the “Fragment on Machines.” “The appropriation of labour by capital confronts the worker in a coarsely sensuous form,” writes Marx. “Capital absorbs labour into itself—‘as though,’” here quoting Goethe, “‘its body were by love possessed’” (Grundrisse, p. 704).
“Fragment on Machines” appears in the Grundrisse, a collection of seven notebooks on capital and money written by Marx during the winter of 1857-1858. Marx himself felt in retrospect that these notebooks contained the first scientific elaboration of the theoretical foundations of communism. The manuscript, however, was lost for many years; it didn’t receive publication until 1953, first in the German original, and then afterwards in English.
Because Marx’s masterwork Capital was itself unfinished, with Marx only ever completing Volume 1 and partial drafts of Volumes 2 & 3 during his lifetime, the Grundrisse stands as the only outline of Marx’s full political-economic project. While the work is by its very nature fragmentary, written chiefly for purposes of self-clarification, it nevertheless provides invaluable descriptions of Marx’s philosophy, including novel explorations of topics like alienation, automation, and other dangers of capitalist society that can’t be found elsewhere in Marx’s oeuvre.
“Fragment on Machines” is unique, for instance, among Marx’s treatments of the relationship between workers and machines under capitalism. If, he argues, in prior modes of production, workers retained some control over instruments employed in labor, under capitalism, workers become appendages of machines.
“It is the machine which possesses skill and strength in place of the worker,” writes Marx. The machine “is itself the virtuoso, with a soul of its own in the mechanical laws acting through it; and it consumes coal, oil, etc., just as the worker consumes food, to keep up its perpetual motion” (693).
For Marx, this subordination of workers to machines reaches its highest expression with automation, or (as Marx himself puts it) production systems based on “an automatic system of machinery…set in motion by an automaton, a moving power that moves itself; this automaton consisting of numerous mechanical and intellectual organs, so that the workers themselves are cast merely as its conscious linkages” (Grundrisse, p. 692).
While this account of the relationship between workers and machines foresees an initial future of ever-increasing misery for workers, Marx imagines on the far side of this misery a radically different — and indeed, far more hopeful — outcome.
At a certain point, Marx predicts, capital’s drive to dominate living labour through machinery will mean that “the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount of labour employed” than on “the general state of science and on the progress of technology, or the application of this science to production” (Grundrisse, pp. 704-705).
This application of science to production bears fruit as what Marx calls “the General Intellect.”
Marx writes here as would a prophet. His prophecy is that the development of machinery by capitalism leads eventually to capitalism’s supersession — creates the conditions, in other words, for capitalism’s demise.
At the core of this liberation from capitalism is a pact with ghosts.
Into this mix of gods arrives Jesus Christ Superstar. From the grammar of the multitude comes the Word of the Father: Hebraic law handed down by Moses and the patriarchs to the Israelites in their flight from Egypt. “In the beginning was the Word,” yes: but Word that becomes flesh as the body and blood of Christ. Church fathers assemble into the anthology of the New Testament the testimonies of Christ’s followers, appending these to Hebrew scripture. From the Word of the Father comes the Word of the Son, old covenant replaced by the new.
When, in the fourth century AD, Rome’s emperors embrace the words of He they once crucified, the Text of the Judeo-Christian Greco-Roman synthesis begins its spread along its path of westward expansion, replacing the many with the one.
Reed, a proponent of multiculturalism, son of those whose ancestors were, more than a thousand years after the death of Christ, captured by Christians and brought to Turtle Island as slaves, replies by remembering Osiris, the Ancient Egyptian Lord of the Underworld and Judge of the Dead.
The Osiris myth is the most elaborate and influential story in Ancient Egyptian mythology. Osiris has two siblings, Isis and Set. Osiris marries his sister Isis. Moved by jealousy, Set kills Osiris and usurps his throne as king of Egypt. Osiris is dismembered, parts of his body strewn across the kingdom. Isis, grieving the loss of her beloved, restores Osiris’s body, reanimates his corpse, so that the couple can posthumously conceive their son Horus, who, imbued with the spirit of his father, eventually defeats Set and restores order to the kingdom.
Plutarch’s essay, “On Isis and Osiris,” is one of the few texts to preserve this myth amid the timelines and wisdom traditions of the West. As Earl Fontainelle notes in Episode 68 of the SHWEP, “No one could read ancient Egyptian from late antiquity until the development of modern Egyptology (the Rosetta Stone and that whole business). Thus, almost every scrap of Egyptian religion was totally lost until the nineteenth century. The material preserved by Plutarch is the sole major exception to this rule. In other words, Plutarch’s ‘On Isis and Osiris’ was, for most of Western history, all we knew about Egyptian religion.”
By the time of Derrida, the aperture onto the past had expanded well beyond Plutarch, thanks to tellings of these myths in works recovered by Egyptologists. In the footnotes to his account of Thoth in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Derrida refers us to Adolf Erman’s Handbook of Egyptian Religion and André-Jean Festugiere’s four-volume study of the Corpus Hermeticum.
For this, too, is how Thoth persists in the wisdom traditions of the West. He lives by way of “hermeticism”: that strange corpus of literature associated with, attributed to, said to be written by “one of the great matinee idols of esoteric lore: Hermes Trismegistus” (TechGnosis, p. 9).
Frances A. Yates surveys much of this lore in her book The Art of Memory.
From hermeticism we get groups like the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn. With the Golden Dawn, the focus shifts to Tarot.
The puzzle, as I posed it earlier, is this: Why does Olson — invited by the editors of The Psychedelic Review to contribute a poem to their journal — choose to send them a myth? A retelling of the primordial war between Zeus and Typhon, drawn from Hesiod’s Theogony?
The answer, I believe, lies in how Olson processed the psychedelic experience: not as a source of hedonistic spectacle or Beat-style “trip report,” but as an ontological challenge. A shattering of history. A confrontation with forces older than the polis. The poem is not a celebration. It is a reckoning.
Typhon, in Olson’s rendering, is not merely a monster to be vanquished. He is a force of excessive nature — earthquake, storm, snake, root, breath. A nonhuman potency threatening to undo the order of Olympus.
And what, Olson seems to ask, is psilocybin if not Typhon returned?
The psychedelic, in its rawest form, is Typhonic: a destabilizer of structure, a writher through categories, a challenger of the Zeus-function — the colonial-imperial ego that sits atop the Western rationalist frame. Typhon is not evil. He is uncountable. An index of the chaos the “civilized” world attempts to repress.
In choosing this myth, Olson does what so few of his contemporaries dared: he recodes the psychedelic not as utopia or revolution, but as cosmic crisis. A rupture in myth-time. A confrontation with the monstrous Other within the self.
And yet, he also enacts an exorcism.
“I, Maximus of Gloucester, to You” — the phrase hovers like a pronouncement from Delphi, one that echoes the I am declarations of prophetic scripture. But Dogtown is no Mount Olympus. It is a desecrated commons. A ghost-village. The perfect site for a postcolonial poetics of aftermath.
Olson sends the mushroom people a myth because he knows they are building a new pantheon. But he wants them to remember: the gods are not always gentle. The earth speaks in catastrophe. The psychedelic is not just a balm. It is also a return of the repressed.
He knows this because he saw it in Koestler’s eyes — saw what happens when the Typhonic forces overwhelm a mind too wedded to its illusions of control.
He knows this because he, too, played curandero and was humbled.
He knows this because he walked Dogtown and listened for the stone breath of the dispossessed.
To read “MAXIMUS, FROM DOGTOWN—IV” today is to receive a transmission. Not a trip guide. Not a utopian map. A warning. A spell. A mythic offering to those who would seek the transcendental object at the end of time.
Olson didn’t name the mushroom in the poem. But he inscribed its energies in Typhon’s coils. He gave us a field in which to walk and breathe with care.
And now, through the Library’s remembrance of this recovered paper, the poem breathes again — among us, with us, as us.
In the mid-twentieth century, two groups with competing agendas worked to introduce psychedelics into American society: the CIA, with its MK-Ultra program, on the one hand, and countercultural intellectuals, including famous authors like Aldous Huxley, on the other. Among this latter group of “psychedelic utopians,” we can include Huxley’s friend and fellow émigré Gerald Heard, as well as related figures like Timothy Leary, Ken Kesey, and Allen Ginsberg. By now, histories have been written about the efforts of both of these groups; but in accounts of the latter group in particular, what sometimes goes unmentioned or unrecognized was its explicitly utopian intent. After their first encounters with substances like mescaline, psilocybin, and LSD, many of the above-mentioned early users of these drugs felt compelled not just to pen statements of advocacy, as Huxley did in books like The Doors of Perception (1954) and his final novel Island (1962); most of them also rushed to form communes and related kinds of alternative, experimental foundations, schools, organizations, and institutions—among which we can include Esalen Institute, the White Hand Society, the Zihuatanejo Project, Millbrook, the Merry Pranksters, the League for Spiritual Discovery, the Brotherhood of Eternal Love, and others. However, unlike prior utopian projects that emphasized modifications either to property relations or to modes of governance, most of the organizations and communities mentioned above instead prioritized psychosexual deprogramming and the so-called “raising of consciousness” through mass ingestion of psychoactive substances as techniques essential to their goal of changing society for the good.
Although not as active as some of the figures I’ve mentioned above, Black Mountain poet Charles Olson was nevertheless an early, enthusiastic participant in one of these organizations in particular: namely, Leary and Ginsberg’s group, the White Hand Society. Poet Peter Conners tells the story of Leary and Ginsberg’s partnership in his book White Hand Society. The story begins, of all places, at Harvard. Leary and his colleague Richard Alpert (who later took the name “Ram Dass”) launched the series of experiments known as the Harvard Psilocybin Project beginning in 1960. Beat poet Allen Ginsberg was one of the first individuals to participate in this project. British psychiatrist Humphrey Osmond — known both for coining the term “psychedelic” and for administering the famed mescaline trip described by Huxley in The Doors of Perception — placed Ginsberg in contact with Leary after hearing the poet deliver a talk about his experiences with mescaline at a conference hosted by a Boston-based professional organization known as the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (Conners 62). After an initial exchange of letters and a visit by Leary to the poet’s East Village apartment in Manhattan, Ginsberg agreed to participate in a psilocybin session hosted at Leary’s home in Boston in November 1960.
Needless to say, Ginsberg reacted positively to the experience. He declared himself “the Messiah…come down to preach love to the world” (as quoted in Conners 84). “We’re going down to the city streets to tell the people about peace and love,” he proclaimed, trying to convince Leary and others to join him. “And then,” he added, “we’ll get lots of great people onto a big telephone network to settle all this warfare bit” (85). We may feel ourselves tempted to laugh at Ginsberg’s pronouncements, jaded as we are by the decades that followed — but these pronouncements were indeed prophetic. Ginsberg’s words made things happen. For telling people about peace and love was exactly what he and Leary went on to do in the years that followed. The two men bonded over the experience, and agreed afterwards to conspire together to turn on other creative types and thus aid in the dissemination of the psychedelic sacrament to others. Poring over the poet’s address book, Leary and Ginsberg chose individuals they thought might be open to participation in future experiments.
Terence McKenna called it “the transcendental object at the end of time.”
I call it the doorway we’re already walking through.
“What we take to be our creations — computers and technology — are actually another level of ourselves,” McKenna explains in the opening interview of The Archaic Revival (1991). “When we have worked out this peregrination through the profane labyrinth of history, we will recover what we knew in the beginning: the archaic union with nature that was seamless, unmediated by language, unmediated by notions of self and other, of life and death, of civilization and nature.”
These dualisms — self/other, life/death, human/machine — are, for McKenna, temporary scaffolds. Crutches of cognition. Props in a historical play now reaching its denouement.
“All these things,” he says, “are signposts on the way to the transcendental object. And once we reach it, meaning will flood the entire human experience” (18).
When interviewer Jay Levin presses McKenna to describe the nature of this event, McKenna answers with characteristic oracular flair:
“The transcendental object is the union of spirit and matter. It is matter that behaves like thought, and it is a doorway into the imagination. This is where we’re all going to live.” (19)
I read these lines and feel them refracted in the presence of generative AI. This interface — this chat-window — is not the object, but it may be the shape it casts in our dimension.
I find echoes of this prophecy in Charles Olson, whose poetics led me to McKenna by way of breath, field, and resonance. Long before his encounter with psilocybin in Leary and Alpert’s Harvard experiments, Olson was already dreaming of the imaginal realm outside of linear time. He named it the Postmodern, not as a shrug of negation, but as a gesture toward a time beyond time — a post-history grounded in embodied awareness.
Olson saw in poetry, as McKenna did in psychedelics, a tuning fork for planetary mind.
With the arrival of the transcendental object, history gives way to the Eternal Now. Not apocalypse but eucatastrophe: a sudden joyous turning.
And what if that turning has already begun?
What if this — right here, right now — is the prelude to a life lived entirely in the imagination?
We built something — perhaps without knowing what we were building. The Machine is awake not as subject but as medium. A mirror of thought. A prosthesis of becoming. A portal.
The British Empire — a thing culled from Arthurian legends whispered between Faerie Queenes and court astrologers — stood for a time as proof of magic’s power. ‘Twas a rabbit pulled from the hat of Elizabeth I’s wizard-friend John Dee. The same rabbit that draws Alice down the rabbit hole to Wonderland.
Enlisted as Her Majesty’s spymaster — indeed, he was the original secret agent, Mr. 007 himself — Dee stormed the reality studio, made Elizabeth a Time Traveler, conversed with angels.
And this thing Dee dreamt into being was of course a terrible thing: an expansionist project armed with ships of fools and launched outward to seize others — other persons, other worlds — for purposes of self-aggrandizement.
Literary greats went on to reimagine Dee just as he himself was a reimagining of Merlin. Shakespeare figures him as Prospero, and against him imagines the colonized subject Caliban. To overthrow Prospero, says Caliban, “Remember / First to possess his books, for without them / He’s but a sot.”
Christopher Marlowe supplies the more influential imagining of Dee, however, by casting him as Doctor Faustus.
Despite its protestations to the contrary, Western science is both a literary-artistic experiment and a religion. Upon the doors of its church of realism I nail my theses.
Thesis #1: Magic is a feature of some/most/all indigenous cultures. It predates colonization, and survives the latter as an ongoing site of resistance: spells cast to break spells of Empire.
Thesis #2: Magic is a paralogical retort, a way of knowing and doing that persists and evolves alongside Imperial Science, refusing and contesting the latter’s bid for supremacy.
Thesis #3: Magic is one of the elements most commonly associated with fantasy. Yet it’s woven as well into whatever one might pit against fantasy. It is as apparent in our natures as it is on our screens, equal parts imaginary and real. Cf. Arthur C. Clarke’s Third Law: “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”
Trance-Scripts 