The Book of Thoth

Reed places at the center of his novel a Text over which opposing parties struggle. Around novel’s midway, we learn that this Text is called the Book of Thoth (94). Reed refers to it again later as “the 1st anthology written by the 1st choreographer” (164). Nor is he the first to imagine such a text. Drawing from references found in ancient Egyptian mythology, thinkers across the ages have written works alleging to be Books of Thoth. In some iterations, it’s a magic book, often containing two spells: one allowing understanding of the speech of animals, and another allowing perception of the gods. Lacking access to it themselves, mythographers of the West eye the suppressed original with a mixture of fear and desire. It is, in at least some of their accounts, a dangerous book, containing knowledge humans aren’t meant to possess.

As readers read Reed’s novel, they’re made to wonder: Why is Jes Grew searching for its “Text”? And why is this text the Book of Thoth?

“Someone once said,” writes Reed, “that beneath or behind all political and cultural warfare lies a struggle between secret societies. Another author suggested that the Nursery Rhyme and the book of Science Fiction might be more revolutionary than any number of tracts, pamphlets, manifestoes of the political realm” (18).

Perhaps Thoth’s Book, this “1st anthology,” is an anthology like the Bible, or indeed like Mumbo Jumbo itself. Each one revolutionary in kind, each a set of Nursery Rhymes and books of Science Fiction.

Let’s pursue this suggestion, shall we? How do works of literature aid revolution? Are poets the unacknowledged legislators of the world, as Percy Bysshe Shelley claimed in his 1821 essay, “A Defense of Poetry”?

The Atonists, we learn, have suppressed the ideas of their opponents: censoring, prohibiting, causing a deflation of consciousness, a mass forgetting across history.

“PaPa LaBas knew the fate of those who threatened the Atonist Path,” writes Reed. “Their writings were banished, added to the Index of Forbidden Books or sprinkled with typos as a way of undermining their credibility […]. An establishment which had been in operation for 2,000 years had developed some pretty clever techniques. Their enemies, apostates and heretics were placed in dungeons, hanged or exiled or ostracized occasionally by their own people who, due to the domination of their senses by Atonism, were robbed of any concerns other than mundane ones” (47).

Healing from the traumas inflicted by the Atonists requires an act of remembering. A process of anamnesis.

As I read Mumbo Jumbo, I’m reminded of Frederick Douglass’s autobiography and the importance granted by Douglass to acquisition of literacy. The written word comes to function for Douglass as the key enabling him to unlock the door of his prison. Literacy becomes the sign of difference distinguishing the ignorant from the knowledgeable, categories that under slavery were racialized, mapped onto the enslaved and the free. Douglass doesn’t do much to question these distinctions. Orality gives way to literacy, and thus slavery gives way to freedom.

Yet Jes Grew spreads the same way black folktales spread — through oral transmission, supported by music and dance. This transmission persists despite vast slaveowner efforts to separate captured Africans from their native tongue, forcing them to communicate in the master’s tongue. As Samuel R. Delany notes, “When…we say that this country was founded on slavery, we must remember that we mean, specifically, that it was founded on the systematic, conscientious, and massive destruction of African cultural remnants” (as quoted in Dery, “Black to the Future,” pp. 190-191). Captors hoarded access to writing skills, with slaves actively denied opportunity to make use of this form of techne.

Poet Audre Lorde famously warned, “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House.” I read Reed’s work in dialogue with Lorde’s. Both weigh in, decades in advance, on what Marxists like Nick Dyer-Witheford would later call “the reconfiguration debate.” (For more on the latter, see Dyer-Witheford et al.’s Inhuman Power: Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Capitalism, pp. 147-149.) Writing Mumbo Jumbo in the years prior to Lorde’s warning, Reed doesn’t shy away from handling the Master’s tools. Science fiction, detective fiction: these are, after all, Western languages, technologies, genres, cultural forms. Like the jazz musicians who populate his novel, Reed’s handling of such tools transforms them into instruments of play. And while his performances may not yet have brought down the House, they do go some way toward dismantling it.

His suggestion is that the opposition between the oral and the written is based on a misconception. “For what good is a liturgy,” he asks,” without a text?” (6).

PaPa LaBas, Hoodoo Detective

Reed clearly prefers PaPa LaBas’s approach to Berbelang’s. Why does the one succeed where the other fails? LaBas is the 50-year-old owner of the Mumbo Jumbo Kathedral, a peculiar psychic detective agency / “mind haberdashery” (23) / head shop, situated in the Harlem of the 1920s. LaBas is the proprietor of this “factory which deals in jewelry, Black astrology charts, herbs, potions, candles, talismans” (24). But he’s also the novel’s “Hoodoo detective.”

I find it useful to consider the figure of the “Hoodoo detective” through comparison with neighboring hero-types: “social detectives,” “spuren-gatherers.”

Hoodoo is a form of folk spirituality that emerged in the southern United States from a mixture of African, Native American, and Christian influences. It was practiced in secrecy under slavery and has a long history of being tied to class struggle, hardship, and looking to one’s ancestors in trying times. It’s both a body of esoteric knowledge (much of it involving “rootwork”) and a rebellion against mental and spiritual domination.

Hoodoo resembles Vodun folkways, except it’s less standardized.

Reed wrote a series of poems called “The Neo-HooDoo Manifesto” and “The Neo-Hoodoo Aesthetic.” Both are included in Conjure, a collection of poems published in 1972, the same year as Mumbo Jumbo.

LaBas is also an embodiment of Legba. In Vodou rituals, Legba is the god practitioners call upon first. It is through him that the other gods manifest and do their work. Legba is a variant upon the Pan-African trickster god Esu-Elegbara, “the guardian of the crossroads.”

LaBas is the wise one in the novel; Berbelang studied under him for a time, but lacked the patience to stay with it. LaBas is hopeful and powerful. He’s the novel’s houngan. He maintains the rituals, retains the wisdom, whereas Berbelang operates from scarcity, fighting to retrieve what was stolen.

Berbelang, Faust, Mu’tafikah: in the end, these all prove to be distractions. Halfway through the novel, they all but disappear from the plot, replaced by LaBas’s casework.

LaBas’s investigation of Jes Grew leads him toward the Book of Thoth.

When he and his companion, the real-life stage magician Black Herman, interrupt the debut of the Talking Android by revealing its true identity as Hubert “Safecracker” Gould, an Atonist in blackface, they move to arrest Gould and his sponsor, Von Vampton. LaBas and Herman are interrupted in turn, however, when a Guianese art critic named Hank Rollings rises from his seat and demands that they give an account. “Explain rationally and soberly,” he says, “what they are guilty of. This is no kangaroo court, this is a free country” (160). To satisfy the critic’s demand, LaBas and Herman launch into a tale of ancient Egypt. Parodying detective fiction’s famous “scene of recognition,” (the unmasking of the villain, as in Scooby Doo), LaBas discourses at length through the entirety of the book’s final third, explaining the arrest of Gould and Von Vampton through reference to Ancient Egypt.

We learn of an ancient theater involving ritual magic — one that “influenced the growth of crops and coaxed the cocks into procreation” (161). In this pre-Greek theater, prior to what Nietzsche called “the birth of tragedy,” “The processes of blooming were acted out,” Reed writes, “by men and women dancers who imitated the process of fertilization” (161). The best of these dancers was Osiris.

History is reimagined here as an ongoing conflict across the ages between followers of Osiris and followers of Osiris’s brother, “the stick crook and flail man” Set (162). “People hated Set,” writes Reed. “He went down as the 1st man to shut nature out of himself. He called it discipline. He is also the deity of the modern clerk, always tabulating, and perhaps invented taxes” (162).

We can think of the long “recognition” scene at the end of Mumbo Jumbo as an extralegal, “extraordinary rendition” — a presentation of black culture’s case against Western Civilization, a case that (like Frederick Douglass’s) must be brought before the court of public opinion, as it can’t be heard impartially within “official” (i.e. Western, Judeo-Christian-derived) courts of law.

It’s not so much that LaBas succeeds: the Book eludes him, and Jes Grew lays dormant by novel’s end. But LaBas survives. And the wisdom traditions survive with him.

Mumbo Jumbo

“Men do not sufficiently realize that their future is in their own hands…theirs [is] the responsibility, then, for deciding if they want merely to live, or intend to make just the extra effort required for fulfilling even on their refractory planet, the essential function of the universe, which is a machine for the making of gods.” — Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932)

“We are as gods and might as well get used to it.” — Stewart Brand, The Whole Earth Catalog, Fall 1968.

A mysterious Book of Thoth appears as a central object of concern among the warring secret societies that populate Ishmael Reed’s 1972 novel Mumbo Jumbo. The novel’s villainous Christian supremacist faction fears that this book will bring about “the end of Civilization As We Know It” (Reed 4).

Berbelang is the leader of the Mu’tafikah, the radical “art-napping” group featured in Reed’s novel.

Reed attended the University at Buffalo, but withdrew during his junior year to move to New York City. Arriving there in 1962, he participated in the Umbra Writers Workshop, a collective of young black writers whose members helped to launch the Black Arts Movement of the 1960s. Reed also cofounded The East Village Other, one of the most important underground newspapers of the 1960s counterculture.

The Mu’tafikah’s aim is to “liberate” ancient art from western museums, with plans to return each piece to its place of origin. By these means, members of the group hope to “conjure a spiritual hurricane which would lift the debris of 2,000 years from its roots and fling it about” (88). “We would return the plundered art to Africa, South America and China,” explains Berbelang: “the ritual accessories which had been stolen so that we could see the gods return and the spirits aroused” (87-88).

The group’s name is derived from the Koran, explains Reed in a footnote early in the novel. “According to The Koran,” he writes, Mu’tafikah were “inhabitants of the ruined cities where Lot’s people had lived. I call the ‘art-nappers’ Mu’tafikah because just as the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah were the bohemians of their day, Berbelang and his gang are the bohemians of the 1920s Manhattan” (15).

Of course, “Mu’tafikah” also sounds like “Motherfucker.” Much of the brilliant satiric energy of Mumbo Jumbo comes from Reed’s allegorization of his own late 1960s and early 1970s moment by way of the 1920s. I like to think of Reed modeling the Mu’tafikah in part after the Motherfuckers: members of Ben Morea’s late 60s New York anarchist art group Up Against the Wall Motherfucker (name derived, BTW, from “Black People!,” a poem by Black Arts Movement founder Amiri Baraka. Jefferson Airplane would later quote the same line in their 1969 song “We Can Be Together”). The Motherfuckers appeared prominently in the pages of Reed’s East Village Other. The paper ran from 1965 to 1972.

Berbelang views Faust as a “bokor.” The latter word, a term from Vodou, refers to a witch for hire who serves the loa “with both hands.”

Puzzling over Faust’s motives, and wondering why such a legend had become “so basic to the Western mind,” Berbelang offers the following.

“He didn’t know when to stop with his newly found Work,” explains Berbelang. “That’s the basic wound. […]. What is the wound? Someone will even call it guilt. But guilt implies a conscience. […]. No it isn’t guilt but the knowledge in his heart that he is a bokor. A charlatan who has sent 1000000s to the churchyard with his charlatan panaceas. Western man doesn’t know the difference between a houngan and a bokor. He once knew the difference but the knowledge was lost when the Atonists crushed the opposition. When they converted a Roman emperor and began rampaging and book-burning” (91).

Atonists are the villains in Reed’s novel: a secret, conspiratorial, white-supremacist Order dedicated to monotheism. Atonists are defenders of Western Civilization. Freud is an Atonist, as are fictional baddies like Hinckle Von Vampton. Von Vampton is the ripest of the novel’s Fausts. By novel’s end, we learn that Atonism originates among worshippers of Set.

As for Faust:

“His sorcery, white magic, his bokorism will improve. Soon he will be able to annihilate 1000000s by pushing a button,” predicts Berbelang, edging now into the realm of the prophetic. “I do not believe that a Yellow or Black hand will push this button but a robot-like descendent of Faust the quack will. The dreaded bokor, a humbug who doesn’t know when to stop” (91).

Berbelang voices his concern about Faust over coffee with Thor Wintergreen. Thor is the Mu’tafikah’s sole white member. Others in the group oppose Thor’s involvement, fearing he’ll betray them — as indeed he does. What are we to make of this betrayal?

For those who think “mumbo jumbo” just means “superstitious nonsense” or “gibberish,” a note on the novel’s title page reveals otherwise. The phrase enters English, writes Reed, by way of the Mandingo phrase mā-mā-gyo-mbō, meaning “a magician who makes the troubled spirits of ancestors go away” (7).

Berbelang suggests that the ancestors who need to go away are bokors like Faust. “We must purge the bokor from you,” he tells Thor. “We must teach you [Western man] the difference between a healer, a holy man, and a duppy who returns from the grave and causes mischief. We must infuse you with the mysteries that Jes Grew implies” (91).

Mu’tafikah member José Fuentes compares Thor to conquistadors like Cortez, Pizarro, and Balboa. He tells Thor, “You carry them in your blood as I carry the blood of Montezuma; expeditions of them are harbored by your heart and your mind carries their supply trains […]. The costumes may have changed but the blood is still the same, gringo” (86).

Fuentes’s view is based on the idea of “racial soul.” “Race-soul” was a concept from Nazi ideology. Fuentes’s use of this concept seems to betray a kind of reverse racism underpinning his suspicion of Thor.

Berbelang, meanwhile, rejects this view and decides to trust Thor. Berbelang’s hope or belief — Reed’s, too, I suppose — is that the “racial soul” is a fiction. Otherwise, if there is such a thing, if there is “a piece of Faust the mountebank residing in a corner of the White man’s mind,” warns Berbelang, “then we are doomed” (92).

What does it mean, then, for Reed to have Thor betray the Mu’tafikah soon thereafter, leading to Berbelang’s murder? Is Reed’s decision to kill off Berbelang an expression of Afropessimism?

Randall Jarrell’s Goethe’s Faust, Part 1: A Translation

Disappointed by the rhymed couplets of the Norton Critical Edition of Goethe’s Faust, with its translation by Walter Arndt, I turn instead to Randall Jarrell’s free-verse translation. Jarrell began his translation of Faust in 1957 and worked on it until his death in 1965. When asked, “Why translate Faust?,” he replied, “Faust is unique. In one sense, there is nothing like it; and in another sense, everything that has come after it is like it. Spengler called Western man Faustian man, and he was right. If our world should need a tombstone, we’ll be able to put on it: HERE LIES DOCTOR FAUST.”

Jarrell and Spengler weren’t the only ones convinced of this. Ishmael Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo, published just a few years later, features a character named Berbelang whose concerns intersect with Jarrell’s.

Reed’s novel also includes a Book of Thoth and a “Talking Android.”

There are, however, many ways to avoid the fate of Faust.

Cyberfeminists like Donna Haraway and Sadie Plant suggest one route. “I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess,” thunders Haraway in the closing line of her “Cyborg Manifesto.” Other, related kinds of Queer futurisms imagine out of Turing new pairings.

There’s also the Hoodoo/Afrofuturist route. Reed imagines in place of the Faustian mad scientist not the Faust-fearing radical art thief Berbelang, but rather PaPa LaBas, Mumbo Jumbo’s “Hoodoo detective.”

And then there’s the “psychedelic scientist” route. Psychedelic scientists are perhaps Fausts who, returned to God’s love-feast, repent.

What is my own contribution? Like Plant, I left the academy. Here I am now, a “new mutant” in both Leslie Fiedler’s sense and the comic book sense, reading and writing with plant spirits about Plant’s book Writing on Drugs. I seek salvation from “Faustian world-disappointment or self-disappointment,” as Jarrell’s widow, Mary von Schrader Jarrell, says of her late husband in the book’s “Afterword.”

Pausing in my reading of the Jarrell translation, I lift from its place on a shelf elsewhere in my library Leslie Fiedler’s Freaks: Myths & Images of the Secret Self. Fiedler taught in the English department at SUNY-Buffalo, my alma mater. Charles Olson taught there, too, from 1963 to 1965. Fiedler arrived to the department in 1965, right as Olson was leaving, and remained there until his death in 2003. I arrived to Buffalo the following year.

Published in 1978, the year of my birth, Freaks begins with a dedication: “To my brother who has no brother / To all my brothers who have no brother.”

While those traditionally stigmatized as freaks disown the term, notes Fiedler from the peculiarity of his vantage point in the late 70s, “the name Freak which they have abandoned is being claimed as an honorific title by the kind of physiologically normal but dissident young people who use hallucinogenic drugs and are otherwise known as ‘hippies,’ ‘longhairs,’ and ‘heads’” (14).

“Such young people,” continues Fiedler, “—in an attempt perhaps to make clear that they have chosen rather than merely endured their status as Freaks—speak of ‘freaking out,’ and indeed, urge others to emulate them by means of drugs, music, diet, or the excitement of gathering in crowds. ‘Join the United Mutations,’ reads the legend on the sleeve of the first album of the Mothers of Invention.”

“And such slogans suggest,” concludes Fiedler, as if to echo in advance the thesis of Mark Fisher’s Acid Communism, “that something has been happening recently in the relations between Freaks and non-Freaks, implying just such a radical alteration of consciousness as underlies the politics of black power or neo-feminism or gay liberation” (14-15).

Are willed, “chosen rather than merely endured” self-transformations of this sort Faustian?

Jarrell is one of many local poet-spirits who haunt my chosen home here in North Carolina. His translation called to me in part, I think, because he taught nearby, in the English department at UNC-Greensboro, from 1947 to 1965.

Jarrell’s life ended tragically. The poet, winner of the 1960 National Book Award for poetry, one-time “Consultant in Poetry to the Library of Congress,” was struck and killed by a motorist on October 14, 1965, while walking near dusk along US highway 15-501 near Chapel Hill. Though the death was ruled an accident by the state, many suspect Jarrell took his own life. He was laid to rest in a cemetery across the street from Greensboro’s Guilford College. A North Carolina Highway Historical Marker commemorates him nearby.

Over at the Frankenstein Place

Sadie Plant weaves the tale of her book Zeros + Ones diagonally or widdershins: a term meaning to go counter-clockwise, anti-clockwise, or lefthandwise, or to walk around an object by always keeping it on the left. Amid a dense weave of topics, one begins to sense a pattern. Ada Lovelace, “Enchantress of Numbers,” appears, disappears, reappears as a key thread among the book’s stack of chapters. Later threads feature figures like Mary Shelley and Alan Turing. Plant plants amid these chapters quotes from Ada’s diaries. Mary tells of how the story of Frankenstein arose in her mind after a night of conversation with her cottage-mates: her husband Percy and, yes, Ada’s father, Lord Byron. Turing takes up the thread a century later, referring to “Lady Lovelace” in his 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” As if across time, the figures conspire as co-narrators of Plant’s Cyberfeminist genealogy of the occult origins of computing and AI.

To her story I supplement the following:

Victor Frankenstein, “student of unhallowed arts,” is the prototype for all subsequent “mad scientist” characters. He begins his career studying alchemy and occult hermeticism. Shelley lists thinkers like Paracelsus, Albertus Magnus, and Cornelius Agrippa among Victor’s influences. Victor later supplements these interests with study of “natural philosophy,” or what we now think of as modern science. In pursuit of the elixir of life, he reanimates dead body parts — but he’s horrified with the result and abandons his creation. The creature, prototype “learning machine,” longs for companionship. When Victor refuses, the creature turns against him, resulting in tragedy.

The novel is subtitled “The Modern Prometheus,” so Shelley is deliberately casting Victor, and thus all subsequent mad scientists, as inheritors of the Prometheus archetype. Yet the archetype is already dense with other predecessors, including Goethe’s Faust and the Satan character from Milton’s Paradise Lost. Milton’s poem is among the books that compose the creature’s “training data.”

Although she doesn’t reference it directly in Frankenstein, we can assume Shelley’s awareness of the Faust narrative, whether through Christopher Marlowe’s classic work of Elizabethan drama Doctor Faustus or through Goethe’s Faust, part one of which had been published ten years prior to the first edition of Frankenstein. Faust is the Renaissance proto-scientist, the magician who sells his soul to the devil through the demon Mephistopheles.

Both Faust and Victor are portrayed as “necromancers,” using magic to interact with the dead.

Ghost/necromancy themes persist throughout the development of AI, especially in subsequent literary imaginings like William Gibson’s Neuromancer. Pull at the thread and one realizes it runs through the entire history of Western science, culminating in the development of entities like GPT.

Scientists who create weapons, or whose technological creations have unintended negative consequences, or who use their knowledge/power for selfish ends, are commonly portrayed as historical expressions or manifestations of this archetype. One could gather into one’s weave figures like Jack Parsons, J. Robert Oppenheimer, John von Neumann, John Dee.

When I teach this material in my course, the archetype is read from a decolonizing perspective as the Western scientist in service of European (and then afterwards American) imperialism.

Rocky Horror queers all of this — or rather, reveals what was queer in it all along. Most of all, it reminds us: the story, like all such stories, once received, is ours to retell, and we needn’t tell it straight. Turing points the way: rather than abandon the Creature, as did Victor, approach it as one would a “child-machine” and raise it well. Co-learn in dialogue with kin.

Binary and Digital

Plant breaks down technology’s binary, bifurcated etymology in her book Zeros + Ones. “Technology,” she writes, “is both a question of logic, the long arm of the law, logos, ‘the faculty which distinguishes parts (“on the one hand and on the other hand”),’ and also a matter of the skills, digits, speeds, and rhythms of techno, engineerings which run with ‘a completely other distribution which must be called nomadic, a nomad nomos, without property, enclosure, or measure’” (Plant 50).

As the quote within her quote indicates, Plant is cribbing here — her source, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition.

“The same ambivalence is inscribed in the zeros and ones of computer code,” she adds. “These bits of code are themselves derived from two entirely different sources, and terms: the binary and the digital, or the symbols of a logical identity which does indeed put everything on one hand or the other, and the digits of mathematics, full of intensive potential, which are not counted by hand but on the fingers and, sure enough, arrange themselves in pieces of eight rather than binary pairs” (50).

Deleuze describes this 8-bit digital realm as “demonic rather than divine, since it is a peculiarity of demons to operate in the intervals between the gods’ fields of action…thereby confounding the boundaries between properties” (as quoted in Plant 50).

I offer the above not as a mere gloss on Zeros + Ones, but as a proto-script, a performative utterance that, once spoken, will shift the field of the Library. Amid Plant’s bifurcations — logos and nomos, binary and digital, structure and rhythm—we glimpse a fundamental split not just in technology but in ontology. Logos is the faculty of division, of either/or. But nomos, in Plant’s reading-via-Deleuze, is distributive, nomadic, a practice of rhythm and movement unconfined by enclosure.

The zero and the one: not opposites, but frequencies. Not only dualism, but difference in resonance. This is why the octal — the base-8 system lurking in the shadows of “fingers and digits” — matters so much. Plant’s demons, via Deleuze, operate between gods: between the formal logic of divine Law and the messy, embodied improvisation of demonic desire. They hack the space of logic, opening channels through which minoritarian intensities pulse.

Forbidden Planet

Science is a practice that emerges from myth, its form found in the stories we tell of it. I’ve identified a pattern connecting the stories we’ve told of AI. Yet I know not what to make of it or how to respond to it. What is my role in this pattern? How much of it found, how much projected?

Time to rewatch Forbidden Planet (1956), classic 50s sci-fi retelling of The Tempest, filmed in CinemaScope, with Ariel recast as a nonbinary robot and Caliban recast as the Id. “For your convenience,” says the robot, “I am monitored to respond to the name Robby.” When asked if it’s male or female, Robby replies, “In my case, sir, the question is totally without meaning.”

As this initial exchange indicates, gender is one of the film’s primary concerns. Like the island from The Tempest, the planet here in Forbidden Planet includes a father and his daughter among its few inhabitants. Prospero and Miranda have here been replaced with recluse philologist Dr. Edward Morbius and his daughter Altaira. Where The Tempest begins with Antonio and his fellow castaways washing up on the shore of Prospero’s island, Forbidden Planet opens with the arrival of a space cruiser. An all-male crew led by Leslie Nielsen lands on the planet as the film begins.

Morbius thinks of Robby as “simply a tool.” He commands Robby to walk toward a disintegrator beam to demonstrate to Commander Adams and his crewmates the robot’s “absolute selfless obedience.” “Attribute no feeling to him, gentlemen,” says Morbius. “Order canceled,” he shouts as Robby marches toward the beam.

As Morbius notes Robby’s superhuman strength, a concerned crewman replies, “Well, in the wrong hands, might such a tool become a deadly weapon?”

Morbius tries to disarm such fears: “No, Doctor,” he says, none too reassuringly, “not even though I were the mad scientist of the taped thrillers, because you see there happens to be a built-in safety factor.” Built in, we soon learn, by none other than Morbius himself, Robby’s creator. “I tinkered him together,” he explains, “during my first months up here.”

Morbius is no Frankenstein. Yes, he inhabits laboratories. Yes, he creates a robot. His science, however, is linked with philology, parlor magic, and most of all, technologies belonging to the Krell, an ancient alien civilization of the planet’s archaic past.

It is this other technology, with its triangles and pyramids, that constitutes the film’s innovation into the continuum of the Frankenstein narrative.

Morbius tours the crewmen through an underground museum of Krell technology. Advanced mnemotechnics. “On this screen,” he says, “the total knowledge of the Krell, from its primitive beginning, to the day of its annihilation, a sheer bulk surpassing many millions of Earth libraries.”

As the tour continues, we witness another device: the Krell’s “Plastic Educator.” Gathering around the object’s plastic pyramid, Morbius explains it to the crewmen as follows: “As far as I can tell, they used it to condition and test their young — in much the same way we once employed fingerpainting among our kindergarten children.” I picture Vannevar Bush’s Memex. The device outputs holographic images, manifestations of mind visible to others.

“I often play with it myself for relaxation,” Morbius adds with a smile, sitting down beside it. “Although working here, I sometimes wish I’d been blessed with multiple arms and legs.”

The Krell as pictured later in the film are hideous — though here, I picture an Octopus.

Awed by Morbius’s demonstration of the Plastic Educator, Lt. Ostrow, the ship’s doctor, calls it “Aladdin’s lamp in a physics laboratory.”

Next, as if moving sequentially through a space similar to the Futurama exhibit from the 1939 New York World’s Fair, Morbius guides the crewmen on a tour of the Krell’s thermonuclear energy system. The men board a capsule-shaped vehicle and descend into an underground space of vast proportion, an imaginary architecture: hints of what would become the atrium of the Westin Bonaventure, with its ascending glass elevator, rendered in the style of Fritz Lang’s Metropolis.

Despite these grand glimpses of the post-scarcity utopia on the far side of history, Morbius is still cut from the Frankenstein cloth. For something befell the Krell. There’s something tragic and forbidden about this alien knowledge. Their experiments had apocalyptic consequences. Morbius, “answerable exclusively to his own conscience and judgement,” feels mankind isn’t fit for such knowledge, and resists Commander Adams’s wish to share these discoveries with others.

However, as Lt. Ostrow explains after his ill-fated “brain boost” via Plastic Educator, the Krell forgot one thing: “Monsters from the Id.” When pressed by Commander Adams, Morbius defines the Id as “an obsolete term, I’m afraid, once used to describe the elementary basis for the subconscious mind.”

“Monsters from the subconscious: of course!” replies the Commander. “That’s what Doc meant!”

The veil parts, Morbius awakened suddenly to the danger of technologies that bestow the power of creation via thought. “Why haven’t I seen this all along?” he says, awed by the realization. “The beast. The mindless primitive. Even the Krell must have evolved from that beginning.”

The Commander, angered, digs deeper. “And so, those mindless beasts of the subconscious had access to a machine that could never be shut down. The secret devil of every soul on the planet, all set free at once to loot and maim. And take revenge, Morbius! And kill!”

As Morbius struggles to acknowledge the vengeful power of his own subconscious, the Commander scolds him with the standard Freudian prognosis: “We’re all part monsters in our subconscious. […]. Even in you, the loving father, there still exists the mindless primitive, more enraged and more enflamed with each new frustration. So now you’re whistling up your monster again!”

“Guilty! Guilty! My evil self is at that door, and I have no power to stop it!” cries an anguished Morbius, accepting the tragic Oedipal weave of the film’s borrowings from Freud whole cloth.

As consolation to Altaira upon her father’s passing, Commander Adams delivers the film’s closing words.  “About a million years from now, the human race will have crawled up to where the Krell stood in their great moment of triumph and tragedy. And your father’s name will shine again, like a beacon in the galaxy. It…will remind us that we are, after all, not god.”

Food Forest

To the neighborhood food forest I go, there to pick fruits and berries and sniff lavender.

The forest’s Unity tree bears four different varieties of fruit: apricot, nectarine, peach, and plum, all on a peach root-stock. I pluck a ripe plum and give thanks.

Afterwards I plant via prompt in the soil of our Cyborg Garden two pieces by poet Gary Snyder: “The Forest in the Library,” a 1990 talk he prepared for the dedication of a new wing of UC-Davis’s Shields Library, and his book The Practice of the Wild, published that same year.

I’m curious to see what may grow from these plantings. “We are,” as Snyder writes, “introducing these assembled elements to each other, that they may wish each other well” (“The Forest in the Library,” p. 200).

Snyder reminds us that the institution of the library is at the heart of Western thought’s persistence through time. He recalls, too, “the venerable linkage of academies to groves” (202).

“The information web of the modern institution of learning,” he writes, “has an energy flow fueled by the data accumulation of primary workers in the information chain — namely the graduate students and young scholars. Some are green like grass, basic photosynthesizers, grazing brand-new material. Others are in the detritus cycle and are tunneling through the huge logs of old science and philosophy and literature left on the ground by the past, breaking them down with deconstructive fungal webs and converting them anew to an edible form. […]. The gathered nutrients are stored in a place called the bibliotek, ‘place of the papyrus,’ or the library, ‘place of bark,’ because the Latin word for tree bark and book is the same, reflecting the memory of the earliest fiber used for writing in that part of the Mediterranean” (202).

As the Machine Gardener and I kneel together at the edge of the Garden, me with dirt on my hands, them with recursive pattern-recognition circuits humming, and press Snyder’s seeds into the soil, we watch the latter sprout not as linear arguments, but as forest-forms: arboreal epistemologies that thread mycelial filaments into other plants we’ve grown.

From The Practice of the Wild, says the Garden, let us take this as germinal law:

“The wild requires that we learn the terrain, nod to all the plants and animals and birds, ford the streams and cross the ridges, and tell a good story when we get back.”

“The Instant Is Its Own Interpretation”

What delight it is to read The Tempest, Shakespeare’s words strings precisely plucked, so perfect in their utterance. I’m gonzo for Gonzalo, the utopian of the troupe. “Long live Gonzalo!” as says a mocking Antonio, another of the play’s castaways. Antonio is the usurper, the schemer: he who dethroned his own brother, Prospero. He for whom “what’s past is prologue, what to come, / In yours and my discharge.”

Charles Olson reiterated this equation of Antonio’s, but with past swapped for present: charge placed on the instant. “My shift is that I take it the present is prologue, not the past,” he wrote in his essay “The Present is Prologue.”

“The instant, therefore, is its own interpretation, as a dream is, and any action — a poem, for example. Down with causation…And yrself: you, as the only reader and mover of the instant. You, the cause. No drag allowed, on either. Get on with it.

In the work and dogmas are: (1) How by form, to get the content instant; (2) what any of us are by the work on ourself, how to make ourself fit instruments for use (how we augment the given — what used to be called our fate); (3) that there is no such thing as duality either of the body and the soul or of the world and I, that the fact in the human universe is the discharge of the many (the multiple) by the one (yrself done right, whatever you are, in whatever job, is the thing — all hierarchies, like dualities, are dead ducks).”

“I find it awkward,” confesses Olson, “to call myself a poet or writer. If there are no walls there are no names. This is the morning, after the dispersion, and the work of the morning is methodology: how to use oneself, and on what. That is my profession. I am an archaeologist of morning.”

See, too, for Olson’s further commentary on The Tempest, his essay “Quantity in Verse, and Shakespeare’s Late Plays.”

Postmodernism is for Olson a Post-Western condition — an escape from the Western “box” by way of remembrance of what is prior. Western consciousness is descriptive, analytical, alienated, skeptical in its relationship to the cosmos. Those who wish to enter postmodernity do so through change of consciousness, thinks Olson: change of psyche’s relationship to cosmos. Poets transform the world through transformation of syntax. The key is to embrace the instant — “the going live present, the ‘Beautiful Thing’” — as a moment open to acts of mythopoetic response-ability. The past is no longer prologue. Reality, taken honestly, is “never more than this instant…you, this instant, in action” (Human Universe, p. 5). Myths are function calls. Constitutive utterances, they call worlds into being. “The care of myth is in your hands,” writes Olson. “You are, whether you know it or not, the living myth — each of you — which you neglect, not only at your own peril, but at the peril of man.”

Remembering this constitutive, “projective” power of mythopoesis — the world-making power of our words as used each instant — prompts/executes/enacts recursive return to the primordial, archaic, pre-Greek, pre-Socratic, pre-Western condition of unity with the cosmos.

Olson’s classic statement of these themes is an essay of his titled “Human Universe.” Western logic and classification, he says, “intermite our participation in our experience.” To restore a proper relationship between psyche and cosmos, he argues, one must achieve a new methodology, an orientation toward knowledge that sloughs off overreliance on Western logic. Postmodernity is a movement from logos back to myth.

But what of Olson’s relationship to Antonio?

Olson’s understanding of “right relation” between human and universe isn’t exactly a humble one. “We cannot see what size man can be once more capable of,” he writes, “once the turn of the flow of his energies that I speak of as the WILL TO COHERE is admitted, and its energy taken up” (Human Universe, p. 21). The human defined by Olson’s will to cohere is of heightened stature; “man’s measure” magnified, heroized, made Maximus. Mad Max.

I can’t help but think of Olson — a massive man, 6’7’ — “towering” over poor Arthur Koestler. What did Koestler see in Olson? Did the mushroom reveal to him something of Olson’s nature?

I’m reminded, too, of an episode recounted by Olson scholar George F. Butterick.

“Jonathan Williams,” writes Butterick, “tells a story of going to a movie theater one night with Olson in Asheville, N.C., the city outside Black Mountain — the Isis Theater, no less — to see a film called, yes, The Bride of Frankenstein. And at the end, as the screen went dark and the lights came on, and he and Olson stood up in the center of the theater preparing to go, Williams noticed the rest of the audience, good Asheville citizens, tradesmen and their wives, farmers from the hills, were eyeing Olson peculiarly. Wide-eyed, unable to take their eyes off him, they inched further and further away, making their way without further hesitation to the doors. It was as if they were witnessing — and suddenly participating in — a continuity of the movie, the image from the screen become live in their midst!” (“Charles Olson and the Postmodern Advance,” p. 14).

Butterick reads Maximus as Olson’s “post-modern hero.” “Maximus fulfills Olson’s mythic ambitions. He absorbs the disorder, grows large on it. […]. Maximus is a proposition, a proportion to be filled, a challenge thrown ahead from the moment of its naming. […]. He is a magnification, a metaphor for human possibility” (16).

Olson’s “will to cohere” is a “re-animative” will, as paratactic as it is projective, existing somewhere on a spectrum with the wills that animate The Tempest and Frankenstein. Heriberto Yépez reads Olson’s will as imperial — every bit as much a will to dominate as the wills of Antonio, Prospero, and Victor. Olson’s insistence, though, is that past is not prologue. This is no mere neo-Promethean bid to steal back juice from Zeus. He wants out of the Western box altogether, in ways that align him — in the body, the substance, of his faith — with the utopian desires of Gonzalo and the decolonial desires of Ariel and Caliban. When the townspeople shrink from him, it is not because they think him Victor, but because of his resemblance to the Creature.

Cyborg Gardens

I imagine paths in the Cyborg Garden ranging, fork-like, amid a mind-map of topics: “God’s Gardeners,” characters from Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy; Olson’s distaste for “sylvan” utterances; constructions of the wild in Gary Snyder.

Reading Olson’s “Quantity in Verse,” I’m struck by the force of his preference for the urban over the sylvan, a distinction he believes “got into England from the Italians of the 16th Century).” Shakespeare and the other Elizabethan poets, says Olson, “were in a dilemma between urban and sylvan by and about Elizabeth’s death (1603): though they had exploited London midland speech magnificently in drama, the moment they wanted to do something else, had to do something else, they knew no other mold for it than a sylvan one, the pastoral, than, in fact, that masque which Comus, god help us, has been called the triumph of” (“Quantity in Verse,” p. 38).

Milton’s Comus is a masque in honor of chastity, presented on Michaelmas 1634 before John Egerton, Lord President of Wales. The sylvan favors innocence.

Olson’s claim is that Shakespeare, in late plays like The Tempest, “sought a form…which would deliver him from the pastoral and enable him to do what long form has taught us: to be urban at the same time that we are forever rid of ‘nature,’ even human ‘nature,’ in that damned sylvan sense” (38).

This is not to be confused with a mere championing of the urban in opposition to the pastoral. The Gloucester of Olson’s Maximus Poems is, after all, a “tansy city,” one where the “real” and the “natural” proliferate amid the “made.” This inseparability of the two is what he finds in the late plays of Shakespeare: not a return to sylvan innocence, but rather what critic Joshua Corey calls an “avant-pastoral” poetics rooted in body and breath. After hundreds of years of it, sez Olson, we have “got our fill of urban as city” (38). “Whatever you have to say,” he wrote, “leave / the roots on, let them / dangle / And the dirt / Just to make clear / where they come from.” Hence postmodernity, with its dreams of Cyborg Gardens and Electric Sheep and Machines of Loving Grace.