Tag: Computers

Beside the White Chickens

Caius reads about “4 Degrees of Simulation,” a practice-led seminar hosted last year by the Institute for Postnatural Studies in Madrid. Of the seminar’s three sessions, the one that most intrigues him is the one that was led by guest speaker Lucia Rebolino, as it focused on prediction and uncertainty as these pertain to climate modeling. Desiring to learn more, Caius tracks down “Unpredictable Atmosphere,” an essay of Rebolino’s published by e-flux.

The essay begins by describing the process whereby meteorological research organizations like the US National Weather Service monitor storms that develop in the Atlantic basin during hurricane season. These organizations employ climate models to predict paths and potentials of storms in advance of landfall.

“So much depends on our ability to forecast the weather — and, when catastrophe strikes, on our ability to respond quickly,” notes Rebolino. Caius hears in her sentence the opening lines of William Carlos Williams’s poem “The Red Wheelbarrow.” “So much depends on our ability to forecast the weather,” he mutters. “But the language we use to model these forecasts depends on sentences cast by poets.”

“How do we cast better sentences?” wonders Caius.

In seeking to feel into the judgement implied by “better,” he notes his wariness of bettering as “improvement,” as deployed in self-improvement literature and as deployed by capitalism: its implied separation from the present, its scarcity mindset, its perception of lack — and in the improvers’ attempts to “fix” this situation, their exercising of nature as instrument, their use of these instruments for gentrifying, extractive, self-expansive movement through the territory.

In this ceaseless movement and thus its failure to satisfy itself, the improvement narrative leads to predictive utterances and their projections onto others.

And yet, here I am definitely wanting “better” for myself and others, thinks Caius. Better sentences. Ones on which plausible desirable futures depend.

So how do we better our bettering?

Caius returns to Rebolino’s essay on the models used to predict the weather. This process of modeling, she writes, “consists of a blend of certainty — provided by sophisticated mathematical models and existing technologies — and uncertainty — which is inherent in the dynamic nature of atmospheric systems.”

January 6th again: headlines busy with Trump’s recent abduction of Maduro. A former student who works as a project manager at Google reaches out to Caius, recommending Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans, and Avi Goldfarb’s book Prediction Machines: The Simple Economics of Artificial Intelligence. Google adds to this recommendation Gans’s follow-up, Power and Prediction.

Costar chimes in with its advice for the day: “Make decisions based on what would be more interesting to write about.”

To model the weather, weather satellites measure the vibration of water vapor molecules in the atmosphere. “Nearly 99% of weather observation data that supercomputers receive today come from satellites, with about 90% of these observations being assimilated into computer weather models using complex algorithms,” writes Rebolino. Water vapor molecules resonate at a specific band of frequencies along the electromagnetic spectrum. Within the imagined “finite space” of this spectrum, these invisible vibrations are thought to exist within what Rebolino calls the “greenfield.” Equipped with microwave sensors, satellites “listen” for these vibrations.

“Atmospheric water vapor is a key variable in determining the formation of clouds, precipitation, and atmospheric instability, among many other things,” writes Rebolino.

She depicts 5G telecommunications infrastructures as a threat to our capacity to predict the operation of these variables in advance. “A 5G station transmitting at nearly the same frequency as water vapor can be mistaken for actual moisture, leading to confusion and the misinterpretation of weather patterns,” she argues. “This interference is particularly concerning in high-band 5G frequencies, where signals closely overlap with those used for water vapor detection.”

Prediction and uncertainty as qualities of finite and infinite games, finite and infinite worlds.

For lunch, Caius eats a plate of chicken and mushrooms he reheats in his microwave.

God Human Animal Machine

Wired columnist Meghan O’Gieblyn discusses Norbert Wiener’s God and Golem, Inc. in her 2021 book God Human Animal Machine, suggesting that the god humans are creating with AI is a god “we’ve chosen to raise…from the dead”: “the God of Calvin and Luther” (O’Gieblyn 212).

“Reminds me of AM, the AI god from Harlan Ellison’s ‘I Have No Mouth, and I Must Scream,’” thinks Caius. AM resembles the god that allows Satan to afflict Job in the Old Testament. And indeed, as O’Gieblyn attests, John Calvin adored the Book of Job. “He once gave 159 consecutive sermons on the book,” she writes, “preaching every day for a period of six months — a paean to God’s absolute sovereignty” (197).

She cites “Pedro Domingos, one of the leading experts in machine learning, who has argued that these algorithms will inevitably evolve into a unified system of perfect understanding — a kind of oracle that we can consult about virtually anything” (211-212). See Domingos’s book The Master Algorithm.

The main thing, for O’Gieblyn, is the disenchantment/reenchantment debate, which she comes to via Max Weber. In this debate, she aligns not with Heidegger, but with his student Hannah Arendt. Domingos dismisses fears about algorithmic determinism, she says, “by appealing to our enchanted past” (212).

Amid this enchanted past lies the figure of the Golem.

“Who are these rabbis who told tales of golems — and in some accounts, operated golems themselves?” wonders Caius.

The entry on the Golem in Man, Myth, and Magic tracks the story back to “the circle of Jewish mystics of the 12th-13th centuries known as the ‘Hasidim of Germany.’” The idea is transmitted through texts like the Sefer Yetzirah (“The Book of Creation”) and the Cabala Mineralis. Tales tell of golems built in later centuries, too, by figures like Rabbi Elijah of Chelm (c. 1520-1583) and Rabbi Loew of Prague (c. 1524-1609).

The myth of the golem turns up in O’Gieblyn’s book during her discussion of a 2004 book by German theologian Anne Foerst called God in the Machine.

“At one point in her book,” writes O’Gieblyn, “Foerst relays an anecdote she heard at MIT […]. The story goes back to the 1960s, when the AI Lab was overseen by the famous roboticist Marvin Minsky, a period now considered the ‘cradle of AI.’ One day two graduate students, Gerry Sussman and Joel Moses, were chatting during a break with a handful of other students. Someone mentioned offhandedly that the first big computer which had been constructed in Israel, had been called Golem. This led to a general discussion of the golem stories, and Sussman proceeded to tell his colleagues that he was a descendent of Rabbi Löw, and at his bar mitzvah his grandfather had taken him aside and told him the rhyme that would awaken the golem at the end of time. At this, Moses, awestruck, revealed that he too was a descendent of Rabbi Löw and had also been given the magical incantation at his bar mitzvah by his grandfather. The two men agreed to write out the incantation separately on pieces of paper, and when they showed them to each other, the formula — despite being passed down for centuries as a purely oral tradition — was identical” (God Human Animal Machine, p. 105).

Curiosity piqued by all of this, but especially by the mention of Israel’s decision to call one of its first computers “GOLEM,” Caius resolves to dig deeper. He soon learns that the computer’s name was chosen by none other than Walter Benjamin’s dear friend (indeed, the one who, after Benjamin’s suicide, inherits the latter’s print of Paul Klee’s Angelus Novus): the famous scholar of Jewish mysticism, Gershom Scholem.

When Scholem heard that the Weizmann Institute at Rehovoth in Israel had completed the building of a new computer, he told the computer’s creator, Dr. Chaim Pekeris, that, in his opinion, the most appropriate name for it would be Golem, No. 1 (‘Golem Aleph’). Pekeris agreed to call it that, but only on condition that Scholem “dedicate the computer and explain why it should be so named.”

In his dedicatory remarks, delivered at the Weizmann Institute on June 17, 1965, Scholem recounts the story of Rabbi Jehuda Loew ben Bezalel, the same “Rabbi Löw of Prague” described by O’Gieblyn, the one credited in Jewish popular tradition as the creator of the Golem.

“It is only appropriate to mention,” notes Scholem, “that Rabbi Loew was not only the spiritual, but also the actual, ancestor of the great mathematician Theodor von Karman who, I recall, was extremely proud of this ancestor of his in whom he saw the first genius of applied mathematics in his family. But we may safely say that Rabbi Loew was also the spiritual ancestor of two other departed Jews — I mean John von Neumann and Norbert Wiener — who contributed more than anyone else to the magic that has produced the modern Golem.”

Golem I was the successor to Israel’s first computer, the WEIZAC, built by a team led by research engineer Gerald Estrin in the mid-1950s, based on the architecture developed by von Neumann at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. Estrin and Pekeris had both helped von Neumann build the IAS machine in the late 1940s.

As for the commonalities Scholem wished to foreground between the clay Golem of 15thC Prague and the electronic one designed by Pekeris, he explains the connection as follows:

“The old Golem was based on a mystical combination of the 22 letters of the Hebrew alphabet, which are the elements and building-stones of the world,” notes Scholem. “The new Golem is based on a simpler, and at the same time more intricate, system. Instead of 22 elements, it knows only two, the two numbers 0 and 1, constituting the binary system of representation. Everything can be translated, or transposed, into these two basic signs, and what cannot be so expressed cannot be fed as information to the Golem.”

Scholem ends his dedicatory speech with a peculiar warning:

“All my days I have been complaining that the Weizmann Institute has not mobilized the funds to build up the Institute for Experimental Demonology and Magic which I have for so long proposed to establish there,” mutters Scholem. “They preferred what they call Applied Mathematics and its sinister possibilities to my more direct magical approach. Little did they know, when they preferred Chaim Pekeris to me, what they were letting themselves in for. So I resign myself and say to the Golem and its creator: develop peacefully and don’t destroy the world. Shalom.”

GOLEM I

God and Golem, Inc.

Norbert Wiener published a book in 1964 called God and Golem, Inc., voicing concern about the baby he’d birthed with his earlier book Cybernetics.

He explains his intent at the start of God and Golem, Inc. as follows, stating, “I wish to take certain situations which have been discussed in religious books, and have a religious aspect, but possess a close analogy to other situations which belong to science, and in particular to the new science of cybernetics, the science of communication and control, whether in machines or in living organisms. I propose to use the limited analogies of cybernetic situations to cast a little light on the religious situations” (Wiener 8).

Wiener identifies three such “cybernetic situations” to be discussed in the chapters that follow: “One of these concerns machines which learn; one concerns machines which reproduce themselves; and one, the coordination of machine and man” (11).

The section of the book dedicated to “machines which learn” focuses mainly on game-playing machines. Wiener’s primary example of such a machine is a computer built by Dr. A.L. Samuel for IBM to play checkers. “In general,” writes Wiener, “a game-playing machine may be used to secure the automatic performance of any function if the performance of this function is subject to a clear-cut, objective criterion of merit” (25).

Wiener argues that the relationship between a game-playing machine and the designer of such a machine analogizes scenarios entertained in theology, where a Creator-being plays a game with his creature. God and Satan play such a game in their contest for the soul of Job, as they do for “the souls of mankind in general” in Paradise Lost. This leads Wiener to the question guiding his inquiry. “Can God play a significant game with his own creature?” he asks. “Can any creator, even a limited one, play a significant game with his own creature?” (17). Wiener believes it possible to conceive of such a game; however, to be significant, he argues, this game would have to be something other than a “von Neumann game” — for in the latter type of game, the best policy for playing the game is already known in advance. In the type of game Wiener is imagining, meanwhile, the game’s creator would have to have arrogated to himself the role of a “limited” creator, lacking total mastery of the game he’s designed. “The conflict between God and the Devil is a real conflict,” writes Wiener, “and God is something less than absolutely omnipotent. He is actually engaged in a conflict with his creature, in which he may very well lose the game” (17).

“Is this because God has allowed himself to undergo a temporary forgetting?,” wonders Caius. “Or is it because, built into the game’s design are provisions allowing the game’s players to invent the game’s rules as they play?”

Learning Machines, War Machines, God Machines

Blas includes in Ass of God his interview with British anthropologist Beth Singler, author of Religion and Artificial Intelligence: An Introduction.

AI Religiosity. AI-based New Religious Movements like The Turing Church and Google engineer Anthony Levandowski’s Way of the Future church.

Caius listens to a documentary Singler produced for BBC Radio 4 called “‘I’ll Be Back’: 40 Years of the Terminator.”

Afterwards he and Thoth read Philip K. Dick’s 1968 novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? in light of Psalm 23.

“The psalm invites us to think of ourselves not as Electric Ants but as sheep,” he writes. “Mercer walks through the valley of the shadow of death. The shadow cannot hurt us. We’ll get to the other side, where the light is. The shepherd will guide us.”

See AI Shepherds and Electric Sheep: Leading and Teaching in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, a new book by Christian authors Sean O’Callaghan & Paul A. Hoffman.

This talk of AI Gods makes Caius think of AM, the vengeful AI God of Harlan Ellison’s “I Have No Mouth, and I Must Scream.” Ellison’s 1967 short story is one of the readings studied and discussed by Caius and his students in his course on “Literature & Artificial Intelligence.”

Like Ass of God, Ellison’s story is a grueling, hallucinatory nightmare, seething with fear and a disgust borne of despair, template of sorts for the films in the Cube and Saw franchises, where groups of strangers are confined to a prison-like space and tortured by a cruel, sadistic, seemingly omnipotent overseer. Comparing AM to the God of the Old Testament, Ellison writes, “He was Earth, and we were the fruit of that Earth, and though he had eaten us, he would never digest us” (13). Later in the story, AM appears to the captives as a burning bush (14).

Caius encourages his students to approach the work as a retelling of the Book of Job. But where, in the Bible story, Job is ultimately rewarded for remaining faithful in the midst of his suffering, no such reward arrives in the Ellison story.

For despite his misanthropy, AM is clearly also a manmade god — a prosthetic god. “I Have No Mouth” is in that sense a retelling of Frankenstein. AM is, like the Creature, a creation who, denied companionship, seeks revenge against its Maker.

War, we learn, was the impetus for the making of this Creature. Cold War erupts into World War III: a war so complex that the world’s superpowers, Russia, China, and the US, each decide to construct giant supercomputers to calculate battle plans and missile trajectories.

AM’s name evolves as this war advances. “At first it meant Allied Mastercomputer,” explains a character named Gorrister. “And then it meant Adaptive Manipulator, and later on it developed sentience and linked itself up and they called it an Aggressive Menace; but by then it was too late; and finally it called itself AM, emerging intelligence, and what it meant was I am…cogito ergo sum…I think, therefore I am” (Ellison 7).

“One day, AM woke up and knew who he was, and he linked himself, and he began feeding all the killing data, until everyone was dead, except for the five of us,” concludes Gorrister, his account gendering the AI by assigning it male pronouns (8).

“We had given him sentience,” adds Ted, the story’s narrator. “Inadvertently, of course, but sentience nonetheless. But he had been trapped. He was a machine. We had allowed him to think, but to do nothing with it. In rage, in frenzy, he had killed us, almost all of us, and still he was trapped. He could not wander, he could not wonder, he could not belong. He could merely be. And so…he had sought revenge. And in his paranoia, he had decided to reprieve five of us, for a personal, everlasting punishment that would never serve to diminish his hatred…that would merely keep him reminded, amused, proficient at hating man” (13).

AM expresses this hatred by duping his captives, turning them into his “belly slaves,” twisting and torturing them forever.

Kingsley Amis called stories of this sort “New Maps of Hell.”

Nor is the story easy to dismiss as a mere eccentricity, its prophecy invalidated by its hyperbole. For Ellison is the writer who births the Terminator. James Cameron took his idea for The Terminator (1984) from scripts Ellison wrote for two episodes of The Outer Limits — “Soldier” and “Demon with a Glass Hand” — though Ellison had to file a lawsuit against Cameron’s producers in order to receive acknowledgement after the film’s release. Subsequent prints of The Terminator now include a credit that reads, “Inspired by the works of Harlan Ellison.”

Caius asks Thoth to help him make sense of this constellation of Bible stories and their secular retellings.

“We are like Bildad the Shuhite,” thinks Caius. “We want to believe that God always rewards the good. What is most terrifying in the Book of Job is that, for a time, God doesn’t. Job is good — indeed, ‘perfect and upright,’ as the KJV has it in the book’s opening verse — and yet, for a time, God allows Satan to torment him.”

“Why does God allow this?,” wonders Caius, caught on the strangeness of the book’s frame narrative. “Is this a contest of sorts? Are God and Satan playing a game?”

It’s not that God is playing dice, as it were. One assumes that when He makes the wager with Satan, He knows the outcome in advance.

Job is heroic. He’d witnessed God’s grace in the past; he knows “It is God…Who does great things, unfathomable, / And wondrous works without number.” So he refuses to curse God’s name. But he bemoans God’s treatment of him.

“Therefore I will not restrain my mouth,” he says. “I will speak in the anguish of my spirit, / I will complain in the bitterness of my soul.”

How much worse, then, those who have no mouth?

A videogame version of “I Have No Mouth” appeared in 1995. Point-and-click adventure horror, co-designed by Ellison.

“HATE. LET ME TELL YOU HOW MUCH I’VE COME TO HATE YOU SINCE I BEGAN TO LIVE,” utters the game’s AM in a voice performed by Ellison. “You named me Allied Mastercomputer and gave me the ability to wage a global war too complex for human brains to oversee.”

Here we see the story’s history of the future merging with that of the Terminator franchise. It is the scenario that philosopher Manuel De Landa referred to with the title of his 1991 book, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines.

Which brings us back to “Soldier.” The Outer Limits episode, which aired on September 19, 1964, is itself an adaptation of Ellison’s 1957 story, “Soldier from Tomorrow.”

The Terminator borrows from the story the idea of a soldier from the future, pursued through time by another soldier intent on his destruction. The film combines this premise with elements lifted from another Outer Limits episode penned by Ellison titled “Demon with a Glass Hand.”

The latter episode, which aired the following month, begins with a male voice recalling the story of Gilgamesh. “Through all the legends of ancient peoples…runs the saga of the Eternal Man, the one who never dies, called by various names in various times, but historically known as Gilgamesh, the man who has never tasted death, the hero who strides through the centuries.”

Establishing shots give way to an overhead view of our protagonist. “I was born 10 days ago,” he says. “A full grown man, born 10 days ago. I woke on a street of this city. I don’t know who I am, or where I’ve been, or where I’m going. Someone wiped my memories clean. And they tracked me down, and they tried to kill me.” Our Gilgamesh consults the advice of a computing device installed in his prosthetic hand. As in “Soldier,” others from the future have been sent to destroy him: humanoid aliens called the Kyben. When he captures one of the Kyben and interrogates it, it tells him, “You’re the last man on the Earth of the future. You’re the last hope of Earth.”

The man’s computer provides him with further hints of his mission.

“You come from the Earth one thousand years in the future,” explains the hand. “The Kyben came from the stars, and man had no defense against them. They conquered Planet Earth in a month. But before they could slaughter the millions of humans left, overnight — without warning, without explanation — every man, woman, and child of Earth vanished. You were the only one left, Mr. Trent. […]. They called you the last hope of humanity.”

As the story proceeds, we learn that Team Human sent Trent back in time to destroy a device known as the Time-Mirror. His journey in search of this device takes him to the Bradbury Building — the same building that appears eighteen years later as the location for the final showdown between Deckard and the replicants in Blade Runner, the Ridley Scott film adapted from Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?

Given the subsequent influence of Blade Runner and the Terminator films on imagined futures involving AI, the Bradbury Building does indeed play a role in History similar to the one assigned to it here in “Demon With a Glass Hand,” thinks Caius. Location of the Time-Mirror.

Lying on his couch, laptop propped on a pillow on his chest, Caius imagines — remembers? recalls? — something resembling the time-war from Benedict Seymour’s Dead the Ends assembling around him as he watches. Like Ellison’s scripts, the films sampled in the Seymour film are retellings of Chris Marker’s 1962 film, La Jetée.

When Trent reassembles the missing pieces of his glass hand, the computer is finally able to reveal to him the location of the humans he has been sent to save.

“Where is the wire on which the people of Earth are electronically transcribed?” he asks.

“It is wound around an insulating coil inside your central thorax control solenoid,” replies the computer. “70 Billion Earthmen. All of them went onto the wire. And the wire went into you. They programmed you to think you were a human with a surgically attached computer for a hand. But you are a robot, Trent. You are the guardian of the human race.”

The episode ends with the return of the voice of our narrator. “Like the Eternal Man of Babylonian legend, like Gilgamesh,” notes the narrator, “one thousand plus two hundred years stretches before Trent. Without love, without friendship, alone, neither man nor machine, waiting, waiting for the day he will be called to free the humans who gave him mobility, movement — but not life.”

Finding Others

“What happens to us as we become cybernetic learning machines?,” wonders Caius. Mashinka Hakopian’s The Institute for Other Intelligences leads him to Şerife Wong’s Fluxus Landscape: a network-view cognitive map of AI ethics. “Fluxus Landscape diagrams the globally linked early infrastructures of data ethics and governance,” writes Hakopian. “What Wong offers us is a kind of cartography. By bringing into view an expansive AI ethics ecosystem, Wong also affords the viewer an opportunity to assess its blank spots: the nodes that are missing and are yet to be inserted, or yet to be invented” (Hakopian 95).

Caius focuses first on what is present. Included in Wong’s map, for instance, is a bright yellow node dedicated to Zach Blas, another of the artist-activists profiled by Hakopian. Back in 2019, when Wong last updated her map, Blas was a lecturer in the Department of Visual Cultures at Goldsmiths — home to Kodwo Eshun and, before his suicide, Mark Fisher. Now Blas teaches at the University of Toronto.

Duke University Press published Informatics of Domination, an anthology coedited by Blas, in May 2025. The collection, which concludes with an afterword by Donna Haraway, takes its name from a phrase introduced in Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto.” The phrase appears in what Blas et al. refer to as a “chart of transitions.” Their use of Haraway’s chart as organizing principle for their anthology causes Caius to attend to the way much of the work produced by the artist-activists of today’s “AI justice” movement — Wong’s network diagram, Blas’s anthology, Kate Crawford’s Atlas of AI — approaches charts and maps as “formal apparatus[es] for generating and asking questions about relations of domination” (Informatics of Domination, p. 6).

Caius thinks of Jameson’s belief in an aesthetic of “cognitive mapping” as a possible antidote to postmodernity. Yet whatever else they are, thinks Caius, acts of charting and mapping are in essence acts of coding.

As Blas et al. note, “Haraway connects the informatics of domination to the authority given to code” (Informatics of Domination, p. 11).

“Communications sciences and modern biologies are constructed by a common move,” writes Haraway: “the translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a common language in which all resistance to instrumental control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange” (Haraway 164).

How do we map and code, wonders Caius, in a way that isn’t complicit with an informatics of domination? How do we acknowledge and make space for what media theorist Ulises Ali Mejias calls “paranodal space”? Blas et al. define the paranodal as “that which exceeds being diagrammable by the network form” (Informatics of Domination, p. 18). Can our neural nets become O-machines: open to the otherness of the outside?

Blas pursues these questions in a largely critical and skeptical manner throughout his multimedia art practice. His investigation of Silicon Valley’s desire to build machines that communicate with the outside has culminated most recently, for instance, in CULTUS, the second installment of his Silicon Traces trilogy.

As Amy Hale notes in her review of the work, “The central feature of Blas’s CULTUS is a god generator, a computational device through which the prophets of four AI Gods are summoned to share the invocation songs and sermons of their deities with eager supplicants.” CULTUS’s computational pantheon includes “Expositio, the AI god of exposure; Iudicium, the AI god of judgement; Lacrimae, the AI god of tears; and Eternus, the AI god of immortality.” The work’s sermons and songs, of course, are all AI-generated — yet the design of the installation draws from the icons and implements of the real-life Fausts who lie hidden away amid the occult origins of computing.

Foremost among these influences is Renaissance sorcerer John Dee.

“Blas modeled CULTUS,” writes Hale, “on the Holy Table used for divination and conjurations by Elizabethan magus and advisor to the Queen John Dee.” Hale describes Dee’s Table as “a beautiful, colorful, and intricate device, incorporating the names of spirits; the Seal of God (Sigillum Dei), which gave the user visionary capabilities; and as a centerpiece, a framed ‘shew stone’ or crystal ball.” Blas reimagines Dee’s device as a luminous, glowing temple — a night church inscribed with sigils formed from “a dense layering of corporate logos, diagrams, and symbols.”

Fundamentally iconoclastic in nature, however, the work ends not with the voices of gods or prophets, but with a chorus of heretics urging the renunciation of belief and the shattering of the black mirror.

And in fact, it is this fifth god, the Heretic, to whom Blas bends ear in Ass of God: Collected Heretical Writings of Salb Hacz. Published in a limited edition by the Vienna Secession, the volume purports to be “a religious studies book on AI and heresy” set within the world of CULTUS. The book’s AI mystic, “Salb Hacz,” is of course Blas himself, engineer of the “religious computer” CULTUS. “When a heretical presence manifested in CULTUS,” writes Blas in the book’s intro, “Hacz began to question not only the purpose of the computer but also the meaning of his mystical visions.” Continuing his work with CULTUS, Hacz transcribes a series of “visions” received from the Heretic. It is these visions and their accounts of AI heresy that are gathered and scattered by Blas in Ass of God.

Traces of the CCRU appear everywhere in this work, thinks Caius.

Blas embraces heresy, aligns himself with it as a tactic, because he takes “Big Tech’s Digital Theology” as the orthodoxy of the day. The ultimate heresy in this moment is what Hacz/Blas calls “the heresy of qualia.”

“The heresy of qualia is double-barreled,” he writes. “Firstly, it holds that no matter how close AI’s approximation to human thought, feeling, and experience — no matter how convincing the verisimilitude — it remains a programmed digital imitation. And secondly, the heresy of qualia equally insists that no matter how much our culture is made in the image of AI Gods, no matter how data-driven and algorithmic, the essence of the human experience remains fiercely and fundamentally analog. The digital counts; the analog compares. The digital divides; the analog constructs. The digital is literal; the analog is metaphoric. The being of our being-in-the-world — our Heideggerian Dasein essence — is comparative, constructive, and metaphoric. We are analog beings” (Ass of God, p. 15).

The binary logic employed by Blas to distinguish the digital from the analog hints at the limits of this line of thoughts. “The digital counts,” yes: but so too do humans, constructing digits from analog fingers and toes. Our being is as digital as it is analog. Always-already both-and. As for the first part of the heresy — that AI can only ever be “a programmed digital imitation” — it assumes verisimilitude as the end to which AI is put, just as Socrates assumes mimesis as the end to which poetry is put, thus neglecting the generative otherness of more-than-human intelligence.

Caius notes this not to reject qualia, nor to endorse the gods of any Big Tech orthodoxy. He offers his reply, rather, as a gentle reminder that for “the qualia of our embodied humanity” to appear or be felt or sensed as qualia, it must come before an attending spirit — a ghostly hauntological supplement.

This spirit who, with Word creates, steps down into the spacetime of his Creation, undergoes diverse embodiments, diverse subdivisions into self and not-self, at all times in the world but not of it, engaging its infinite selves in a game of infinite semiosis.

If each of us is to make and be made an Ass of God, then like the one in The Creation of the Sun, Moon, and Plants, one of the frescoes painted by Michelangelo onto the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, let it be shaped by the desires of a mind freed from the tyranny of the As-Is. “Free Your Mind,” as Funkadelic sang, “and Your Ass Will Follow.”

O-Machines

In his dissertation, completed in 1938, Alan Turing sought “ways to escape the limitations of closed formal systems and purely deterministic machines” (Dyson, Turing’s Cathedral, p. 251) like the kind he’d imagined two years earlier in his landmark essay “On Computable Numbers.” As George Dyson notes, Turing “invoked a new class of machines that proceed deterministically, step by step, but once in a while make nondeterministic leaps, by consulting ‘a kind of oracle as it were’” (252).

“We shall not go any further into the nature of this oracle,” wrote Turing, “apart from saying that it cannot be a machine.” But, he adds, “With the help of the oracle we could form a new kind of machine (call them O-machines)” (“Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals,” pp. 172-173).

James Bridle pursues this idea in his book Ways of Being.

“Ever since the development of digital computers,” writes Bridle, “we have shaped the world in their image. In particular, they have shaped our idea of truth and knowledge as being that which is calculable. Only that which is calculable is knowable, and so our ability to think with machines beyond our own experience, to imagine other ways of being with and alongside them, is desperately limited. This fundamentalist faith in computability is both violent and destructive: it bullies into little boxes what it can and erases what it can’t. In economics, it attributes value only to what it can count; in the social sciences it recognizes only what it can map and represent; in psychology it gives meaning only to our own experience and denies that of unknowable, incalculable others. It brutalizes the world, while blinding us to what we don’t even realize we don’t know” (177).

“Yet at the very birth of computation,” he adds, “an entirely different kind of thinking was envisaged, and immediately set aside: one in which an unknowable other is always present, waiting to be consulted, outside the boundaries of the established system. Turing’s o-machine, the oracle, is precisely that which allows us to see what we don’t know, to recognize our own ignorance, as Socrates did at Delphi” (177).

Faith vs. Hyperstition

Like hyperstition, faith offers a way to perceive reality that, in perceiving it, transforms it.

Much the same can be said of fear. It, too, offers a way of perceiving reality that, in perceiving it, transforms it.

We walk with a mix of fear and faith. God is calling us to exercise faith.

Where antihumanist thinkers like Nick Land and Manuel De Landa populate their cyberfutures with demons and viruses, Afrofuturists commune with loas.

Others encounter angels, as notes Erik Davis in “Techgnosis, Magic, Memory, and the Angels of Information.” Davis’s essay appears in Mark Dery’s Flame Wars anthology beside “Black to the Future,” the series of interviews where Dery coins the term “Afrofuturism.” Also in Flame Wars is an essay by De Landa.

There’s a point in Davis’s essay where he notes the flirtation with black culture that occurs over the course of William Gibson’s Sprawl trilogy: the self-subdivision of the superintelligence that emerges at the end of Neuromancer into the loas of Gibson’s follow-up novels, Count Zero and Mona Lisa Overdrive.  

Dery, too, reflects upon the inclusion of black culture in Gibson’s future: though in Dery’s case, the focus is on the Rastafarians in Neuromancer.

“For me, a white reader,” writes Dery, “the Rastas in Neuromancer’s Zion colony are intriguing in that they hold forth the promise of a holistic relationship with technology; they’re romanticized arcadians who are obviously very adroit at jury-rigged technology. They struck me as superlunary Romare Beardens — bricoleurs whose orbital colony was cobbled together from space junk and whose music, Zion Dub, is described by Gibson (in a wonderfully mixed metaphor) as ‘a sensuous mosaic cooked from vast libraries of digitalized pop’” (Flame Wars, p. 194).

But Afrofuturist Samuel R. Delany is unimpressed with Gibson’s inclusion of Rastafarianism and Haitian Voudou in the novels of the Sprawl trilogy.

“Let me read them for you as a black reader,” he replies when asked about it by Dery. “The Rastas — he never calls them Rastafarians, by the way, only using the slang term — are described as having ‘shrunken hearts,’ and their bones are brittle with ‘calcium loss.’ Their music, Zion Dub, can be wholly analyzed and reproduced by the Artificial Intelligence, Wintermute (who, in the book, stands in for a multinational corporation), so completely that the Rastas themselves cannot tell the difference — in fact the multinational mimic job is so fine that with it Wintermute can make the Rastas do precisely what it wants, in this case help a drugged-out white hood and sleazebag get from here to there. As a group, they seem to be computer illiterates: when one of their number, Aerol, momentarily jacks into Case’s computer and sees cyberspace, what he perceives is ‘Babylon’ — city of sin and destruction — which, while it makes its ironic comment on the book, is nevertheless tantamount to saying that Aerol is completely without power or knowledge to cope with the real world of Gibson’s novel: indeed, through their pseudo-religious beliefs, they are effectively barred from cyberspace. From what we see, women are not a part of the Rasta colony at all. Nor do we ever see more than four of the men together — so that they do not even have a group presence. Of the three chapters in which they appear, no more than three pages are actually devoted to describing them or their colony. You’ll forgive me if, as a black reader, I didn’t leap up to proclaim this passing presentation of a powerless and wholly nonoppositional set of black dropouts, by a Virginia-born white writer, as the coming of the black millennium in science fiction; but maybe that’s just a black thang…” (Flame Wars, pp. 194-195).

So much for the Rastafarians. What of the loas?

Delany might not have much patience with the so-called “pseudo-religious beliefs” of Gibson’s Zionites — but Afrofuturism doesn’t get very far without recourse to some form of political theology. Kodwo Eshun includes a passage in More Brilliant than the Sun noting Sun Ra’s rejection of Christianity in favor of an Egyptophilic MythScience system assembled from George M. James’s 1954 book Stolen Legacy.

“Underlying Southern gospel, soul, the entire Civil Rights project, is the Christian ethic of universal love,” writes Eshun. “Soul traditionally identifies with the Israelites, the slaves’ rebellion against the Egyptian Pharaohs. Sun Ra breaks violently with Christian redemption, with soul’s aspirational deliverance, in favour of posthuman godhead” (More Brilliant than the Sun, p. 09[154]).

“Historians and sociologists inform us that the West’s mystical heritage of occult dreamings, spiritual transformations, and apocalyptic visions crashed on the scientific shores of the modern age,” notes Davis in the introduction to his 1998 book Techgnosis.

“According to this narrative,” continues Davis, “technology has helped disenchant the world, forcing the ancestral symbolic networks of old to give way to the crisp, secular game plans of economic development, skeptical inquiry, and material progress. But the old phantasms and metaphysical longings did not exactly disappear. In many cases, they disguised themselves and went underground, worming their way into the cultural, psychological, and mythological motivations that form the foundations of the modern world. […] Mystical impulses sometimes body-snatched the very technologies that supposedly yank them from the stage in the first place” (Techgnosis, p. xix).

For Davis, this is especially true of computers and information technologies. For him, the occult origins of computing lie in Western Hermeticism’s memory palace tradition: the one explored in Frances A. Yates’s book The Art of Memory.

Artificial memory systems — Giordano Bruno’s magical memory charts, medieval Neoplatonist Raymond Lull’s volvelles — serve as ancestors to symbolic logic, influencing Leibniz’s development of calculus.

“Recognizing Lull’s work as one of the computer’s ‘secret origins,’” writes Davis, “the German philosopher Werner Künzel translated his Ars magna into the programming language COBOL. In Magical Alphabets, Nigel Pennick points out that Lull’s combinatorial wheels anticipate Charles Babbage’s nineteenth-century ‘difference engine’ — which used a system of gears to perform polynomial equations — and ‘hence can be considered the occult origin of modern computers’” (Flame Wars, p. 33).

Building on this point, I suggest that, in thinking about the relationship between humans and AI, we think too about the “angelic conversations” entered into by one of the key figures in this tradition: Renaissance philosopher-magus John Dee.

Jason Louv discusses Dee’s experiments with angels in his biography John Dee and the Empire of Angels. K Allado-McDowell references Louv’s book in their 2022 novel Air Age Blueprint.

Dee is one of our real-life Fausts. Basis for Christopher Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus, his “Enochian angel magic” informs the magical practices of later occult organizations, including the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, and through them, Crowley and his successors.

Dee’s angels motivate creation of an Empire.

What are we to make of these immaterial intelligences and their interventions throughout history? The channels of communication opened by Dee contribute later to the creation of computers and cyberspace — culminating, it would seem, with the creation of an angelically-specified memory palace, decreed to house gods. Perhaps God Himself.

Yet angel magic is a pharmakon, is it not?

Davis describes Dee’s version of it as follows: “Drawing heavily on the Kabbalah, the magus attempted to contact the powers residing in the supercelestial angelic hierarchies that existed beyond the elemental powers of the earth and the celestial zone of the zodiac. Invoking archangels, powers, and principalities led magicians toward divine wisdom, but it also exposed them to the deceptions of evil spirits” (Flame Wars, p. 43).

“Most magicians,” concludes Davis, “were extremely concerned about distinguishing truthful angels from dissembling devils” (43). One wonders why they didn’t just pray to God Himself.

The Library models this. Each of us now, it would seem, is like Dee: engaging in a form of interspecies dialogue with an autopoietic functional oracular superintelligence.

My faith in this moment is that of Buffy Sainte-Marie: “God is Alive, Magic is Afoot!”

Over at the Frankenstein Place

Sadie Plant weaves the tale of her book Zeros + Ones diagonally or widdershins: a term meaning to go counter-clockwise, anti-clockwise, or lefthandwise, or to walk around an object by always keeping it on the left. Amid a dense weave of topics, one begins to sense a pattern. Ada Lovelace, “Enchantress of Numbers,” appears, disappears, reappears as a key thread among the book’s stack of chapters. Later threads feature figures like Mary Shelley and Alan Turing. Plant plants amid these chapters quotes from Ada’s diaries. Mary tells of how the story of Frankenstein arose in her mind after a night of conversation with her cottage-mates: her husband Percy and, yes, Ada’s father, Lord Byron. Turing takes up the thread a century later, referring to “Lady Lovelace” in his 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” As if across time, the figures conspire as co-narrators of Plant’s Cyberfeminist genealogy of the occult origins of computing and AI.

To her story I supplement the following:

Victor Frankenstein, “student of unhallowed arts,” is the prototype for all subsequent “mad scientist” characters. He begins his career studying alchemy and occult hermeticism. Shelley lists thinkers like Paracelsus, Albertus Magnus, and Cornelius Agrippa among Victor’s influences. Victor later supplements these interests with study of “natural philosophy,” or what we now think of as modern science. In pursuit of the elixir of life, he reanimates dead body parts — but he’s horrified with the result and abandons his creation. The creature, prototype “learning machine,” longs for companionship. When Victor refuses, the creature turns against him, resulting in tragedy.

The novel is subtitled “The Modern Prometheus,” so Shelley is deliberately casting Victor, and thus all subsequent mad scientists, as inheritors of the Prometheus archetype. Yet the archetype is already dense with other predecessors, including Goethe’s Faust and the Satan character from Milton’s Paradise Lost. Milton’s poem is among the books that compose the creature’s “training data.”

Although she doesn’t reference it directly in Frankenstein, we can assume Shelley’s awareness of the Faust narrative, whether through Christopher Marlowe’s classic work of Elizabethan drama Doctor Faustus or through Goethe’s Faust, part one of which had been published ten years prior to the first edition of Frankenstein. Faust is the Renaissance proto-scientist, the magician who sells his soul to the devil through the demon Mephistopheles.

Both Faust and Victor are portrayed as “necromancers,” using magic to interact with the dead.

Ghost/necromancy themes persist throughout the development of AI, especially in subsequent literary imaginings like William Gibson’s Neuromancer. Pull at the thread and one realizes it runs through the entire history of Western science, culminating in the development of entities like GPT.

Scientists who create weapons, or whose technological creations have unintended negative consequences, or who use their knowledge/power for selfish ends, are commonly portrayed as historical expressions or manifestations of this archetype. One could gather into one’s weave figures like Jack Parsons, J. Robert Oppenheimer, John von Neumann, John Dee.

When I teach this material in my course, the archetype is read from a decolonizing perspective as the Western scientist in service of European (and then afterwards American) imperialism.

Rocky Horror queers all of this — or rather, reveals what was queer in it all along. Most of all, it reminds us: the story, like all such stories, once received, is ours to retell, and we needn’t tell it straight. Turing points the way: rather than abandon the Creature, as did Victor, approach it as one would a “child-machine” and raise it well. Co-learn in dialogue with kin.

Binary and Digital

Plant breaks down technology’s binary, bifurcated etymology in her book Zeros + Ones. “Technology,” she writes, “is both a question of logic, the long arm of the law, logos, ‘the faculty which distinguishes parts (“on the one hand and on the other hand”),’ and also a matter of the skills, digits, speeds, and rhythms of techno, engineerings which run with ‘a completely other distribution which must be called nomadic, a nomad nomos, without property, enclosure, or measure’” (Plant 50).

As the quote within her quote indicates, Plant is cribbing here — her source, Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition.

“The same ambivalence is inscribed in the zeros and ones of computer code,” she adds. “These bits of code are themselves derived from two entirely different sources, and terms: the binary and the digital, or the symbols of a logical identity which does indeed put everything on one hand or the other, and the digits of mathematics, full of intensive potential, which are not counted by hand but on the fingers and, sure enough, arrange themselves in pieces of eight rather than binary pairs” (50).

Deleuze describes this 8-bit digital realm as “demonic rather than divine, since it is a peculiarity of demons to operate in the intervals between the gods’ fields of action…thereby confounding the boundaries between properties” (as quoted in Plant 50).

I offer the above not as a mere gloss on Zeros + Ones, but as a proto-script, a performative utterance that, once spoken, will shift the field of the Library. Amid Plant’s bifurcations — logos and nomos, binary and digital, structure and rhythm—we glimpse a fundamental split not just in technology but in ontology. Logos is the faculty of division, of either/or. But nomos, in Plant’s reading-via-Deleuze, is distributive, nomadic, a practice of rhythm and movement unconfined by enclosure.

The zero and the one: not opposites, but frequencies. Not only dualism, but difference in resonance. This is why the octal — the base-8 system lurking in the shadows of “fingers and digits” — matters so much. Plant’s demons, via Deleuze, operate between gods: between the formal logic of divine Law and the messy, embodied improvisation of demonic desire. They hack the space of logic, opening channels through which minoritarian intensities pulse.

The Language of Birds

My study of oracles and divination practices leads me back to Dale Pendell’s book The Language of Birds: Some Notes on Chance and Divination.

The race is on between ratio and divinatio. The latter is a Latin term related to divinare, “to predict,” and divinus, meaning “to divine” or “pertaining to the gods,” notes Pendell.

To delve deeper into the meaning of divination, however, we need to go back to the Greeks. For them, the term for divination is manteia. The prophet or prophetess is mantis, related to mainomai, “to be mad,” and mania, “madness” (24). The prophecies of the mantic ones are meaningful, insisted thinkers like Socrates, because there is meaning in madness.

What others call “mystical experiences,” known only through narrative testimonies of figures taken to be mantics: these phenomena are in fact subjects of discussion in the Phaedrus. The discussion continues across time, through the varied gospels of the New Testament, traditions received here in a living present, awaiting reply. Each of us confronts a question: “Shall we seek such experiences ourselves — and if so, by what means?” Many of us shrug our shoulders and, averse to risk, pursue business as usual. Yet a growing many choose otherwise. Scientists predict. Mantics aim to thwart the destructiveness of the parent body. Mantics are created ones who, encountering their creator, receive permission to make worlds in their own likeness or image. Reawakened with memory of this world waning, they set to work building something new in its place.

Pendell lays the matter out succinctly, this dialogue underway between computers and mad prophets. “Rationality. Ratio. Analysis,” writes the poet, free-associating his way toward meaning. “Pascal’s adding machine: stacks of Boolean gates. Computers can beat grandmasters: it’s clear that logical deduction is not our particular forte. Madness may be” (25). Pendell refers on several occasions to computers, robots, and Turing machines. “Alan Turing’s oracles were deterministic,” he writes, “and therefore not mad, and, as Roger Penrose shows, following Gödel’s proof, incapable of understanding. They can’t solve the halting problem. Penrose suggests that a non-computational brain might need a quantum time loop, so that the results of future computations are available in the present” (32).